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ABSTRACT 
The executive ownership and the CEO over-confidence can affect the issue of firm 
policies. The thesis examines the influence of the executive ownership on the firm 
accounting strategy and the dividend payout policy in China. The thesis also examines 
the influence of the CEO over-confidence on the cash policy and the cash adjustment 
speed in the U.S. Firstly, I investigate the relationship between the executive ownership 
and accounting conservatism in China. The results show that accounting conservatism 
has a U shape relationship with the executive ownership. It is different from the U.S. 
studies because of the unique corporate governance features in China. I further find that 
any deviations from the optimal executive ownership can increase accounting 
conservatism level in the firms. Secondly, I examine the relationship between the 
executive ownership and the dividend tunnelling behaviour in China. The results show 
that the increase of the executive ownership can increase the dividend tunnelling 
behaviour and help with the move from the traditional tunnelling method toward the 
more conceived tunnelling method of paying abnormal dividends to the controlling 
shareholders. Thirdly, I investigate the relationship between the CEO over-confidence 
and the cash adjustment speed to make the cash reverse to the target cash level. The 
results show that the over-confident CEOs have the intentions to store more cash. 
Therefore, they reduce the cash adjustment speed when there is excess cash in the firm. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The thesis focuses on executive ownership and CEO over-confidence and their 
relationships with corporate policies including firms’ accounting strategy, dividend 
payout policy and cash strategy. The arrangement of the following chapters is as 
follows. I first introduce the literature of executive ownership and CEO over-confidence. 
Second, I summarise the introductions of the three chapters, which are Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Chapter 2 discusses the influence of executive ownership on 
firms’ accounting conservatism strategy in the Chinese market. Chapter 3 examines the 
influence of the executive’s ownership on dividend tunnelling behaviour in the Chinese 
market. Chapter 4 examines the influence of CEO over-confidence on the corporate 
cash strategy, including cash adjustment speed in the US market. 
 
I introduce the literature about the two aspects related to the top managers, which are 
executive ownership and CEO over-confidence. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I introduce the literature about executive ownership. There 
are two theories explaining why executive ownership is important in firms by Morck et 
al. (1988). They are the incentive alignment theory1 (effect) and the entrenchment 
theory2 (effect). The incentive alignment effect argues that agency problems arise from 
                                                             
1 Morck et al. (1988) and Shuto and Takada (2010) suggest that incentive alignment theory applies and dominates 
when managerial ownership is below a certain threshold. It is because the seperation of the ownership and the 
management of the executives are large when the executives do not have enough shares, which indicates that the 
executives’ interests are not aligned with those of shareholders’ (Morck et al., 1988). 
2 About entrenchment theory: Morck et al. (1988) suggest a significant nonlinear cubic relationship between the 
managerial ownership and the firm value. The reason of the nonlinearity is that the agency cost is raised up when the 
2 
 
the separation of the ownership and the management power of the executives (Lafond 
and Roychowdhury, 2008; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and 
Takada, 2010). And therefore, the agency cost can be increased if the separation of the 
ownership and the management power of the executives is big. The reasons are in the 
following sentences. Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) suggest that the limited horizon 
and limited liability encourage the executives to overstate the current earnings. The 
executives’ payments and bonuses are based on the overstated firm performance, which 
leads to the agency cost (Shuto and Takada, 2010). When the executive ownership level 
is lower than a threshold, the increase of executive ownership is regarded as a method to 
reduce the agency problems because it ensures the interests alignment of the executives 
and the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is because Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) suggest that the managers with higher ownership have longer horizons in their 
sample of US firms. A longer horizon of the executive position indicates that the 
overpaid compensations and the bonuses paid to the executives based on the distorted 
firm performance can be offset by the future decline of the overstated earnings (Lafond 
and Roychowdhury, 2008). Many papers that support that the agency problems between 
the executives and the shareholders can be partly resolved by increasing the executives’ 
ownership of the firms as incentives when the executive ownershipo is low (Claessens 
and Djankov, 1999; Core and Larcker, 2002; Denis et al., 1997; Holderness et al., 1999; 
Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994; McConnell and Servaes, 1990, 1995; McConnell et al., 
2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010; Zhou, 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
managerial ownership is higher than a threshold and distorts the original positive relationship between the managerial 
ownership and the firm value. In order to explain the phenomenon, Morck et al. (1988) introduce the entrenchment 
effect (theory). McConnell and Servaes (1990), Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) and McConnell et al. (2008) also 
point out that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the performance and managerial ownership, they also 
use the entrenchment effect to explain why there is turning point in the relationship between firm value and 
managerial ownership. The entrenchment theory also explains why the firm value can drop when the managerial 
ownership is above threshold. 
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However, the relationship between the executive ownership and the agency cost is not 
conclusive. If executive ownership is higher than a threshold, further increase in 
executive ownership can increase executives’ discretionary power and risk of potential 
misconduct (Stulz, 1988). The different relationship can be explained by entrenchment 
theory. Entrenchment theory argues that, compared to managers with low ownership, 
managers with above-threshold level ownership are less monitored by the board of 
directors and market discipline and can exhibit more entrenchment behaviour (Lafond 
and Roychowdhury, 2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). Morck et al. 
(1988) document that entrenchment behaviour of managers can increase the firm’s 
agency cost. Therefore, under the entrenchment effect, if executive ownership is higher 
than a threshold, the further increase in executive ownership can lead to the increase in 
the agency cost from executive’s entrenchment behaviour. Morck et al. (1988) suggest a 
significant nonlinear relationship between the managerial ownership and the firm value. 
The reason of the nonlinearity is that the agency cost is increased and in turn reduces 
the firm value when the managerial ownership is higher than a threshold. McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) and McConnell et al. (2008) point 
out that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the performance and 
managerial ownership. Therefore, the different levels of executive ownership can affect 
the levels of the agency cost in the firm. 
 
Literature does define some threshold, but there is no consensus on the threshold. The 
thresholds differ across different papers. For example, on paper page 16 of Shuto and 
Takada (2010), the turning points on the cubic model of managerial ownership are set 
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around 28.64% (a minimum point) and 56.68% (a maximum point) in the Japanese 
market. Morck et al. (1988) examine the US market and find that firm value and 
executive ownership have a cubic relationship as displayed in their Figure 1. The 
turning points are 5% and 25%. It is obvious that the two papers mentioned above 
document different turning points. The difference in the turning points is partly ascribed 
to the distinct feature of the underlying market. In a similar vein, I find that the turning 
point or the threshold in China is about 29% using a quadratic model. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I introduce literature about CEO over-confidence. Ross 
(1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency problems in the corporate 
governance between the executives and the shareholders can be traced back to the 
different benefits appeals and the attitudes toward the risks to realise the appeals. CEO 
over-confidence can lead to the overstatement in the firm’s performance (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005, 2008). The overstatement in the firm’s performance can distort the 
executives’ pay-performance relationship and lead to  overpayments to the executives 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010). The executives’ 
over-confidence can affect many aspects of the firm operations. The previous literature 
shows that the over-confidence of the CEOs can affect the firms’ investment strategies 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008), the firms’ financial reports accuracy (Schrand and 
Zechman, 2012) and the firms’ accounting strategy (Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). 
 
Libby and Rennekamp (2012) suggest that over-confidence has two key aspects which 
are over-optimism and miscalibration. The CEOs’ over-confidence refers to the CEOs’ 
unreasonable optimism for the uncertainty (Ahmed and Duellman, 2013; Malmendier 
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and Tate, 2005, 2008). The over-optimism reflects two features of the over-optimistic 
CEOs. Firstly, the over-optimistic CEOs have the perceptions that they have better than 
average abilities. Secondly, they have “illusion of control”. This feeling indicates that 
the over-optimistic CEOs believe in their great controlling ability for the uncertainty 
which can lead to their under-preparation when there are uncontrolled events (Larwood 
and Whittaker, 1977). Therefore, the over-optimistic CEOs recognise that the firms 
under their control are better than other firms. Meanwhile, the over-optimistic CEOs 
believe the market may underestimate the firms’ value and profitability (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005). 
 
The miscalibration means the CEOs are likely to underestimate the degree of risk and 
uncertainty of an event. This feature is reflected in the investment process. The 
over-confident CEOs can underestimate the risk and make aggressive decisions 
(Englmaier, 2010; Heaton, 2002). In other words, the over-confident executives are 
more likely than the rational executives to take more risky actions. Therefore, the 
over-confident CEOs are more likely to conduct value-destroying mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
This paragraph is used to explain that the definition of a normal (rational) executive is 
opposite to the definition of an over-confident executive. Normal (rational) CEOs here 
means not over-confident CEOs. In my Chapter 4, I use two different measures to 
examine the impact of CEO over-confidence on firms’ cash level and the cash 
adjustment speed in my main analysis. The first measure is based on the options 
exercise timing of CEOs, and the second measure is based on the overinvestment 
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behaviour conducted by CEOs. The details are in the methodology of Chapter 4. 
 
To find the influences of executive ownership and CEO over-confidence on the firms’ 
policies, I divided my thesis into three chapters. I examine the relationship between 
executive ownership and accounting conservative strategy in Chapter 2. I examine the 
relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling in Chapter 3. I 
examine the relationship between CEO over-confidence and firm cash strategy in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between executive ownership and accounting 
conservatism. Basu (1997) points out that accounting conservatism affects the 
accounting practice for a long time. Sterling (1970) suggests that conservative 
accounting is the most influential accounting principle to evaluate the firms. Bliss (1924) 
points out that accounting conservatism is defined as the activity which anticipates no 
profit but all losses. Basu (1997) makes further interpretations that conservative 
accounting requires a higher standard of verification to recognise good news as gains 
than to recognise bad news as losses. Watts (2003) suggests that the main implication of 
accounting conservatism from the different verifications is the persistent understatement 
of the net asset value. The incentive alignment theory argues that the agency cost is 
from the overstatement of the firms’ performance because of the separation of the 
managers’ management and ownership in the firm (Morck et al., 1988). The firm 
managers may receive a large number of bonuses via the overstated future cash flows 
that can increase the agency costs (Shuto and Takada, 2010). In addition, Ball (2001) 
argues that accounting conservatism can monitor the firms’ investment decisions, 
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because the feature called asymmetric verifiability of accounting conservatism can help 
the shareholders to investigate the manager’s behaviour of investing in the negative 
NPV (net present value) projects with positive earnings. Therefore, accounting 
conservatism can help to constrain the manager’s intentions to overstate the firm’s 
performances and monitor the self-benefit behaviour of the managers (Ball, 2001; Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2005; Givoly et al., 2007; Watts, 2003). Shuto and Takada (2010) 
argue that accounting conservatism is a useful tool to address the agency problems 
between the managers and the shareholders. 
 
As I mentioned above, the relationship between the agency costs and the executive 
ownership can vary when there are different levels of executive ownership. The 
shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism can also vary when there is a change 
of the executive ownership level. On the one hand, when the executive ownership is 
lower than the threshold executive ownership level, the executive ownership may be not 
sufficient for the executives to conduct the self-interested behaviour because they can be 
easily affected by monitoring from the board of directors and the discipline of the 
market. At this stage, the agency cost is generated from the separation of the executive 
management and the executive ownership
3
. Watts (2003) suggests that conservative 
accounting can help to constrain the executives’ intention to overstate the asset value 
because the managers’ compensation is tied to the change of firm value. The 
conservative accounting involves stricter accounting standards which can make the 
contracting procedures between the managers and shareholders effective (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). In other words, accounting conservatism can help reduce the 
conflicts between the executives and the other shareholders. Therefore, when the level 
                                                             
3 The detailed reasonings are in the introduction of Chapter 2. 
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of the executive ownership is below the threshold level, the increase in the executive 
ownership can enhance the alignment between the executives and the shareholders, 
which reduces the agency costs. Thus, when the executive ownership is below the 
threshold level, the shareholders’ demand for the monitoring of accounting 
conservatism reduces when the executive ownership increases. 
 
On the other hand, if the executive ownership is higher than the threshold level of the 
executive ownership, the agency costs can increase because of the management 
entrenchment effect (Morck et al., 1988). Morck et al. (1988) and Fan and Wong (2002) 
argue that when the executive ownership is above the threshold, the managers are less 
subject to monitoring by the board of directors and the discipline of the market (Lafond 
and Roychowdhury, 2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). The executives 
can conduct behaviour which is only beneficial to themselves. Shuto and Takada (2010) 
suggest that accounting conservatism can reduce the agency cost. Therefore, when the 
executive ownership is above the threshold level, the agency costs from the 
management entrenchment effect can increase the shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism. 
 
This paragraph explains my motivation to conduct the Chinese market study about the 
relationship between accounting conservatism and executive ownership in Chapter 2. In 
China, the relationship between accounting conservatism and the executive ownership 
may be different from that in the developed countries because of the weak corporate 
governance mechanism, the weak investor protection mechanism and the weak legal 
systems. Several papers show the evidence of the weak corporate governance 
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mechanism in the Chinese-listed firms (Bai et al., 2004; Braendle et al., 2005; Chen et 
al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2007). The weak governance in Chinese-listed 
firms endangers the firms and increases the agency cost (Braendle et al., 2005; Fan et al., 
2007). Chen et al. (2011) argue that the management entrenchment is more severe in 
China than in the developed countries. Therefore, the shareholders’ demand for 
accounting conservatism is greater in order to balance the large management 
entrenchment effects when the executive ownership is above the threshold. This fact 
may lead to the different relationship between the shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism and the executive ownership in China. In addition, Kuo et al. (2014) 
conjecture that the investor protection is often very weak compared to the developed 
markets. The less developed legal systems in China also make the corporate governance 
and the investor protection even worse (Firth et al., 2007b). As a result, the features of 
the Chinese market are my motivations to do this study. I need to find out how different 
the relationship between accounting conservatism and executive ownership can be from 
developed countries. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the influence of executive ownership on the dividend tunnelling 
behaviour in China. The previous research by Johnson et al. (2000) introduced the word 
‘tunnelling’ to describe controlling shareholders’ behaviour in moving company 
resources for their own benefits. The traditional tunnelling includes the outright theft, 
the loan guarantees and the deviation from the market prices when selling assets or 
products. Such tunnelling methods soon attract the attention of scholars and become a 
heated research area. 
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Firms in emerging countries usually have concentrated ownership structures, less 
independent boards, inactive external takeover markets and low-quality disclosure 
(Braendle et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2007b; Gao and 
Kling, 2008; Lin, 2004; Liu and Lu, 2007; Lv et al., 2012; Tenev et al., 2002; Xu and 
Wang, 1999). Therefore, the corporate governance mechanism is weak. The tunnelling 
is negatively related to effective corporate governance mechanisms (Johnson et al., 
2000). As a result, emerging markets are assumed to have a more serious problem of the 
tunnelling than developed countries. In addition, Lv et al. (2012) suggest that China has 
over-concentrated ownership structure, and therefore breaks the balance of ownership 
structure which increases the risk of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on minority 
shareholders. Therefore, I follow their ideas and state that China has weak corporate 
governance mechanism, particularly the over-concentrated ownership structure. And 
this can lead to potential tunnelling activities. Therefore, it is necessary to study 
tunnelling behaviour in China. 
 
Previous studies in China ignore the influence of executives on tunnelling behaviour 
and focus on the controlling shareholders (Chen et al., 2009; Gao and Kling, 2008; 
Jiang et al., 2005; Li, 2010; Liu and Lu, 2007). The word “tunnelling” is initially used 
to describe the top managers’ fraudulent transfer of the previous firms’ property to their 
own businesses (e.g. Skoda tunnelling problem in the Czech Republic). Tunnelling 
differs from outright theft because people who engage in tunnelling generally comply 
with all of the relevant legal procedures (Johnson et al., 2000). Tunnelling behaviour is 
not possible without the support of the managers. This is because that the managers 
have superior access to the private information, the corporate decision-making process, 
11 
 
and are eventually responsible for the corporate outcomes (Zhang et al., 2014). If there 
is any behaviour of controlling shareholders to tunnel the resources, they need the 
assistance from executives. The implicit assumption is that the managers may collude 
with the controlling shareholders in the tunnelling behaviour. 
 
This paragraph explains my motivation to study the relationship between dividend 
tunnelling and executive ownership. I provide two aspects of my motivation. The first is 
that executives and controlling shareholders in Chinese-listed firms may collude in 
tunnelling. The second is that dividend tunnelling has been found in China, but previous 
literature does not reveal the link between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling. 
The explanation for the first aspect of my motivation is discussed in the following 
sentences. Public-listed firms in the Chinese market have weak corporate governance 
with a dominant controlling shareholder in each firm (Jiang et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 
2014). The controlling shareholders can nominate the board members (Cullinan et al., 
2012) and determine the executives’ remuneration, appointments and dismissals 
(Conyon and He, 2011; Firth et al., 2006a). Furthermore, the minority shareholders have 
little access to the decision-making process (Firth et al., 2016). The executives need 
only to align their interests with the controlling shareholders. In addition, Zhang et al. 
(2014) suggest that the controlling shareholders cannot conduct dividend tunnelling 
without the help of the executives because the executives have superior access to the 
private information, the corporate decision-making process, etc. Therefore, the 
executives and the controlling shareholders may have collusions in their tunnelling 
activities (Wang and Xiao, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014). The explanation for the second 
aspect of my motivation is discussed in the following sentences. Lv et al. (2012) point 
12 
 
out that the controlling shareholders in the Chinese public listed firms issue dividends as 
the tunnelling method, and the dividend payout is higher when the controlling 
shareholders hold more shares. Hu and Kumar (2004) indicate that the executives have 
the intentions to hold more shares because it helps them to gain more power and secure 
their position. Therefore, the executives can help the controlling shareholders in the 
process of concentrating the shares to the insiders. As a result, my motivation to study 
the influence of the executive ownership on dividend tunnelling is to reveal the fact that 
the executives play important roles in the tunnelling process and colluding with the 
controlling shareholders. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between the CEO over-confidence and the firm’s 
cash adjustment strategy to the target cash level. Jensen (1986) argues that apart from 
the precautionary motivations
4
 of holding more cash, there are the agency-based 
explanations for holding more cash. Many other papers also hold the same view 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Dittmar et al., 2003; Harford et al., 2008; Pinkowitz et 
al., 2006). They argue that the excess cash (the cash is derived from the models using 
the precautionary motivations for holding more cash as the determinants) can make the 
agency problems worse by offering the managers with a large pool of accumulated cash. 
Therefore, the shareholders do not want too large cash reserves in the firms. However, 
the executives want to keep their discretion or conduct self-benefit behaviours. Harford 
et al. (2008) show that the not well-governed firms spend and in turn reserve more cash 
than the better-governed firms because the better-governed firms can manage the cash 
more efficiently. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) suggest that the CEOs’ desire can 
                                                             
4 The precautionary motivations are discussed in Chapter 3 literature. These motivations to hold more cash include 
the consideration of the transaction costs aspects, the taxes associated with payouts aspects and the managers’ desire 
aspects to wait for the investment projects which can enhance their power through cash. 
13 
 
lead to a relatively high reserve of the cash as they have the preference for holding more 
cash. 
 
Jiang and Lie (2016) argue that there are two views for the firms to hold cash. Firstly, 
under the trade-off theory, the managers need to compare and balance the costs and the 
benefits of holding more cash. Therefore, the trade-off theory indicates that there should 
be an optimal value of the cash level which can be pursued in the firm. Secondly, Jiang 
and Lie (2016) also suggest that there is an alternative to the trade-off theory, which 
argues that holding more cash is secondary to the other firm’s targets. These targets 
contain the equity raising when the equity is overpriced and the transaction cost 
minimisation by using the cash as the source of the new investment projects rather than 
the external financing. Jiang and Lie (2016) argue that the two views of the cash 
holdings are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, they suggest that the firms can make an 
optimal deviation from the target cash ratio, and the speed of the cash adjustment 
depends on the relative priority of the two views of the cash holdings. 
 
This paragraph explains my motivation to carry out the study about the relationship 
between CEO over-confidence and cash adjustment speed. My research in Chapter 4 is 
the first to examine the influence of the CEO over-confidence on the cash adjustment 
speed and extends the cash adjustment literature into the behavioural finance area. My 
motivation to conduct the study is that over-confident CEOs have different perceptions 
of the market environment and their own ability to improve firm performance compared 
to rational CEOs. Therefore, the cash strategies used by the over-confident CEOs should 
be different. For example, the over-confident CEOs are over-confident about their 
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management and have the perception that the firms are undervalued by the market 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011). Therefore, the 
over-confident CEOs are more likely to reserve cash for future investment opportunities 
(Huang-Meier et al., 2015). And over-confident CEOs may avoid external financing due 
to the high overpriced cost of external financing perceived by the over-confident CEOs 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005). This is still because over-confident CEOs often 
overestimate the performance of the firm under their control and perceive that external 
financing suppliers can under-value their firms and incur a relatively higher cost to what 
over-confident CEOs accept. Meanwhile, too much cash reserve can raise the concern 
of the shareholders because the inefficient investments reduce the shareholders’ wealth. 
However, the over-confident CEOs prefer cash rather than other financing resources 
(Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Therefore, I suggest that the 
over-confident CEOs may reduce the cash adjustment speed to the target cash level 
when there is excess cash in the firms, which can improve their discretion to make 
investments in risky projects. 
 
I make several contributions in each chapter. My thesis examines the influence of the 
executive ownership and the CEO over-confidence on firm policy issues including 
accounting strategy, dividend payout policy and cash strategy. I am the first to examine 
executive ownership and CEO over-confidence together in one thesis and provide a 
comprehensive picture of how the executives can affect the accounting strategy, 
dividend payout policy and the cash strategy. In Chapter 2, I am the first to find the 
U-shape relationship between the executive ownership and accounting conservatism in 
China. The second contribution is that I am the first to find that executive ownership 
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deviation can increase accounting conservatism regardless of the deviation directions 
and further support the U-shape relationship. Thirdly, I find that accounting 
conservatism can also reverse to the target level with the reverse of the executive 
ownership to the target level. Fourthly, I am the first to find the evidence that the analyst 
coverage can reduce the sensitivity between the executive ownership and accounting 
conservatism and provide the evidence that the external monitoring can cover the 
shortage of accounting conservatism. 
 
In Chapter 3, I am the first to fill the gap between the relationship of dividend tunnelling 
and the influence of the executive ownership concentration. Second, I extend the 
literature by researching the influences of both the internal factors (ownership 
concentration degree, the account of other receivables, government ownership) and the 
external factors (analyst coverage) on the sensitivity between the dividend payouts and 
the executive ownership. Third, I am the first to use the abnormal dividend payouts to 
investigate the relationship between the dividend payout and the executive ownership, 
which further points out that dividend tunnelling is a concealed tunnelling method. 
 
In Chapter 4, I make contributions to the literature by showing that the cash adjustment 
speed may be decelerated by CEO over-confidence. Secondly, over-confident CEOs are 
more likely to reduce firms’ cash adjustment speed when there is excess cash, while 
CEO over-confidence does not show a significant effect on firms’ cash adjustment 
speed when the cash is insufficient. Furthermore, cash is reserved for future dissipation 
under the influence of the over-confident CEOs rather than just cash accumulation. In 
addition, I make a further contribution by showing that over-confident CEOs dissipate 
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cash through investments rather than dividend payouts or debt retirements. 
 
1.2 Structure and scope of the thesis 
The first chapter of the thesis is the introduction. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship 
between firms’ accounting conservatism and the executive ownership concentration. In 
Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between dividend tunnelling and the influence 
of the executive ownership concentration. In Chapter 4, I provide the evidence that the 
over-confident CEOs have intentions to make cash reserves for future investment and 
reduce the cash adjustment to the target level to keep the excess cash. Chapter 5 is the 
conclusion of the previous three chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between firms’ conservatism and the executive 
ownership in China using the data from CSMAR for the sample period 2005-2015. I 
find that the conservatism has a U-shaped relationship with the executive ownership. I 
further examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and the deviation 
(the target executive ownership minus the actual executive ownership from the previous 
period) of the executive ownership. The results indicate that the executive ownership 
deviation has a positive relationship with accounting conservatism but with different 
sensitivities below and above the threshold. The executive ownership can reverse to the 
target level. These results support that accounting conservatism can reverse to its target 
level when executive ownership reverses to the target level. Furthermore, I find that the 
influence of the analyst coverage can reduce the sensitivity between accounting 
conservatism and the executive ownership because it is an effective external monitoring 
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mechanism. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between executive ownership and the dividend 
payouts in Chinese-listed firms. I use the sample from all the Chinese-listed firms 
between 2005 and 2015. I find that the dividend payout can be a method for tunnelling 
because of the weak corporate governance environment in China. I find that the increase 
in executive ownership can lead to an increase in the abnormal dividend payout ratio as 
an alternative form of tunnelling. The results also show that the tunnelling through the 
related party transactions can be replaced by dividend tunnelling. The government 
ownership concentration can increase dividend tunnelling behaviour. The analysts’ 
monitoring can reduce the sensitivity between abnormal dividend payouts and executive 
ownership. The results imply that Chinese firms need to introduce a more balanced 
ownership structure to improve the corporate governance or strengthen the external 
monitoring to regulate any potential tunnelling behaviour. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the influence of the CEOs’ over-confidence on the firms’ cash 
holding level and the cash level adjustment speed. I use the data from COMPUSTAT 
and EXECUCOMP to form the research sample with US firms excluding all financial 
firms. The sample period is 1993 to 2014. The results show that the over-confident 
CEOs can positively affect firms’ cash reserve levels. I extend the literature by showing 
that the cash adjustment speed to the target level is lower in the firms controlled by the 
over-confident CEOs when the firms have excess cash. The further results show that 
over-confident CEOs are likely to use the reserved cash to finance the future 
investments but not dividend payouts and the debt retirement. The investments include 
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R&D, the acquisitions and the capital expenditures. However, over-confident CEOs can 
encourage firms to hold more cash indirectly when the cash is insufficient, but the 
influence of the over-confidence itself is not significant. 
 
Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the whole thesis. I discuss the main findings, the 
implications, the limitations and the future study possibilities in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 FIRM CONSERVATISM AND THE TARGET 
EXECUTIVE OWNERSHIP 
2.1 Introduction 
Basu (1997) points out that the influence of accounting conservatism on accounting 
practice has covered over 500 years. Sterling (1970) suggests that conservative 
accounting is the most influential accounting principle of firm valuation. Accounting 
conservatism is traditionally defined by the adage “anticipating no profit but all losses” 
(Bliss, 1924). Basu (1997) further interprets that conservative accounting requires a 
higher standard of verification to recognise good news as gains than to recognise losses 
due to bad news. The main implication of accounting conservatism from differential 
verification is the persistent understatement of the net asset value (Watts, 2003). 
Accounting conservatism can help to facilitate the efficient contracting between the 
managers and shareholders by downward adjusting the overstatement firm 
performances (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Givoly et al., 2007; Watts, 
2003). 
 
I conjecture that the relationship between executive ownership and shareholders’ 
demand for accounting conservatism can vary when the executive ownership level 
increases. On the one hand, when the managerial ownership of a firm is low, the 
executive ownership may not be sufficient for the executives to conduct self-interested 
behaviour. Low executive ownership also makes the executives less powerful compared 
to the monitoring given by the board of directors and the market discipline (Morck et al., 
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1988; Stulz, 1988). Morck et al. (1988) also indicate that the incentive alignment effect 
dominates when the executive ownership is low. The incentive alignment theory argues 
that the agency cost exists because of the separation of executive management and 
executive ownership, and thus the increase in the executive ownership can align the 
executives’ interests with the shareholders. The reason is that the limited horizon and 
limited liability of the tenure encourage the executives to overstate the current earnings 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). The executives can increase their payments by 
providing biased performance via the overstatement of the expected cash flow, which 
leads to a higher level of the agency costs (Shuto and Takada, 2010). Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) suggest that the managers with higher ownership are likely to have longer 
horizons. A longer horizon of the executive position indicates that the current benefits 
transferred to the executives can be offset by the future decline of the overstated 
earnings. In other words, the managers are tied to the firms by increasing their 
ownership. Therefore, when executive ownership is lower than a threshold, a lower 
(higher) level of the executive ownership indicates a larger (smaller) potential 
overstatement of the financial reports, which can increase (decrease) the agency cost 
from the separation of the executives’ management and cash flow rights. 
 
Watts (2003) suggests that conservative accounting can constrain the executives’ 
intention to overstate the asset value because the executives’ compensation is linked to 
the changes of firm values. The conservative accounting employs stricter accounting 
standards which may reduce inefficient contracting between the managers and 
shareholders (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). LaFond and Watts (2008) suggest that 
conservatism accounting is an efficient method for reducing the risk of asymmetric 
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information and mitigating the agency problems and in turn can benefit the shareholders 
of the firms. Shuto and Takada (2010) follow the arguments of Watts (2003) that 
accounting conservatism is useful for reducing the likelihood that a manager can 
overstate net asset value and cumulative earnings in order to distribute the net assets of 
the firms to themselves instead of exerting efforts to take positive net present value 
projects. The argument also suggested that firm managers with less or no accounting 
conservatism may be able to receive large bonuses through providing a biased upward 
estimate of future cash flows. The behaviour creates deadweight losses and reduces firm 
value. Therefore, Shuto and Takada (2010) argue that conservative accounting is helpful 
for firms to monitor investment decisions and can reduce the risk of executives’ 
misbehaviour. As a consequence, accounting conservatism is negatively related to the 
executive ownership when the executive ownership is below the threshold. 
 
On the other hand, Morck et al. (1988) and Fan and Wong (2002) argue that when the 
managerial ownership is above the threshold, the managers are less subject to 
monitoring from the board of directors and the market discipline (Morck et al., 1988; 
Stulz, 1988). Their arguments support the management entrenchment theory. Morck et 
al. (1988) indicate that the executives with ownership percentages higher than a 
threshold level are more likely to conduct opportunistic behaviour for their own benefits, 
such as through earnings management activities5. When the executive ownership is 
above the threshold, the increase in the executive ownership enhances the management 
entrenchment and increases the agency costs. Shareholders’ demand for conservatism 
can be higher because conservative accounting can be used to monitor executives and 
                                                             
5 The earnings management is an opportunistic behaviour of the managers to benefit themselves. 
Chung, R, Firth, M, Kim, J-B. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 2002;8;29-48. 
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reduce agency costs from management entrenchment effects (Shuto and Takada, 2010). 
Ball (2001) argues that accounting conservatism is expected to monitor firms’ 
investment policies. Shuto and Takada (2010) suggest that managers have incentives to 
delay the termination of negative net present value projects if the managers want to 
obtain private benefits through entrenchment behaviour. Accounting conservatism can 
recognise bad news in earnings in a timelier manner, which is useful to identify negative 
net present value projects (Watts, 2003). The timely recognition of potential 
management entrenchment provides shareholders with a signal to investigate the 
existence of negative net present value projects. As a result, inefficient investment by 
managers, which can lead to deadweight losses, can be reduced through conservative 
accounting. Therefore, accounting conservatism is necessary for the firms to reduce the 
agency costs from the management entrenchment. As a consequence, the shareholders’ 
demand for accounting conservatism is positively related to executive ownership when 
the executive ownership is above the threshold. 
 
To my best knowledge, the literature pays little attention to the relationship between 
executive ownership and accounting conservatism except for the two papers, Lafond 
and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada (2010). Lafond and Roychowdhury 
(2008) use U.S. market data while Shuto and Takada (2010) use Japanese market data. 
The literature and data of the previous two papers of Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) 
and Shuto and Takada (2010) are related to my study for the Chinese market for the 
following reasons: First, to the best of my knowledge, these are the only two papers that 
discuss the relationship between managerial ownership and accounting conservative. I 
refer to them to provide a general idea of accounting conservatism and how it reacts 
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with the change of managerial ownership, even though the two studies are in developed 
countries whose market contexts may not be similar to the context of China. However, 
the contribution of my study is to find whether the different market environment in 
China may lead to a different relationship between accounting conservatism and 
executive ownership. Second, Shuto and Takada (2010) make their Japanese study 
based on the findings and methods of the U.S. market study by Lafond and 
Roychowdhury (2008). Therefore, I have cited these two papers and compared their 
findings with the relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism China. China is the largest developing market in the world, and thus it is 
very important to study the relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism in China. It is also important to find out how the relationship is different 
from those found in developed countries. Third, I have followed the definition and 
measure of managerial ownership and accounting conservatism of these two papers for  
my Chinese study. Finally, I follow these two papers to exclude financial firms. 
 
Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) show that executive ownership is linearly and 
negatively related to accounting conservatism because of the incentive alignment effect. 
Shuto and Takada (2010) find that accounting conservatism first decreases then 
increases when there is intermediate managerial ownership and finally decreases as the 
managerial ownership increases. They use management entrenchment theory to explain 
the short period of the positive relationship between the managerial ownership and 
accounting conservatism. The general trend of the relationship between the managerial 
ownership and accounting conservatism is still negative. However, the results of Lafond 
and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada (2010) may not be applicable to the 
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public-listed firms in the Chinese market. 
 
The relationship between the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism and 
executive ownership in the developing countries may be different from the results of the 
developed countries. The executives of the Chinese-listed firms with larger than 
threshold shareholdings can conduct more serious self-benefit behaviour than those in 
the developed countries because of the weak corporate governance mechanism, the 
weak investor protection mechanism and the weak legal systems (Jiang et al., 2010; 
Kuo et al., 2014). Furthermore, a Japanese study of Shuto and Takada (2010) show that 
CEOs’ entrenched behaviour and related agency costs can be reduced when CEO 
ownership is over the second turning point (56.68%) of CEO ownership because CEOs 
then become the large block holders. However, Wang and Xiao (2009) document that 70% 
of Chinese-listed firms are ultimately controlled by the government. Then, executives 
can hardly become the block holders. Therefore, there are more agency costs in the 
Chinese-listed firms than in the developed countries, and thus the shareholders’ demand 
for accounting conservatism to monitor the executives is higher in the developing 
countries. 
 
As a consequence, the pattern of relationship between executive ownership and 
accounting conservatism may be different in developing countries, especially in China. 
Firstly, there are several studies that provide evidence of the weak corporate governance 
mechanism in the Chinese-listed firms (Bai et al., 2004; Braendle et al., 2005; Chen et 
al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2007). The weak governance in Chinese-listed 
firms endangers the firms’ value and increases the agency cost (Braendle et al., 2005; 
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Fan et al., 2007). Therefore, it is necessary to introduce conservative accounting to 
monitor the executives regardless of the executive ownership level. Stulz (1988) and 
Morck et al. (1988) indicate that the executives with larger than the threshold level of 
ownership can be less monitored by the board of directors and the market discipline. 
Chen et al. (2011) argue that management entrenchment is more severe in China than in 
the developed markets. Therefore, in China, the shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism is larger than that in the developed countries in order to balance the large 
management entrenchment effects when the executive ownership is above the threshold. 
This fact may lead to the different relationship between the shareholders’ demand for 
accounting conservatism and executive ownership in China. 
 
Secondly, Kuo et al. (2014) speculate that the investor protection and the legal systems 
in China are very weak compared to the developed markets. The minority shareholders 
have almost no private channels to take actions against the misconduct of the insiders 
(Jiang et al., 2010). Allen et al. (2005) and MacNeil (2002) indicate that the courts in 
China have traditions to protect the interests of state-owned enterprises. They also 
speculate that the courts in China have limited experience in minority protections when 
the minority shareholders reclaim their rights in the conflicts between the controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders. Jiang et al. (2010) also suggest that the 
regulations to protect the minority shareholders are limited, not only because of the lack 
of laws but also because of the weak enforcement mechanism of complying with the 
laws. Allen et al. (2005) point out that the development levels of the law and the 
institutions in the Chinese market are not as advanced as those in the most countries 
from the literature of La Porta et al. (1997) and Porta et al. (1998). The Chinese market 
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is less developed compared to other countries such as the US and Western European 
countries. Allen et al. (2005) make a list of the under-developed aspects in China 
compared to developed countries, including weaker investor protection systems, worse 
corporate governance mechanisms, lower accounting standards and lower quality 
government policies. The less developed legal systems in China also make corporate 
governance mechanisms and investor protection even worse (Firth et al., 2007b). As a 
result, the features of the Chinese market are my motivations to conduct this study to 
find out how different from the developed countries the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and the executive ownership can be. 
 
In the Chinese context, when the executive ownership is higher than the threshold, the 
shareholders’ demands for accounting conservatism are larger than those in the 
developed countries to provide efficient monitoring on the executives. I contribute to 
the literature to be the first to find the U-shaped relationship between executive 
ownership and shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism in China. 
 
Previous studies only focus on the relationship between the firms’ value and managerial 
ownership deviation (McConnell et al., 2008; Tong, 2008). In this chapter, I contribute 
to the literature by being the first to examine the executive ownership deviation 
relationship with accounting conservatism in the context of the developing markets. I 
test the relationship between executive ownership deviation (the absolute value of the 
target level of the executive ownership minus the actual level of the executive 
ownership) and accounting conservatism and find a positive relationship between them. 
The results indicate that the more distance from the target executive ownership level, 
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the more shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism is needed in the firms to 
monitor the executives’ behaviour. It is consistent with the U-shape relationship 
between accounting conservatism and the executive ownership. Firstly, when the 
executive ownership is below the threshold level, the lower level of executive 
ownership means the larger separation of the executive management and their 
ownership and the larger absolute distance from the target executive level, which 
indicates the larger agency costs. Therefore, the shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism is larger. Secondly, when the executive ownership is above the threshold 
level, the higher level of the executive ownership means the more management 
entrenchment and the larger absolute distance from the target executive ownership level, 
which indicates larger agency costs. Therefore, the shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism is also larger. 
 
Furthermore, the reason to examine the relationship between the executive ownership 
deviation and accounting conservatism is that the firm’s target executive ownership is 
determined by each firm’s features of different years and industries. In this chapter, I 
test that whether the executive ownership can reverse to the target level in the Chinese 
market. According to the regression results in Table 2.5 and 2.6, shareholders’ demand 
for accounting conservatism is positively related to the absolute value of executive 
ownership deviation (distance between actual and target executive ownership). 
Following Jiang and Lie (2016), I obtain target executive ownership. My results show 
that executive ownership can reverse to its target value, which indicates that executive 
ownership deviation may decrease over time. Since shareholders’ demand for 
accounting conservatism is positively related to executive ownership deviation, I 
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conjecture that shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism can decrease along 
with the decrease of executive ownership deviation. When executive ownership reaches 
its target, shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism would reach its expected 
minimum value. Therefore, when executive ownership is at the target value, the 
shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism should be at the expected target 
value. However, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada (2010) only 
focus on the general pattern of managerial ownership and accounting conservatism 
among all the observations, regardless of the different firm features in different fiscal 
years. 
 
The analyst coverage may play a role of the external monitoring power to the firms. 
Degeorge et al. (2013) suggest that analyst coverage can enhance the good corporate 
governance in the markets. Since corporate governance mechanisms and the minorities' 
protections are weak in China, it is necessary to introduce external monitoring to 
improve corporate governance. The Chinese market is defined as having weak corporate 
governance with a dominant controlling shareholder (Jiang et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 
2014). The controlling shareholders can nominate the board members (Cullinan et al., 
2012) and determine the executives’ remuneration, appointments and dismissals 
(Conyon and He, 2011; Firth et al., 2006a). Furthermore, the minorities have little 
access to the decision-making process in China (Firth et al., 2016). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that the monitoring effects given by the financial analysts can reduce the 
agency costs caused by the separation of management and cash flow rights. Yu (2008) 
argues that analyst coverage enhancement can reduce the earnings management. Dyck 
et al. (2010) document that the analysts’ monitoring is an efficient way to detect the 
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fraud behaviours in firms. Doukas et al. (2005) and Jung et al. (2012) argue that the 
analysts can monitor the firms effectively and reduce the agency cost. When the 
executive ownership is higher than the threshold, the discretionary power of the 
executives is higher. The shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism is higher to 
monitor the executives (Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). Crutchley et al. 
(1999) argue that managerial entrenchment can increase the agency cost. The weak 
governance in Chinese-listed firms endangers the firms and increases the agency cost 
(Braendle et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007). The relationship between the executive 
ownership deviation and the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism can also 
be reduced by the analysts’ monitoring because analyst coverage is the substitute for 
accounting conservatism. And thus, the analyst coverage has a negative influence on the 
sensitivity of the executive ownership deviation and accounting conservatism. Therefore, 
the external monitor power can be more important in China due to the weak corporate 
governance, the weak minority shareholder protections and the weak legal systems. I 
contribute to the literature to examine the influence of the analyst coverage on the 
sensitivity of executive ownership and accounting conservatism. 
 
I use the account of the allowance for the uncollectibles as the measure of accounting 
conservatism because it is directly related to accounting conservatism central 
implication.
6
 Penman and Zhang (2002) and Watts (2003) conclude that the central 
implication of accounting conservatism is the understatement of the net asset values. 
Jackson and Liu (2010) have introduced the account of the allowance for the 
uncollectibles, which can understate the net asset values, as the measure of a firm’s 
                                                             
6 The allowance for the uncollectible account is a contra current asset account associated with the accounts 
receivable mentioned in the footnote of Jackson, SB, Liu, X. The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts, 
Conservatism, and Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting Research 2010;48;565-601. 
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conservatism. The higher amount of the allowance indicates the lower current asset and 
the lower total asset in the balance sheet. In addition, I use the unconditional accounting 
conservatism measure to examine the relationship between executive ownership 
deviation and accounting conservatism and provide evidence that the expected 
accounting conservatism can be reached by maintaining the target executive ownership 
level. 
 
I obtained the data for Chinese-listed firms from the CSMAR database during the years 
2005 and 2015. In this study, I examine the relationship between the executive 
ownership and accounting conservatism. I find that accounting conservatism first 
decreases then increases when the executive ownership increases, which indicates the 
U-shape relationship. Next, I obtain the target value of executive ownership to calculate 
the deviation of executive ownership from the target value. After generating the 
deviations, I find a positive relationship between the executive ownership deviation and 
the change of the executive ownership, which indicates the executive ownership can 
reverse to the target level. The model of the ownership reversing mechanism is derived 
from the paper of Jiang and Lie (2016). 
 
I then examine the influence of the executive ownership deviation on accounting 
conservatism. The results show that the executive ownership deviation has a 
significantly positive relationship with accounting conservatism, which can support the 
U-shape relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism. 
Furthermore, since the executive ownership can reverse to the target level, the deviation 
of the executive ownership can be reduced. The shareholders’ demand for accounting 
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conservatism can also reverse to the target level. I find that the sensitivity of accounting 
conservatism and the executive ownership deviation is different when the executive 
ownership is below or above the target executive ownership level. It is because the 
weak corporate governance environment in China distorts the original downward 
relationship into an upward relationship when executive ownership is higher than the 
target level. 
 
In addition, I examine the influence of the analyst coverage on the sensitivity between 
the executive ownership deviation and accounting conservatism. The analyst monitoring 
is suggested by several papers to reduce the agency cost (Dyck et al., 2010; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Yu, 2008). The results in this chapter indicate that the sensitivity of the 
shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism and the executive ownership 
deviation is reduced. Therefore, the analyst coverage is a substitute for accounting 
conservatism when the executive ownership is lower than the target level. When the 
executive ownership is higher than the target level, the analyst coverage can monitor the 
management entrenchment to reduce the agency cost. 
 
I make several contributions to the literature. This is the first paper to find the U-shaped 
relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism in the context of 
the developing markets. The second contribution is that I first examine the influence of 
the executive ownership deviation on accounting conservatism and find that the 
executive ownership deviation can increase accounting conservatism regardless of the 
deviation directions. Thirdly, I find that executive ownership can reverse to the target 
value in the Chinese market. It means that the deviation (defined as the distance 
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between executive ownership and the target value) has a trend to be smaller than the 
previous year. I also find that the need for accounting conservatism is positively related 
to the deviation of executive ownership. Therefore, if the executive ownership deviation 
is smaller, the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism is smaller. When the 
executive ownership deviation is zero, which means that the executive ownership is at 
the target level, the need for accounting conservatism is at its target value. Fourthly, I 
am the first to examine the influence of the analyst coverage on executive ownership 
and accounting conservatism sensitivity. I find evidence that the analyst coverage can 
reduce the sensitivity between the executive ownership and accounting conservatism. 
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.2 discusses the literature 
and hypotheses. Section 2.3 introduces the methodology used and describes the data. 
Section 2.4 reports the empirical results of the regressions. Finally, Section 2.5 is the 
conclusion. 
 
2.2 Literature and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Conservatism 
Conservatism can be established in different ways, as long as it indicates the 
understatement of the net asset value (Watts, 2003). It is further confirmed by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and Givoly et al. (2007). Basu (1997) uses the coefficients of the 
asymmetric timeliness in firms’ reporting of the earnings news to examine accounting 
conservatism. Givoly and Hayn (2000) make a combination of the measures 
(asymmetric timeliness coefficients and the accruals) of accounting conservatism to 
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examine firms’ conservatism strategies. Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) find that 
combining timeliness with the book-to-market ratio enables them to assess firms’ 
conservatism and earnings management. Beaver and Ryan (2000) focus on the 
book-to-market ratio to predict the book return on equity in order to reveal the 
relationship between the conservatism and the earnings management. Ahmed et al. 
(2002) use the book-to-market ratio and the accruals method to test the degree of 
conservatism among the mitigating bondholders. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) use only 
the accruals to investigate firms’ conservatism. Dechow et al. (1999) use the residual 
income model to assess the short-term earnings management and accounting 
conservatism. Therefore, conservatism can be established in many ways. I use the 
account of the allowance for the uncollectables to measure accounting conservatism 
because Jackson and Liu (2010) point out two advantages of using this measure. The 
first reason is its direct relationship to the core implications of 
conservatism-understatement of asset value because the more allowance for 
uncollectable account means more understatement of asset value (Watts, 2003). The 
second reason is that the account of the allowance for the uncollectables has been used 
to examine managers’ discretionary behaviour in previous studies. The model used by 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) study shows that firms need to manage earnings when 
earnings are extreme and that firms can decrease bad debt expenses in their income 
statements. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) provide evidence that firms have the 
potential to manipulate account receivables in response to equity changes to maintain 
the appearance of a healthy financial statement. Jackson and Liu (2010) suggest that 
conservatism measured by the allowance for the uncollectables may reveal problems, 
such as earnings management in accounting conservatism. 
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The accounting conservatism I discussed here is demanded by the shareholders of firms. 
Apart from reducing firm value due to managers’ overstatement of financial position, 
Ball (2001) and Watts (2003) suggest that accounting conservatism also helps to 
establish the rules if there are more than one financial reporting alternatives, which 
allows the reporting to be fair and objective. Accounting conservatism demanded by 
shareholders can overestimate the “allowance for doubtful accounts”, which can provide 
the shareholders with a more accurate picture of firm receivables under protection 
(Jackson and Liu, 2010). 
 
I apply this accounting conservatism measure in my study to test whether there is a 
target level of accounting conservatism of the firms by regressing on the absolute value 
of the deviations of the executive ownership level. My study makes the first attempt to 
assess accounting conservatism in the context of developing markets using the account 
of the allowance for the uncollectibles. Furthermore, the demand for accounting 
conservatism is originated from that shareholders need to constrain the managers’ 
behaviour of overestimation of future cash flow, which can cause deadweight losses and 
reduce the firm value (shareholder wealth) (Shuto and Takada, 2010). According to the 
arguments of Shuto and Takada (2010) and Ball (2001), shareholders approve and 
implement the monitoring function of conservative accounting strategy in the firms to 
constrain the managers’ overestimation of future cash flow, which can cause deadweight 
losses. Therefore, I follow the previous literature to say that shareholders drive the 
demand for accounting conservatism. And since the deadweight loss caused by 
managers’ overestimation of future cash flow can reduce firm value, the firm 
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shareholders are willing to implement conservative accounting strategy in firms. 
 
2.2.2 The executive ownership and the firm contracting agency cost 
The executive ownership is an important mechanism in the corporate governance to deal 
with the agency cost. The studies provide evidence that the conflicts between managers 
and shareholders can be partly resolved by increasing the managers’ shareholdings as 
incentives (Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Core and Larcker, 2002; Denis et al., 1997; 
Holderness et al., 1999; Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994; McConnell and Servaes, 1990, 
1995; McConnell et al., 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010; Zhou, 2001). It is because of 
the incentive alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988). The 
following paragraph provides explanations of incentive alignment theory. 
 
The incentive alignment theory argues that agency cost exists because of the separation 
of executive management power and executive ownership, and thus the increase in 
executive ownership can align executives’ interests with those of shareholders. The 
reason is that the limited horizon and limited liability of tenure encourage executives to 
overstate current earnings (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Executives can increase 
their payments by providing biased performance via the overstatement of expected cash 
flow, which leads to a higher level of agency costs (Shuto and Takada, 2010). Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) suggest that managers with higher ownership are likely to have longer 
horizons. A longer horizon of executive position indicates that current benefits 
transferred to executives can be offset by the future decline of overstated earnings. In 
other words, managers are tied to firms by increasing their ownership. Therefore, a 
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lower (higher) level of executive ownership indicates a larger (smaller) potential 
overstatement of financial reports, which can increase (decrease) agency cost from the 
separation of executives’ management and cash flow rights. Therefore, conflicts 
between managers and shareholders can be partly resolved by increasing managers’ 
shareholdings as incentives. 
 
However, the agency cost cannot be reduced by increasing the managers’ shareholdings 
in all situations. Morck et al. (1988) suggest a significant non-linear relationship 
between the managerial ownership and firm value. Morck et al. (1988) introduce the 
entrenchment theory which argues that the managerial ownership above the threshold 
level can lead to managers’ entrenchment. When the managerial ownership is larger 
than the threshold, the managers have more discretionary power in the daily operation 
and become entrenched. Compared to the managers with low ownership, the managers 
with the above-threshold ownership level are less subjected to monitoring from the 
board of directors and the market discipline due to their increased entrenchment powers 
from the increase in ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990), Lichtenberg and 
Pushner (1994) and McConnell et al. (2008) also point out that the entrenchment 
behaviour of the managers with ownership larger than the threshold can reduce the 
benefit of the increase in the managerial ownership to reduce the separation of the 
management and ownership. 
 
Managerial ownership does have effects on the agency cost of the firm. The previous 
papers show that the incentive alignment theory
7
 and entrenchment theory
8
 may be 
                                                             
7 By increasing the managerial ownership, the separation of the managers’ management and ownership is reduced, 
which also reduces the agency cost. The arguments are consistent with the incentive alignment theory. 
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applicable at different managerial ownership levels (Chen and Steiner, 1999; Lafond 
and Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010). However, the managerial 
ownership is relatively stable or changes a little through the years (Zhou, 2001). If the 
change of the executive ownership is small through the years, the mechanism that the 
increase in executive ownership can reduce the agency cost from the separation of the 
executives’ management and ownership is not obvious. On the one hand, the change of 
the executive ownership can change the ownership structure and affect the wealth 
allocation pattern. On the other hand, conservative accounting is applied more through 
the years (Watts, 2003). Therefore, conservative accounting is treated as a method to 
help control the agency cost (Ball, 2001; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Watts, 
2003). The conservative accounting strategy is relatively easily conducted compared to 
the change of the executive ownership because accounting conservatism does not 
change the ownership structure and cannot affect the wealth allocation pattern to the 
shareholders. Therefore, I am motivated to examine the relationship between the firm’s 
shareholders’ demand for conservative accounting and managerial ownership. 
 
2.2.3 Hypotheses on the conservatism and the executive ownership 
Zhou (2001) finds that managerial ownership is very low compared to other kinds of 
ownership using the sample from COMPUSTAT in the US market. The increase of the 
managerial ownership is treated as a method of encouraging managers to work more 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Jensen, MC, Meckling, WH. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal 
of Financial Economics 1976;3;305-360, Morck, R, Shleifer, A, Vishny, RW. Management ownership and market 
valuation: An empirical analysis. Ibid.1988;20;293-315. 
8 The entrenchment theory dominants when the managerial ownership is larger because the larger managerial 
shareholdings provide more power to the managers and make them less subject to the forced replacement under the 
monitoring by the board of directors and the market discipline. 
Stulz, R. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control. Journal of 
Financial Economics 1988;20;25-54. 
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efficiently and reduce the agency cost from the separation of the management and the 
ownership under the incentive alignment theory (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Demsetz (1983), Berle and Means (1991) and Shuto and Takada 
(2010) suggest that the lower executive ownership can cause more agency problems 
between managers and other shareholders when the executive ownership is below the 
threshold. It is because the limited horizon and limited liability can encourage the 
executives to overstate the firm’s value through overstating the expectation of cash flow 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). They also argue that if the managerial ownership 
increases, the benefits that the managers can obtain from the overstatement can be offset 
by the future decline of the firm’s value. This is because the managers with more 
ownership are likely to have longer horizons (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Therefore, the 
increase of the managerial ownership reduces the managers’ overstatement incentives, 
and the agency cost when the executive ownership is below the threshold (29% 
(6.199/(2*10.590)) in my thesis according to Table 2.3 Model 1). 
 
Watts (2003) and Shuto and Takada (2010) suggest that without conservative accounting, 
the executives can increase their salaries and bonuses through biased performance-based 
pays. The biased performance is because of the executives’ overstatement of the 
expectation of cash flow. The executives are diverted from their primary target to 
maximise the shareholders’ wealth. Watts (2003) suggests that the conservative 
accounting can help to constrain the executives’ intention to overstate the net asset value. 
It is because conservative accounting indicates the stricter accounting standards in the 
reports and lowers the potential overstatement of the earnings by the managers. The 
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managers’ incentives and payments are tied to the book value and firm performance. 
The use of the conservative accounting rules can effectively penalise the managers who 
create the agency cost when the managers tend to overstate the earnings as their 
ownership is low. In conclusion, when the level of executive ownership is below the 
threshold level, the increase in the executive ownership can enhance the alignment 
between the executives and the shareholders, and thus the shareholders’ demand for 
accounting conservatism reduces. 
 
If the executive ownership is higher than the threshold (29% (6.199/(2*10.590)) in my 
thesis according to Table 2.3 Model 1), the executives may conduct self-interested 
behaviour. The higher-than-threshold managerial shareholdings can provide more 
discretionary power to the managers and make them less subject to the monitoring by 
the board of directors and the market discipline when they plan to conduct 
self-interested behaviour (Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988). Morck et al. (1988) indicate 
that the executives with larger than threshold shareholdings are likely to conduct 
opportunistic behaviour to benefit themselves, such as earnings management
9
. The 
shareholders’ demand for conservatism can be higher because the conservative 
accounting can be used to monitor the executives and reduce the agency costs from the 
management entrenchment effects (Shuto and Takada, 2010). Therefore, the 
shareholders’ demand for a conservative accounting is positively related to the 
executive ownership when the executive ownership is above the threshold. 
 
Furthermore, the Chinese market, like other developing markets, has distinctive features 
                                                             
9 The earnings management is an opportunistic behaviour of the managers to benefit themselves. 
Chung, R, Firth, M, Kim, J-B. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 2002;8;29-48. 
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compared to developed markets. Management entrenchment is more severe in China, as 
suggested by Chen et al. (2011), because the law and regulation development is behind 
economic growth. When the Chinese government and firms start to emulate the 
Anglo-American models of the economic development, Tam (2002) concludes that the 
Chinese market does not have the relevant financial infrastructure
10
 to work effectively. 
The relatively low level of legal systems in China endangers the corporate governance 
mechanism (Firth et al., 2007b). Allen et al. (2005) conclude that the Chinese market 
has weaker investor protection systems, worse corporate governance mechanism, lower 
accounting standards and lower quality government policies compared to developed 
countries, which can increase the agency cost to firms. As a result, the agency cost from 
management entrenchment can also be increased. Consequently, the cubic model of the 
Japanese market of Shuto and Takada (2010) and the linear model of the U.S. market of 
Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) may not be suitable for the Chinese context. 
Therefore, shareholders’ demands for accounting conservatism mentioned above can be 
larger than that demanded in developed markets because it can balance the large 
management entrenchment effects to reduce agency costs when executive ownership is 
above the threshold. 
 
Therefore, I conjecture that accounting conservatism has a U-shaped relationship with 
executive ownership in the Chinese market and thus conjecture the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a U-shaped relationship between the degree of firm 
                                                             
10
 The Chinese market has severe corruption, the manipulation of the stock market, the cheating in the tax, the abuse 
of the state assets and the lack of minority protections. 
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conservatism and executive ownership. 
 
On the one hand, when the executive ownership is lower than the threshold, to increase 
the firm’s value, the incentive alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests 
that the agency costs should be lower. Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and 
Takada (2010) suggest that higher accounting conservatism can reduce the agency cost 
from the low executive shareholdings. In order to reach the optimal firm value, the firms 
need to reduce the agency costs by increasing the executive shareholdings, which can 
also lower the shareholders’ demand for conservatism (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008). It indicates the deviation from target executive ownership level increases the 
conservatism. On the other hand, when the executive ownership is higher than the target 
level, the executives serve their own interests, because they possess more discretionary 
power from their larger than threshold shareholdings (Morck et al., 1988). Shuto and 
Takada (2010) suggest that if the executives with larger than threshold shareholdings 
increase their ownership, more accounting conservatism is needed to monitor the 
self-interested behaviour of the executives. Therefore, the deviation above the target 
level of executive ownership can also incur a demand for higher accounting 
conservatism. I then make the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The executive ownership deviation degree is positively related to the 
degree of conservatism. 
 
When the executive ownership is below the target level, the increase in executive 
ownership can reduce the agency cost caused by separation of ownership and 
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management (Shuto and Takada, 2010). Therefore, the executives are encouraged by 
shareholders to increase their shareholdings. The reason is explained by incentive 
alignment theory. The incentive alignment theory argues that the agency cost exists 
because of the separation of executive management and executive ownership, and thus 
the increase in the executive ownership can align the executives’ interests with the 
shareholders. The reason is that the limited horizon and limited liability of the tenure 
motivate the executives to overstate the current earnings (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008). The executives can increase their payments by providing biased performance and 
the overstatement of the expected cash flow (Shuto and Takada, 2010). Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) suggest that the managers with higher ownership are likely to have longer 
horizons. In other words, the managers are tied to the firms by increasing their 
ownership. 
 
When the executive ownership is above the target level, the executives may be pushed 
by the pressure from government shareholders and controlling shareholders to reduce 
executive ownership. I provide explanations why managers can be pushed to dilute their 
shares when they have too many shares. First, when executive ownership is above the 
target level, the further increase in executive ownership can increase executives’ 
entrenched behaviour and reduce firm value as suggested by entrenchment theory of 
Morck et al. (1988). Therefore, shareholders do not prefer that executives hold too many 
shares and then reduce firm value too much because of large agency costs. Second, Sun 
et al. (2002) indicate that firms in China should keep a fraction of government shares to 
show the links between government support and the firm business. It is important to 
maintain good relations with the government in China because the Chinese-listed firms 
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need the relationship with government to obtain special resources. Meanwhile, most 
listed firms in China are carve-outs from large state-owned enterprises or separate from 
them initially (Jiang et al., 2010). After the separation, the state-owned shares still 
occupy a large part of all outstanding shares. Jiang et al. (2010) point out that the 
Chinese government has declared that the remaining state-owned shares can only be 
traded under strict restrictions. Yuan et al. (2008) find that the average shareholdings by 
the government in listed firms are very high. As a consequence, the level of ownership 
concentration is very high, and many firms are still state-controlled. Yuan et al. (2008) 
suggest that the controlling shareholders and the state-owned shareholders can be the 
same most of the time. Furthermore, Firth et al. (2006a) and Conyon and He (2011) 
point out that the controlling shareholder in China can decide executives’ remuneration, 
appointments and dismissals. Therefore, executives can be pushed by the controlling 
shareholders or the government shareholders to reduce their shareholdings to a certain 
level if they have too many shares in Chinese-listed firms. 
 
Therefore, executives with too few shares are encouraged to increase their voting power 
to eliminate agency problems while executives are forced to dilute their high ownership 
to keep social links to other firm supporters like banks, government and research 
institutions. I suggest, therefore, that executive ownership can reverse to the target level. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The executive ownership can reverse to the target level. 
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2.2.4 The influence of the analyst coverage on the executive ownership and 
conservatism sensitivity 
Degeorge et al. (2013) suggest that the analyst coverage can help the firms to build up 
the good corporate governance. Previous studies provide evidence for that. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that the analysts’ activities are able to reduce the agency cost 
caused by separation of management and cash flow rights to some extent. Yu (2008) 
argues that the earnings management opportunities can be reduced by the increase in the 
analyst coverage density. Dyck et al. (2010) document that analysts can monitor the 
fraud behaviour of companies quickly. The analysts are trained to analyse the 
accounting reports of firms to monitor the firms’ operations. If the analysts cannot 
produce a good quality monitoring report which can reflect the target firms’ information 
and financial position accurately, the analysts’ reputation and interests can be damaged 
(Degeorge et al., 2013). 
 
I conjecture that the analyst coverage can affect the executive ownership and accounting 
conservatism sensitivity because it is an external monitoring mechanism to reduce the 
agency cost linked to the executive ownership and accounting conservatism. Doukas et 
al. (2005) and Jung et al. (2012) argue that the analysts can facilitate monitoring on the 
firms effectively to reduce the agency cost. On the one hand, when the executive 
ownership is lower than the threshold, accounting conservatism can reduce the agency 
cost caused by separation of the management and cash flow rights in executive 
ownership (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). The relationship between the deviation 
of executive ownership and accounting conservatism can be weakened because the 
analyst monitoring can reduce the agency cost and lower the shareholders’ demand for 
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accounting conservatism to regulate the executive behaviour. Therefore, the analyst 
coverage can be the substitute of the increase in the executive ownership. On the other 
hand, when the executive ownership is larger than the threshold, the firms take more 
conservative accounting strategies to monitor the management entrenchment effects 
(Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). Crutchley et al. (1999) argue that 
managerial entrenchment can increase the agency cost. As the analyst monitoring can 
reduce agency costs, the relationship between the executive ownership deviation and 
accounting conservatism can also be weakened by analysts monitoring because the 
agency costs have already been reduced by the analyst coverage monitoring. Therefore, 
I have the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The analyst coverage is the substitute of accounting conservatism and 
can reduce the sensitivity of the relationship between accounting conservatism and the 
executive ownership deviation. 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Methodology and model specification 
The first regression is used to test whether there is a U-shape relationship between the 
accounting conservatism and the executive ownership. The regression model is shown 
below. Equation (2.1) uses the model similar to the regression model given in 
McConnell and Servaes (1990)’s study. 
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          (2.1) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 is the conservatism measure which is the allowance for uncollectible account 
divided by the firm’s revenue. 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 is the fraction of executives’ ownership. 
𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡
2  is the squared term of the executive ownership. If the curves have the 
assumed U-shape, the sign of α1 should be negative while the sign of α2 should be 
positive. The control variables are denoted as the 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡. It contains the firm’s 
capital structure measure which is the leverage ratio (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡) of the firm in the 
current year. 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the firm’s asset size measure in the natural logarithm. 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 
is the market-to-book ratio of the firm in the current year. The three control variables are 
mainly used in accounting conservatism related papers to control for the firms’ 
fundamental features (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010). 
 
𝐾_𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the fixed asset divided by the total asset. Tong (2008) uses the fixed asset as 
the control variable to test the relationship between the managerial ownership and the 
firm’s value and finds the coefficient of the fixed asset is positively related to the firm’s 
value. The main implication of accounting conservatism is to understate the asset value 
(Watts, 2003). Therefore, the coefficient in this chapter should be negatively related to 
the dependent variable. 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 is the revenue growth ratio in the current 
year. Ahmed et al. (2002) and Tong (2008) use the sales growth ratio as the control 
variable to control for the firm growth capability. The results of Tong (2008) show that 
the sales growth is positively related to the firm’s value. I conjecture that the sales 
growth is negatively related to accounting conservatism using the same reasoning. In 
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addition, accounting conservatism measured by the allowance for the uncollectible 
account reduces the available funds used to make further investment to increase the 
sales growth. This is because the cash is reserved for the allowance and cannot be used 
for investments. 𝑆𝐷_𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the volatility of the revenue to measure the operating 
risk (García Lara et al., 2016; Tong, 2008). The greater sales volatility means the more 
risks in the revenue. García Lara et al. (2016) suggest that the income volatility is high 
when the investments of the firms are not prudent. García Lara et al. (2016) also suggest 
that accounting conservatism can reduce the firm risk-taking level, which indicates the 
that the firm may invest in more prudent ways and reduces the income volatility. 
Therefore, if the risk level is high, the shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism is high. 𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the measure of the listing age from paper of Hu and 
Zhou (2008). Watts (2003) suggests that the firm takes more accounting conservatism if 
the firm has longer existing time. Therefore, the coefficient of 𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 should be 
positive. 
 
𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹3𝑖𝑡 is the large shareholding concentration degree which is the Herfindahl index 
(Wang et al., 2004). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) show that the greater concentration 
of share ownership can raise the firm’s performance. However, the conservatism is the 
understatement of asset value (Watts, 2003), and thus my results show that the 
ownership concentration index (Herfindahl 3) is negatively related to accounting 
conservatism. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cash generated from the operating activity divided 
by the operating revenue. It measures the ability of a company to generate cash from its 
sales. I include this control variable because the cash level is important in the firms for 
the daily operations. The lack of liquidity reduces the opportunity to make further 
48 
 
investment and reduce the ability to resist the adverse conditions (Gao et al., 2013). 
Since accounting conservatism can understate cash flow of the firms, I suppose that the 
sign of the coefficient is negative. 
 
When I design the models, I also include the industry and the year-fixed effect in the 
regressions. By adding the year-fixed effect, the influences of the market environment 
features like the annual financial positions and policies changes can be examined. The 
industry-fixed effect examines the different industry features. Therefore, I can reduce 
the omitted variables’ effects of the regression models. The normal regressions use the 
robust standard error. I also take consideration of the firm clustered standard error 
robust into the regression to test the consistency of the regression results. I follow Gao 
et al. (2013) and Jiang and Lie (2016) to use the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors to account for the possible correlation within a firm cluster. 
 
I then need to determine the model for obtaining the target level of the executive 
ownership by industry year grouped regressions. Appendix 2.2 shows the regressions 
for obtaining the target value of executive ownership. Following Jiang and Lie (2016), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Tong (2008). Appendix 2.2 shows the regressions of 
obtaining the target value of executive ownership. The main variables are the same as 
those used in the papers of Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Tong (2008). Following Jiang 
and Lie (2016), I use the pooled regression results in the appendix instead of the 
industry-year grouped regressions to show the determinants of the target executive 
ownership. In addition to those control variables employed by Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
and Tong (2008), I also incorporate more variables to control for the impact of firm 
49 
 
characteristics. 
 
The additional variables include CASH_LIABILITY, LABOR, LNEQ, TO and ROA. 
CASH_LIABILITY is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the current liability which 
measures the current capability of the firms to use cash to pay back all the liabilities 
(Ertuğrul and Karakaşoğlu, 2009). The variables from Himmelberg et al. (1999) and 
Tong (2008) do not consider the liquidity aspect of the firm. Therefore, I include the 
liquidity-related variable - CASH_LIABILITY to increase the accuracy of the target 
executive ownership according to different firm features. Following Hu and Zhou 
(2008), I include LABOR which is the measure of the employee size of the firms. Hu 
and Zhou (2008) suggest that the number of the employee is not only the alternative 
measure of the firm’s size but also a significant factor in determining the firm’s 
productivity. Therefore, I include this variable to cover the productivity aspect of the 
firm’s features. LNEQ is the natural logarithm of the shareholders’ equity. It is an 
alternative to the firm’s size. I use it to improve the accuracy of the prediction for the 
target executive ownership because this measure removes the influence of the liability 
on the firm’s size and is directly related to the capital amount. TO is the turnover ratio 
of sales divided by the accounts receivable. The high turnover ratio indicates that the 
firms can collect its receivables more quickly (Ertuğrul and Karakaşoğlu, 2009). 
Jackson and Liu (2010) use the turnover ratio as the control variable to test the firm’s 
accounting conservatism. Therefore, I include this variable to cover the turnover aspects 
of the firm features. ROA is the performance measure. I use it to examine the influence 
of the firm’s performance on the target executive ownership. 
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This methodology is applicable to the Chinese market because the variables regarded in 
the previous papers as the determinants of executive ownership are mainly from the 
balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement. These variables are accessible 
in China. In particular, I have included more control variables in the model for 
Chinese-listed firms. Furthermore, I can more easily compare my empirical results 
about Chinese-listed firms with those from U.S. studies by using similar variables. 
 
The executive ownership deviation is defined as the target value of executive ownership 
minus the actual lagged executive ownership. I use DEF to represent the deviation in 
managerial ownership. Therefore, I have the following equations: 
 
1it it itDEF TARGET EXEOWN                                         (2.2) 
 
0 1 ( )it it it itDEXEOWN DEF CONTROL                                (2.3) 
 
Following Jiang and Lie (2016) and Byoun (2008), the regression model Equation (2.3) 
is employed to capture the capital structure adjustment speed. DEXEOWN is the current 
executive ownership minus the lagged executive ownership. DEF is the target executive 
ownership minus the lagged executive ownership. The positive sign of the coefficient on 
DEF (𝛽1) indicates that the actual executive ownership can reverse to the target 
executive ownership. The coefficient of DEF (𝛽1) is the adjustment speed at a given 
level of the deviation. The industry and the year-fixed effects are also included in 
Equation (2.3). The firm clustered standard error is also used in the regression 
estimation. 
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To examine the relationship between the executive ownership deviation and accounting 
conservatism, I use Equations (2.4.1) and (2.4.2) derived from the paper of Tong (2008). 
The regression model is as follows. 
 
0 1 ( )it it it itCON ABSDEF CONTROL                                 (2.4.1) 
 
0 1 2
3 ( )
it it it it
it it it
CON ABSDEF ABSDEF ABOVEDUMMY
ABOVEDUMMY CONTROL
  
 
   
  
                (2.4.2) 
 
The CON is the same as I mentioned before, and is measured as the allowance for the 
uncollectible account divided by the sales. The ABSDEF is the absolute value of the 
deviation of the executive ownership following Tong (2008). By using the absolute 
value of the deviation, I can examine the degree of the executive ownership deviation 
regardless of the direction of the executive ownership deviations. However, I use a 
dummy variable ABOVEDUMMY to include the influences of the executive ownership 
on accounting conservatism both below and above the target executive ownership level. 
The above target dummy equals one if the actual previous executive ownership is higher 
than the target level, otherwise zero. The interaction of the absolute value of the 
deviation and the above target dummy is used to examine whether the executive 
ownership deviations above the target level also increase accounting conservatism. The 
control variables are the same as I discussed in Equation (2.1). The influences of the 
industry and the year fixed effects are included in the regressions. I test the regression 
standard errors not only using the basic robust but also test the regression standard 
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errors using the firm clustering robust (Jiang and Lie, 2016). 
 
This paragraph further explains why the relationship between accounting conservatism 
and executive ownership has a U shape in my study. I use Function 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 to 
further prove that the relationship between executive ownership and accounting 
conservatism can only be U shape in China by introducing the deviation of executive 
ownership. According to Shuto and Takada (2010), the relationship between managerial 
ownership and accounting conservatism is a cubic regression function in Japan. If the 
Chinese market listed firms have the cubic pattern similar to that in Japan rather than a 
U-shaped pattern, the results of the two functions can be insignificant. It is because the 
distance to the target value cannot be determined in a cubic function since there are two 
turning points in the cubic function. The distance to the target level can only be 
determined in a U-shaped function as there is only one turning point. My results in 
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show that the shareholders’ demands for accounting 
conservatism are positively related to the absolute value of executive ownership 
deviation. This indicates that the more distance from the target value, the more 
shareholders’ demands for accounting conservatism, which can support that the 
U-shaped relationship holds in China. 
 
To examine the influence of the analyst coverage on the executive ownership deviation 
and accounting conservatism sensitivity, I introduce the following regression models 
(2.5.1) and (2.5.2). 
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The analyst coverage (ANALYST) contains three aspects, the number of analysts, 
number of brokers and the number of reports. I use the dummy variable AD, BD and RD 
to represent the heavy monitoring from the analysts. AD equals to one if the analyst 
coverage is greater than the industry-year mean, otherwise zero. BD equals one if the 
broker coverage is greater than the industry-year mean, otherwise zero. RD equals one if 
the report coverage is greater than the industry-year mean, otherwise zero. The other 
variables are the same as the variables mentioned before. The industry and the year 
fixed effects and the firm clustered standard errors are included. 
 
In econometrics, an endogeneity problem occurs when an explanatory variable is 
correlated with the error term (Jeffrey, 2013). Endogeneity can arise as a result of 
measurement error, autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneous causality, 
omitted selection, and omitted variables (Antonakis et al., 2010). However, the 
endogeneity problem can be reduced but very difficult to be eliminated (McCarthy et al., 
2017). I have tried my best to deal with the potential endogeneity problems. First, I use 
many control variables following relevant literature to reduce the problem from omitted 
variables. Second, I use the panel data year-and-industry-fixed effect to check 
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robustness between the OLS model and the fixed effect model. Rossi (2013) suggests 
that by controlling for all time and industry differences, the unobservable effects can be 
considered, and fixed effects models greatly reduce the threat of omitted variable bias. 
The Hausman test results are in Appendix 2.3, which indicate that I need to use industry 
and year-fixed effect. Third, to solve the potential distribution bias of executive 
ownership, I use the bootstrap regression. The bootstrap regression allows the 
estimation of the sampling distribution of almost any statistic using random sampling 
methods and forms a normally distributed resampled data (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994; 
Varian, 2005). Since executive ownership data is skewed and biased, using bootstrap 
regression can resample the variables and correct the skewed distribution of executive 
ownership. The results of bootstrap regression results are consistent with main results. I 
include this robustness check and provide the results in Table 2.12 of my thesis. The 
details of why I use bootstrap regression are discussed in Section 2.4.7. Fourth, 
following McCarthy et al. (2017), Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) and Duchin et al. (2010), 
I apply a regression in which the dependent variable is measured at time t while the 
independent variables, as well as the control variables, are measured at time t-1 to 
reduce simultaneity related endogeneity. The details are provided in Section 2.4.7, and 
the results are reported in Table 2.13. Using these four methods to deal with the 
potential endogeneity and bias problems, I find the results are still consistent with my 
original regressions, and thus my results are robust across different models. 
 
I provide the reasons to explain that executive ownership is a meaningful magnitude for 
large listed firms. In addition, I also explain why I use executive ownership as the 
measure of managerial ownership in my thesis. First, Shuto and Takada (2010) use CEO 
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ownership in their study about the Japanese listed firms. I do not use CEO ownership 
because CEO ownership only takes consideration of one top manager rather than the 
management team. Therefore, CEO ownership is even smaller in percentage and can be 
more skewed in data distribution as suggested by Core and Larcker (2002), which 
cannot reflect enough influence of the management team on firm operations in Chinese 
large listed companies. Executive ownership reflects the sum of the shareholding 
percentage of top three managers, which is a better measure than just CEO ownership. I 
have referred to Wang and Judge (2012) and found that executive ownership is used in 
China to investigate its influence on the listed firms’ performances. They find that 
executive ownership can significantly affect firm performance even though it is much 
smaller compared to other shareholding types. Following the study of Wang and Judge 
(2012), we also use executive ownership to investigate the Chinese-listed firms. In 
addition, many papers such as Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008), Shuto and Takada (2010) and Florackis et al. (2015) 
use similar ownership like board ownership, insider ownership, CEO ownership and 
executive ownership as the measure of managerial ownership in their studies of large 
listed companies across the world. Even though these types of ownership are small in 
shareholding percentages and skewed in distribution, these papers point out that 
managerial ownership can affect firm policies and performances directly and 
significantly. For example, Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
develop and further confirm the incentive alignment theory and entrenchment theory to 
explain the significant non-monotonic relationship between firm value and board 
ownership in US-listed firms. Their managerial ownership data is also small in 
shareholding percentage, but their papers are widely cited by other researchers to 
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continue the relevant research. Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) find that shareholders’ 
demand for accounting conservatism has a significant negative relationship with 
executive ownership in US-listed firms while executive ownership is relatively smaller 
compared to other types of shareholdings. Shuto and Takada (2010) find that Japanese 
shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism has a significant cubic pattern of 
relationship with CEO ownership when executive ownership still has small size and 
skewed distribution. Florackis et al. (2015) find out that dividend payments and 
managerial ownership have a significant non-monotonic relationship when managerial 
ownership is small and skewed. Therefore, executive ownership still has a meaningful 
magnitude when investigating the listed firms across the world. 
 
Second, in my thesis, EXEOWN is used to measure the executive ownership in my 
thesis. The managerial ownership discussed by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) is measured by the board ownership. The board of directors contains the 
executive directors and non-executive directors. The non-executive members are 
expected to engage in the executives’ decision-making process because they are 
designed as the internal monitoring mechanisms to regulate the executives (Mura, 2007). 
Morck et al. (1988) show that there is a positive relationship between the board 
ownership and the firm value when the board ownership is above 25% (second turning 
point of a cubic relationship). The reason for this phenomenon is that the monitoring 
mechanism from the non-executive members is internally built into the structure of the 
board of directors. Therefore, the self-interested behaviour can be reduced when the 
board ownership is above 25%. Therefore, I only use the executive ownership to 
eliminate the potential influence of the monitoring of the non-executive directors. 
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Third, Core and Larcker (2002) suggest that even though managerial ownership is 
important in studies, it still suffers from its skewed distributions in data. In order to 
eliminate the influence of bias from the measure of executive ownership, I add a new 
regression which is the bootstrap regression. The bootstrap regression allows the 
estimation of the sampling distribution of almost any statistic using random sampling 
methods (Varian, 2005). The bootstrap regression can improve the estimation accuracy 
regardless of original sample data distributions. I use STATA to run the regression, and 
the results are consistent with main results. I add this robustness check and provide the 
results in Table 2.12 of my thesis. 
 
2.3.2 Data & sample 
All the variables are obtained from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. Similar to the previous studies, my sample includes all the firms 
listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) but removes all the financial firms from the sample (Firth et al., 2006a, b, 2007a; 
Takao Kato and Cheryl Long, 2006). My sample period is from 2005 to 2015. The 
reason for me to start the sample from the year 2005 is that the split share reform took 
place in that year (Firth et al., 2010; Hou et al., 2012; Kuo et al., 2014). Prior to the split 
share reform, the non-tradable shares were in the hands of the insiders including the 
managers, the directors and the controlling shareholders. The non-tradable shareholders’ 
wealth was unrelated to the stock price movement before the reform which can lead to 
the lack of incentives to provide the good quality of the information disclosure (Liu and 
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Tian, 2012). Therefore, I can ensure a good quality of the sample data by excluding the 
influence of a large amount of the non-tradable shares before the split share reform in 
2005. In Table 2.1-Panel A, the total number of firm-year observations is 16,133 for all 
the variables. In Table 2.1-Panel B, the distribution of the executive ownership is 
displayed. The sample period covers both the pre- and post- the financial crisis in 2008.  
 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
I take the year-end accounting record from CSMAR. In Table 2.1, I report all the 
variables used in this study. Panel A includes those variables used to test the U-shape 
relationship between the firms’ accounting conservatism and the executive ownership. 
In Panel A, CON is the measure of accounting conservatism, which is the allowance for 
uncollectible account divided by the revenue. The mean is 1.509 while the standard 
deviation is 8.915. 
 
EXEOWN is used to measure the executive ownership. The detailed distribution of the 
executive ownership is shown in Panel B. Almost half of the non-zero executive 
ownership is located in the range from zero to 1%. The data show that few executive 
ownerships are greater than 50%. The EXEOWN, which denotes the executive 
ownership, is the main variable I need to examine. The analyst coverage is transferred 
into the heavy analyst coverage for the firms. The AD, BD and RD equal to one if the 
number of analysts, brokers and reports is greater than the industry-year mean. 
 
LEVERAGE is the firm’s leverage ratio, which is obtained by dividing the long-term 
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debt by the replacement value. The mean is 0.419 while the standard deviation is 0.240. 
CFOCOVER is the cash generated from operating activity divided by operating revenue. 
The cash flow consideration becomes increasingly important in China because in 2012 
and 2013 the domestic market suffered a severe shortage of liquidity, which caused a 
widespread economic downturn. The mean of CFOCOVER is -0.845 while the standard 
deviation is 11.459. K_AS is the value of plant, property and equipment to the firms’ 
total assets. LNAT is the firm’s size measure calculated as the log of total book asset. 
LNTIME is the natural logarithm of the listing time of companies up to the latest reading. 
Watts (2003) concludes that the firms’ accounting can become increasingly 
conservative over time. Therefore, the listing age should be positively related to 
accounting conservatism. SALE_GROWTH is the sales growth rate. The mean of the 
sales growth rate is 0.187 while the standard deviation is 0.971. HERF3 is the 
ownership concentration degree of the top 3 shareholders. SD_LNSALE measures the 
volatility of the log of sales. 
 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
 
Table 2.2 shows the correlation matrix for all the aforementioned variables in Panel A. 
These variables are the core components of the main regression. In Table 2.2 the 
correlations for all the variables are not large. Therefore, there is no concern about 
multicollinearity. Each of the control variables stands for a different aspect of the 
features of firms, so there are no highly correlated cases. 
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2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 The relationship between executive ownership and conservatism 
Table 2.3 reports the results of testing the relationship between the degree of accounting 
conservatism and the executive ownership for the Chinese market. 
 
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
 
The results show that both the first order and second order of executive ownership are 
significantly related to accounting conservatism. The coefficients of EXEOWN are 
negatively significant at the 1% level across all regressions in Table 2.3. The 
coefficients of the square of the executive ownership (EXEOWN
2
) are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The results are consistent when the industry and the year 
effects are controlled. The results with the firm clustering standard errors are still 
consistent. The results show a typical pattern for the U-shaped relationship between the 
executive ownership and the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism. 
Therefore, I can provide evidence that there is a significant U-shaped relationship 
between the executive ownership and the shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism. 
 
Regarding the control variables, I find that LEVERAGE, CFOCOVER, K_AS, LNTIME, 
LNAT, SALE_GROWTH, HERF3, SD_LNSALE and MTB are significant across all the 
regression models regardless of the robust types. LEVERAGE is the long-term debt 
divided by the total asset. The coefficient is positive, and it implies that the firms’ 
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leverage ratio is positively related to the degree of accounting conservatism. Since the 
long-term debt needs to be repaid and has the payment of interests to the debtors, the 
increase in long-term debt may constrain the managers from taking more risks and 
being aggressive in the investment projects. And thus the firm’s leverage is positively 
related to the demand for accounting conservatism. CFOCOVER measures the amount 
of cash from operating activities as a proportion of total sales. I find that the coefficient 
of CFOCOVER is significant and negative, which is consistent across all the regression 
models in the table. Firms may try to ensure that they have more than enough cash 
available to protect against possible adverse conditions in the market (Bates et al., 2009). 
However, the cash can be reduced when the allowance for the uncollectible account is 
large (i.e. when accounting conservatism is high). Therefore, the cash from operating 
divided by the sales has a negative relationship between accounting conservatism. K_AS 
is the fixed asset divided by the total asset. Tong (2008) shows that the fixed asset is 
positively related to the firm’s value. Accounting conservatism is the understatement of 
the net asset value. Therefore, the fixed asset should be negatively related to accounting 
conservatism, which has been supported by the results of the regressions. 
 
LNTIME is the log of listing time of the firm. The coefficient is positively significant. It 
indicates the longer period a firm has been listed on the market, the more conservative it 
can be (Watts, 2003). LNAT is the measure of the firm’s size. As I discussed above, the 
main implication of conservatism is its understatement of the firm value. Therefore, the 
coefficient is negative and significant. SALE_GROWTH is the sales growth rate of the 
firms. The result shows that it is negatively related to the conservatism. It is because the 
measure of accounting conservatism is the allowance for the uncollectible accounts, 
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which need cash or internal funds to cover the potential bad debt expenses. Therefore, 
the funds used in the investment to increase the sales growth rate can be reduced. As a 
result, the sales growth rate is negatively related to accounting conservatism. 
SD_LNSALE is the volatility of the revenue to measure the operating risk (García Lara 
et al., 2016; Tong, 2008). The larger sales volatility means the more risks in the revenue. 
García Lara et al. (2016) suggest that the income volatility is high when the investments 
of the firms are not prudent. García Lara et al. (2016) also suggest that accounting 
conservatism can reduce the firm’s risk-taking level, which indicates that the firm may 
invest in more prudent ways and reduce the income volatility. Therefore, if the risk level 
is high, the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism is high. 
 
MTB is the relative valuation of the firm to identify whether the firm is overvalued or 
undervalued. Accounting conservatism can understate the firms’ value but is not 
directly related to the relative value of the firms. Therefore, I do not conjecture the signs 
of the coefficients of MTB. HERF3 is the top three shareholders’ concentration degree 
in Chinese firms. This variable is used to capture the high ownership concentration of 
Chinese firms. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) show that the greater concentration of 
share ownership can raise the firms’ performance. However, conservatism is the 
understatement of asset value (Watts, 2003). And thus, my results show that the 
ownership concentration index (Herfindahl 3) is negatively related to accounting 
conservatism. 
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2.4.2 The relationship between the executive ownership deviation and the change of 
executive ownership 
Appendix 2.2 shows the target value of the target ownership fitting model for the 
executive ownership. The adjusted R-square is 42.2%, which is similar to the results of 
Himmelberg et al. (1999). Therefore, I have developed a reasonable model to generate 
the target executive ownership. I use the fitted values from the industry-year grouped 
regression as the target executive ownership to obtain the deviations. The deviation 
value is calculated as the difference between the expected target value and the actual 
lagged executive ownership. The deviation (DEF) is used to test its impacts on the 
executive ownership and the degree of conservatism in the next parts. ABSDEF is the 
absolute value of the deviation. It is more convenient and easy to test the regression 
results with the absolute value because it eliminates the positive and negative sign 
effects. 
 
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
 
Table 2.4 shows the results of the relationship between changes in executive ownership 
and executive ownership deviation from the target executive ownership. DEF is the 
deviation value generated using the target executive ownership from Appendix 2.2. 
DEXEOWN is the dependent variable. I consider the pooled OLS model, the year fixed 
effect model and the year-industry fixed effect model in Table 2.4. The coefficients of 
DEF are significant and positive at the 1% level across all the regressions. The results 
indicate that the non-financial firms do react to revert to the target level. The 
relationship between DEF and DEXEOWN shows that the executive ownership can 
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reverse to the target level. This result provides the evidence for Hypothesis 3 in this 
chapter. The reversing speed of the executive ownership to the target executive 
ownership level is around 13%. 
 
2.4.3 The influence of the deviation on executive ownership and conservatism 
Following the model of Tong (2008), Table 2.5 shows the results of the relationship 
between conservatism and deviation. The deviation absolute value ABSDEF is 
positively related to conservatism. ABSDEF indicates how far is the current executive 
ownership from the target level of executive ownership. I focus on the coefficients of 
ABSDEF and ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY. The coefficient of ABSDEF shows that the 
deviation has a positive relationship with the conservatism without considering the 
influence of the executive ownership below or above the target executive ownership. 
The combination of the two coefficients shows that the deviation has a positive 
relationship with conservatism when the executive ownership is above the target level. 
Therefore, the results show that an increase in the deviation can lead to an increase in 
the use of the conservative accounting strategy, which supports Hypothesis 2. The 
results can also support the U-shaped relationship between executive ownership and 
accounting conservatism because the conservatism is at minimum only if the firms keep 
the executive ownership at the target level. If executive ownership is away from the 
target level, the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism also increases. 
 
[Insert Table 2.5&2.6 here] 
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Furthermore, I also find that the sensitivities of accounting conservatism and executive 
ownership are significantly different in the above target executive ownership level 
compared to the whole sample. I compare the coefficients from Table 2.5 Model 1 and 
Model 4. The sensitivity when the executive ownership is above target level 
(25.189-19.494=5.695) is weaker than that in the whole sample (9.451). Morck et al. 
(1988) suggest that the incentive alignment may regain dominance when the executive 
ownership becomes even higher in US market. The reason is that the good corporate 
governance makes the managers align effectively with the shareholders even when the 
executives obtain a very high level of the ownership. However, the corporate 
governance in China is very weak (Braendle et al., 2005). In addition, investor 
protection and the legal systems are also less developed than the developed markets 
(Jiang et al., 2010; Kuo et al., 2014). Therefore, the management entrenchment can be 
more severe in China, which indicates that the demand for the monitoring of accounting 
conservatism is higher when the executive ownership is above the threshold. The results 
show that the incentive alignment effect cannot regain dominance in the Chinese market 
when the executive ownership is very high. The results reveal that I need to consider the 
weak corporate governance conditions when the studies are about Chinese-listed firms. 
 
I use the pooled OLS model, the year-fixed-effect model and the year-industry fixed 
effect model in Table 2.5. The standard error is robust. The results are consistent across 
the different models. In Table 2.6, I use the same variables but with the firm-clustered 
robust standard error. The results are consistent with Table 2.5. Therefore, I can 
conclude the deviation distance from the target executive ownership level enhances the 
shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism. By using firm-clustered robust 
66 
 
standard error in the regressions, I eliminate the heteroskedasticity of the different firm 
features. 
 
2.4.4 The influence of the analyst coverage on the executive ownership deviation and 
conservatism 
Table 2.7 examines the relationship between the deviation-DEF and the 
conservatism-CON with the analyst number dummy effect. AD, BD and RD represent 
the analyst number dummy, the broker number dummy and the report number dummy. 
 
[Insert Table 2.7, 2.8&2.9 here] 
 
AD is the dummy equal to one if the number of analysts focusing on the firm is larger 
than the average number of analysts by year and industry. RD is the dummy equal to 
one if the number of reports focusing on the firm is larger than the average number of 
reports by year and industry. According to Hou et al. (2012), the number of reports 
indicates the strength of monitoring similar to the number of analysts. It also indicates 
the frequency of forecast results. In other words, the number of report can measure the 
review frequency for a certain firm. I consider this measure because analysts are divided 
into different groups to compile the reports. Even though the number of analysts is 
sometimes very large, they may just issue one version of the forecast report. Therefore, 
it is necessary to include the number of reports as another measure. Similarly, the 
number of brokerage firms measures how many analyst brokerage institutions 
investigate a certain firm. BD is the dummy equal to one if the number of brokers 
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focusing on the firm is larger than the average number of brokers by year and industry. I 
include AD and the interaction with AD to the original ABSDEF and 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY. The results show that the analyst coverage reduces the 
influence of the executive ownership deviation on accounting conservatism. It implies 
that the external monitoring, such as the analyst coverage, can help the firms to reduce 
the agency cost and meanwhile reduce the sensitivity between the executive ownership 
and accounting conservatism because the external monitoring (analyst coverage) is a 
substitute for the internal monitoring (accounting conservatism). The conservative 
accounting strategy is appreciated because it reduces the agency cost. If the external 
monitoring mechanism like the analyst coverage is well built, the agency cost can be 
reduced efficiently. Therefore, the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism to 
reduce the agency cost is lower. Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 results are consistent with Table 
2.7. 
 
2.4.5 The robustness test including the state-controlled firm dummy 
In Table 2.10, I include the state-controlled firm dummy STATEDUMMY to test whether 
the government-controlled firms have some special features in the relationship between 
the executive ownership and accounting conservatism. The dummy equals one if the 
state controls the firm, otherwise zero. 
 
[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
 
The explanatory power of the original models is the same because the main variable 
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coefficients are consistently significant with the same signs. However, the 
state-controlled firm dummy is not significant throughout different regression models. It 
indicates the state-owned firms do not have a significant direct impact on accounting 
conservatism. The findings of this chapter reveal that the weak corporate governance 
environment is the main concern in the relationship between the executive ownership 
and accounting conservatism rather than the state-owned-firm features. 
 
2.4.6 The robustness test using the method of the asymmetric timeliness accounting 
conservatism measure 
The measure of accounting conservatism can be classified as the unconditional 
measures and the conditional measures. The method of using the allowance for the 
uncollectible account is the unconditional method. Therefore, I follow Basu (1997), 
Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada (2010) to use the conditional 
method of the asymmetric timeliness to measure accounting conservatism. I use this 
robust check to further support the U-shaped relationship between accounting 
conservatism and the executive ownership in China. I follow Shuto and Takada (2010)
11
 
to design the regression with the same structure and the same control variables. Basu et 
al. (2005) and Khan and Watts (2009) also use similar regression models. 
 
                                                             
11 They follow the argument of Khan and Watts (2009) that the regression only needs the interaction terms between 
the return and the firm’s characteristics. They provide two reasons for the absence of the separate firm’s 
characteristics. The first is that adding the firm’s characteristics separately can lead to strong multicollinearity. The 
precision of the estimates can be reduced. Secondly, the goal of the study is to obtain the measure of accounting 
conservatism rather than focus on the effects of the firm’s characteristics. The paper of Basu et al. (2005) also does 
not use the separate firm’s characteristics. 
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Shuto and Takada (2010) point out that the primary concern in the analysis of Basu 
(1997) is the coefficient on RETit×NEGit, because the coefficient measures the degree of 
accounting conservatism. Therefore, the coefficients of the first three variables 
RETit ×NEGit, RETit ×NEGit ×EXEOWNit-1 and RETit ×NEGit × EXEOWN
2
it-1 in the 
regression are the main variables I am interested in. If the firms’ accounting strategies 
are conservative, the coefficient of RETit×NEGit should be significant and positive 
according to the paper of Basu (1997). Basu (1997) investigates that the news about a 
firm in a given period can be incorporated in the earnings of the firm. The news can be 
conditioned as “good” (positive return) or “bad” (negative return). Basu (1997) suggests 
that the asymmetric standards for the verification of the losses and the gains from the 
bad news can be reflected more than those from the good news in the current earnings. 
In the above regression, the coefficient (𝛽7) of RETit can measure the response of the 
earnings to the positive returns. The coefficients combination (𝛽7 + 𝛽1) of RETit and 
RETit×NEGit measures the response of the negative return. Basu (1997) suggests that 
accounting conservatism indicates that the combined coefficients of RETit and 
RETit×NEGit (𝛽7 + 𝛽1) is larger than the coefficient of RETit (𝛽7). Therefore, the 
positive sign of the coefficient of RETit×NEGit can show that the accounting strategy is 
conservative in the firm. 
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[Insert Table 2.11 here] 
 
Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada (2010) suggest that the 
coefficients of RETit×NEGit×EXEOWNit-1 should be negative while the coefficients of 
RETit×NEGit×EXEOWN
2
it-1 should be positive if the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and executive ownership is U-shaped. It is because the negative sign of 
RETit×NEGit×EXEOWNit-1 indicates the incremental effect of the executive ownership 
is to reduce the original accounting conservatism when the executive ownership 
increases and the executive ownership is below the threshold. Therefore, the executive 
ownership is a substitute of accounting conservatism when the executive is below the 
threshold. The positive coefficient of RETit×NEGit×EXEOWN
2
it-1 shows that the 
incremental effect of the square of the executive ownership also adds the shareholders’ 
demand of accounting conservatism to monitor the management entrenchment effect 
when the executive ownership is above the threshold. The results of Table 2.11 show 
that the regressions of the conditional accounting conservatism support my hypothesis 
that the relationship between accounting conservatism and the executive ownership is a 
U-shape. The coefficients of RETit × NEGit × EXEOWNit-1 and 
RETit×NEGit×EXEOWN
2
it-1 have the same signs and meanings compared to the results 
of Shuto and Takada (2010). Therefore, my results are consistent across both the 
unconditional and conditional measures of accounting conservatism. 
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2.4.7 The robustness test to reduce potential endogeneity problem using bootstrap 
regression and the regression with first lag of all independent variables 
[Insert Table 2.12 here] 
 
The bootstrap regression allows the estimation of the sampling distribution of almost 
any statistic using random sampling methods (Varian, 2005). DiCiccio and Efron (1996) 
suggest that bootstrap is a straightforward way to derive estimates of standard errors and 
confidence intervals for complex estimators and complex parameters which do not have 
normal distributions, including percentile points, proportions and odd ratio. They also 
suggest that bootstrap is an appropriate way to control and check the stability of the 
results. In the event that it is impossible to know the true confidence interval, DiCiccio 
and Efron (1996) suggest that bootstrap is asymptotically more accurate than the 
standard intervals obtained using sample variance and assumptions of normality. 
Bootstrap regression does not require normal distribution assumptions and can provide 
more accurate inferences when the data are not normally distributed or when the sample 
size is small (Fox, 2002). Therefore, I can reduce the potential problem from the biased 
distribution of executive ownership. 
 
 [Insert Table 2.13 here] 
 
I also apply a regression in which the dependent variable is measured at time t while the 
independent variables, as well as the control variables, are measured at time t-1. A 
similar approach is also applied by Duchin et al. (2010) and Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) 
in order to reduce the effect of endogeneity. By using this method to reduce the potential 
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endogeneity problem, I find the results are still consistent with my original regressions. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
I obtained the data for Chinese-listed firms from the CSMAR database. The sample data 
covers a time span of 11 years from 2005 to 2015, excluding financial firms. In this 
study, accounting conservatism is measured by the allowance for the uncollectible 
account. The core implication of accounting conservatism is the understatement of the 
asset value (Jackson and Liu, 2010; Penman and Zhang, 2002; Watts, 2003). Jackson 
and Liu (2010) suggest the allowance for the uncollectible account can help to constrain 
a significant amount of the management discretion. Furthermore, Jackson and Liu (2010) 
suggest that the allowance for the uncollectible account is an account for which 
accounting conservatism is amenable to fairly direct observation and measurement. The 
U-shaped relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism can 
be explained by the incentive alignment theory when executive ownership is lower than 
the threshold (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008) and the entrenchment theory when the 
executive ownership is higher than the threshold (Shuto and Takada, 2010). 
 
I obtain the target value of the executive ownership to calculate the deviation of the 
executive ownership from the target value. I find a positive relationship between the 
executive ownership deviation and the change of the executive ownership, which 
indicates the executive ownership can reverse to the target level. The adjustment speed 
of the reversing mechanism is around 13%. The results are consistent with the 
arguments of Core and Larcker (2002) which suggest that the executive ownership can 
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reverse to the target level under the consideration of the firms’ contracting and 
re-contracting cost and benefit balance. 
 
I examine the influence of the executive ownership deviation on accounting 
conservatism. The results show that the executive ownership deviation has a positive 
relationship with accounting conservatism. It supports the U-shaped relationship 
between the executive ownership and accounting conservatism. Furthermore, I find that 
the sensitivities of accounting conservatism and the executive ownership deviation are 
different when the executive ownership is above or below the target level. When 
executive ownership is higher than the target level, the sensitivity of accounting 
conservatism and the executive ownership deviation is lower and positive in amount. 
Compared to developed markets, more shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism is needed to monitor the executives’ entrenchment behaviour (executive 
ownership higher than the threshold). 
 
Chinese firms do apply accounting conservatism in the operations. For example, Li and 
Lu (2003) consider the effects of conservatism on accruals and find the significant 
phenomenon of accounting conservatism in financial reports of China A-share market 
listing firms. Razzaq and Zou (2016) find that the accounting conservatism enables 
timely loss recognition to mitigate firms from overinvestment in China. Hence 
conservatism is mostly demanded by investors and shareholders. However, in this 
chapter, I discuss the relationship between shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism and executive ownership. When executive ownership is below the 
threshold, the incentive alignment theory dominates. The increase in executive 
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ownership reduces the agency costs. Shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism 
decreases along with the increase in executive ownership. It is because that Watts (2003) 
suggest accounting conservatism can monitor the executives and reduce the agency cost 
of their misbehaviour. Therefore, shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism is 
negatively related to executive ownership (lower than the threshold). When executive 
ownership is above the threshold, the entrenchment theory dominates. The increase in 
executive ownership increases the agency cost. Shareholders’ demand for accounting 
conservatism is increased along with the increase in executive ownership as Watts 
(2003) suggest accounting conservatism can reduce the agency cost caused by 
executives’ misconduct. Therefore, shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism 
is positively related to executive ownership (higher than the threshold). 
 
I examine the influence of the analyst coverage to the relationship between the 
executive ownership deviation and accounting conservatism. Analyst coverage reduces 
sensitivity between the demand for accounting conservatism and executive ownership 
deviation. The monitoring power of the analyst can also reduce the agency cost (Dyck et 
al., 2010; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Yu, 2008). Therefore, the analyst coverage is a 
substitute to accounting conservatism. 
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Tables for Chapter 2 
Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
PANEL A 
VARIABLE N MEAN SD P25 P50 P75 
CON 16133 1.509 8.915 0.007 0.023 0.080 
EXEOWN 16133 0.049 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AD 16133 0.353 0.478 0 0 1 
BD 16133 0.358 0.479 0 0 1 
RD 16133 0.328 0.470 0 0 1 
LEVERAGE 16133 0.419 0.240 0.243 0.407 0.567 
CFOCOVER 16133 -0.845 11.459 -0.028 0.074 0.212 
K_AS 16133 0.163 0.157 0.040 0.118 0.242 
LNTIME 16133 2.052 0.714 1.609 2.197 2.639 
LNAT 16133 21.569 1.147 20.788 21.461 22.202 
SALE_G~H 16133 0.187 0.971 -0.101 0.059 0.232 
HERF3 16133 0.166 0.120 0.072 0.134 0.237 
SD_LNS~E 16133 0.306 0.415 0.098 0.175 0.314 
MTB 16133 2.478 1.861 1.335 1.883 2.900 
PANEL B        EXECUTIVE OWNERSHIP 
EXEOWN 0<EXE<=1% 1%<EXE<=10% 10%<EXE<=30% 30%<EXE<=50% EXE >50% N 
OBSERVATION 3030 992 1019 895 319 6255 
YEAR 2005 48 0 0 0 0 48 
YEAR 2006 222 10 3 0 0 235 
YEAR 2007 199 11 4 0 0 214 
YEAR 2008 240 34 18 2 3 297 
YEAR 2009 287 59 33 7 0 386 
YEAR 2010 263 60 48 27 10 408 
YEAR 2011 279 87 77 56 26 525 
YEAR 2012 316 140 127 134 102 819 
YEAR 2013 361 170 188 220 102 1041 
YEAR 2014 398 193 231 236 50 1108 
YEAR 2015 417 228 290 213 26 1174 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015. 
Panel A variables are used to run the regression to test the curve linear relationship between CON and 
independent variables. Panel B variables are used to get the target value of the managerial ownership. 
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Table 2.2 Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 
CON 1.000 
             
EXEOWN -0.061 1.000 
            
AD -0.094 0.078 1.000 
           
BD -0.099 0.079 0.918 1.000 
          
RD -0.093 0.077 0.866 0.865 1.000 
         
LEVERAGE 0.099 -0.221 -0.086 -0.081 -0.082 1.000 
        
CFOCOVER -0.303 0.027 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.028 1.000 
       
K_AS -0.109 -0.099 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 0.142 0.080 1.000 
      
LNTIME 0.121 -0.489 -0.135 -0.142 -0.137 0.221 -0.068 -0.066 1.000 
     
LNAT -0.165 -0.123 0.375 0.374 0.358 0.157 0.007 0.021 0.164 1.000 
    
SALE_GROWTH -0.033 -0.025 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.020 0.032 -0.062 0.041 0.011 1.000 
   
HERF3 -0.098 -0.066 0.104 0.107 0.101 -0.028 0.030 0.103 -0.114 0.282 0.005 1.000 
  
SD_LNSALE 0.317 -0.085 -0.056 -0.057 -0.053 0.076 -0.152 -0.217 0.155 -0.078 0.342 -0.048 1.000 
 
MTB 0.134 0.165 0.061 0.052 0.074 -0.114 -0.018 -0.083 -0.080 -0.362 0.005 -0.106 0.045 1.000 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015. The bold and italic correlation coefficients are significant at 5%. 
1=CON, 2=EXEOWN, 3=AD, 4=BD, 5=RD, 6=LEVERAGE, 7=CFOCOVER, 8=K_AS, 9=LNTIME, 10=LNAT, 11=SALE_GROWTH, 12=HERF3, 13=SD_LNSALE, 
14=MTB.
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Table 2.3 Executive ownership impacts on firms’ conservatism 
CON (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EXEOWN -6.199*** -6.546*** -6.400*** -6.199*** -6.546*** -6.400*** 
 (-7.238) (-7.438) (-7.275) (-4.233) (-4.685) (-4.573) 
EXEOWN2 10.590*** 10.325*** 10.202*** 10.590*** 10.325*** 10.202*** 
 (7.356) (7.185) (7.088) (4.450) (4.726) (4.654) 
LEVERAGE 3.888*** 3.897*** 3.790*** 3.888*** 3.897*** 3.790*** 
 (6.916) (6.995) (6.661) (3.875) (3.934) (3.687) 
CFOCOVER -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.192*** 
 (-8.044) (-8.047) (-8.019) (-6.274) (-6.280) (-6.279) 
K_AS -2.161*** -2.024*** -1.598*** -2.161*** -2.024*** -1.598*** 
 (-6.034) (-5.597) (-4.455) (-3.774) (-3.475) (-2.637) 
LNTIME 0.670*** 0.661*** 0.643*** 0.670*** 0.661*** 0.643*** 
 (7.994) (8.149) (7.873) (4.616) (4.593) (4.398) 
LNAT -1.004*** -0.972*** -0.967*** -1.004*** -0.972*** -0.967*** 
 (-12.648) (-11.163) (-10.983) (-6.493) (-5.662) (-5.568) 
SALE_GROWTH -1.174*** -1.184*** -1.184*** -1.174*** -1.184*** -1.184*** 
 (-8.334) (-8.364) (-8.354) (-7.902) (-7.923) (-7.939) 
HERF3 -1.683*** -1.802*** -1.790*** -1.683* -1.802* -1.790* 
 (-3.264) (-3.408) (-3.382) (-1.819) (-1.905) (-1.869) 
SD_LNSALE 6.025*** 6.029*** 5.937*** 6.025*** 6.029*** 5.937*** 
 (11.689) (11.653) (11.347) (9.495) (9.388) (9.270) 
MTB 0.417*** 0.486*** 0.499*** 0.417*** 0.486*** 0.499*** 
 (5.847) (5.765) (5.903) (3.520) (3.373) (3.515) 
CONSTANT 18.078*** 17.289*** 17.103*** 18.078*** 17.289*** 17.103*** 
 (11.140) (9.719) (9.464) (5.694) (4.929) (4.853) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST R R R CLUSTER STKCD CLUSTER STKCD CLUSTER STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 16,133 16,133 16,133 16,133 16,133 16,133 
R2_A 0.226 0.227 0.228 0.226 0.227 0.228 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table reports the relationships of the 
conservatism and the managerial ownership. The results show the OLS and fixed effect of the regression 
model. CON is the firms’ conservatism degree which is the provision for bad debt divided by firm’s 
revenue. EXEOWN is the board member ownership. It is the fraction of board shares in all outstanding 
shares. EXEOWN
2
 is the square of EXEOWN. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 
0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.4 Relationship between changes of executive ownership and the deviation from target level 
DEXEOWN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (24.453) (23.357) (23.302) (24.010) (21.926) (21.862) 
LEVERAGE -0.004* -0.003* -0.004* -0.004** -0.003* -0.004** 
 (-1.947) (-1.780) (-1.934) (-2.041) (-1.928) (-2.085) 
CFOCOVER 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (2.654) (2.622) (2.615) (2.507) (2.574) (2.556) 
K_AS -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-5.466) (-5.139) (-4.901) (-6.089) (-5.869) (-5.668) 
LNTIME 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (7.532) (7.955) (8.042) (8.649) (9.076) (9.149) 
LNAT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.097) (0.935) (0.889) (0.099) (0.956) (0.910) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (6.447) (5.421) (5.434) (6.301) (5.331) (5.343) 
HERF3 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (1.301) (0.879) (0.794) (1.511) (1.037) (0.936) 
SD_LNSALE -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-5.144) (-5.168) (-5.078) (-4.627) (-4.656) (-4.512) 
MTB -0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.687) (0.346) (0.455) (-1.718) (0.362) (0.477) 
CONSTANT -0.013* -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.013* -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 (-1.798) (-3.041) (-3.121) (-1.886) (-3.183) (-3.285) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST R R R CLUSTER STKCD CLUSTER STKCD CLUSTER STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 11,293 11,293 11,293 11,293 11,293 11,293 
R2_A 0.166 0.181 0.182 0.166 0.181 0.182 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table shows the relationship between 
DEXEOWN and DEF. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Table 2.5 Relationship between the deviation and the conservativism with robust standard error 
CON (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ABSDEF 9.451*** 9.728*** 9.757*** 25.189*** 25.839*** 25.877*** 
 (4.965) (4.999) (5.012) (5.662) (5.719) (5.730) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY    -19.494*** -19.894*** -19.917*** 
    (-5.502) (-5.539) (-5.554) 
ABOVEDUMMY    0.805*** 0.625*** 0.630*** 
    (4.033) (3.254) (3.302) 
LEVERAGE 1.634*** 1.541*** 1.624*** 0.934*** 0.991*** 1.079*** 
 (4.867) (4.682) (4.783) (3.154) (3.337) (3.570) 
CFOCOVER -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.171*** 
 (-4.526) (-4.528) (-4.544) (-4.205) (-4.191) (-4.206) 
K_AS -0.379** -0.486** -0.593*** -1.648*** -1.626*** -1.726*** 
 (-2.002) (-2.492) (-2.905) (-6.210) (-6.202) (-6.026) 
LNTIME 1.209*** 1.233*** 1.245*** 1.538*** 1.616*** 1.628*** 
 (6.877) (6.989) (7.058) (7.310) (7.394) (7.428) 
LNAT -0.516*** -0.457*** -0.452*** -0.426*** -0.413*** -0.411*** 
 (-9.489) (-7.945) (-7.818) (-8.048) (-7.251) (-7.156) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.931*** -0.942*** -0.940*** -0.787*** -0.782*** -0.781*** 
 (-6.812) (-6.848) (-6.840) (-6.233) (-6.164) (-6.163) 
HERF3 -0.746** -0.958*** -0.884** -1.638*** -1.760*** -1.695*** 
 (-2.285) (-2.753) (-2.556) (-4.378) (-4.565) (-4.427) 
SD_LNSALE 4.363*** 4.324*** 4.325*** 3.678*** 3.650*** 3.646*** 
 (7.693) (7.648) (7.571) (7.084) (7.036) (6.992) 
MTB 0.077* 0.118** 0.111* 0.062 0.100* 0.092 
 (1.679) (2.043) (1.955) (1.329) (1.723) (1.604) 
CONSTANT 6.592*** 5.407*** 5.450*** 3.931*** 3.399*** 3.561*** 
 (6.100) (4.622) (4.635) (3.112) (2.602) (2.738) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 
R2_A 0.247 0.247 0.248 0.284 0.286 0.286 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table shows the relationship between the 
deviation-DEF and the conservativism-CON. DEF is calculated from the fitted values minus the previous 
accounting period actual EXEOWN. And these fitted values are the target values in each firm-year. The 
standard errors of the variables are basic robust standard errors. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P 
< 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.6 Relationship between the deviation and the conservativism with firm clustered robust standard 
error 
CON (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ABSDEF 9.451*** 9.728*** 9.757*** 25.189*** 25.839*** 25.877*** 
 (3.878) (3.901) (3.909) (4.909) (4.994) (5.007) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY    -19.494*** -19.894*** -19.917*** 
    (-4.797) (-4.864) (-4.883) 
ABOVEDUMMY    0.805*** 0.625*** 0.630*** 
    (3.599) (2.889) (2.903) 
LEVERAGE 1.634*** 1.541*** 1.624*** 0.934** 0.991** 1.079** 
 (3.026) (2.908) (3.044) (2.000) (2.096) (2.295) 
CFOCOVER -0.186** -0.186** -0.186** -0.172** -0.171** -0.171** 
 (-2.499) (-2.503) (-2.516) (-2.293) (-2.285) (-2.299) 
K_AS -0.379 -0.486* -0.593* -1.648*** -1.626*** -1.726*** 
 (-1.443) (-1.765) (-1.795) (-4.516) (-4.402) (-3.921) 
LNTIME 1.209*** 1.233*** 1.245*** 1.538*** 1.616*** 1.628*** 
 (5.161) (5.216) (5.221) (6.020) (6.130) (6.109) 
LNAT -0.516*** -0.457*** -0.452*** -0.426*** -0.413*** -0.411*** 
 (-5.407) (-4.642) (-4.545) (-4.721) (-4.297) (-4.210) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.931*** -0.942*** -0.940*** -0.787*** -0.782*** -0.781*** 
 (-5.942) (-5.977) (-6.004) (-5.454) (-5.393) (-5.421) 
HERF3 -0.746 -0.958* -0.884 -1.638*** -1.760*** -1.695*** 
 (-1.492) (-1.733) (-1.571) (-2.973) (-2.999) (-2.849) 
SD_LNSALE 4.363*** 4.324*** 4.325*** 3.678*** 3.650*** 3.646*** 
 (6.344) (6.266) (6.413) (5.829) (5.738) (5.952) 
MTB 0.077 0.118 0.111 0.062 0.100 0.092 
 (0.990) (1.122) (1.142) (0.789) (0.947) (0.939) 
CONSTANT 6.592*** 5.407*** 5.450*** 3.931** 3.399* 3.561* 
 (3.725) (2.913) (2.969) (2.156) (1.794) (1.898) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 
R2_A 0.247 0.247 0.248 0.284 0.286 0.286 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table shows the relationship between the 
deviation-DEF and the conservativism-CON. DEF is calculated from the fitted values minus the previous 
accounting period actual EXEOWN. And these fitted values are the target values in each firm-year. The 
standard errors robust to clustering by firm. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.7 Relationship between the deviation-DEF and the conservativism with AD effect 
CON (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ABSDEF 12.511*** 12.742*** 12.787*** 29.566*** 30.151*** 30.205*** 
 (4.189) (4.212) (4.226) (5.550) (5.634) (5.654) 
AD 0.870*** 0.800*** 0.808*** 1.094*** 1.051*** 1.058*** 
 (3.274) (2.923) (2.940) (4.418) (4.077) (4.071) 
ABSDEFAD -9.383*** -9.301*** -9.342*** -21.477*** -21.373*** -21.435*** 
 (-4.388) (-4.393) (-4.424) (-5.681) (-5.649) (-5.662) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY    -23.560*** -23.958*** -23.982*** 
    (-5.464) (-5.536) (-5.555) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMYAD    17.983*** 18.014*** 18.043*** 
    (5.623) (5.601) (5.591) 
ABOVEDUMMY    0.675*** 0.515*** 0.519*** 
    (3.328) (2.600) (2.599) 
LEVERAGE 1.688*** 1.586*** 1.668*** 0.892* 0.921* 1.011** 
 (3.089) (2.933) (3.090) (1.926) (1.953) (2.184) 
CFOCOVER -0.185** -0.185** -0.185** -0.173** -0.172** -0.172** 
 (-2.492) (-2.498) (-2.511) (-2.332) (-2.328) (-2.343) 
K_AS -0.476* -0.580** -0.677** -1.578*** -1.577*** -1.667*** 
 (-1.798) (-2.045) (-1.986) (-4.413) (-4.306) (-3.845) 
LNTIME 1.164*** 1.182*** 1.194*** 1.363*** 1.435*** 1.445*** 
 (5.296) (5.362) (5.366) (6.164) (6.280) (6.257) 
LNAT -0.538*** -0.464*** -0.459*** -0.431*** -0.397*** -0.395*** 
 (-5.019) (-3.838) (-3.770) (-4.310) (-3.398) (-3.329) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.908*** -0.917*** -0.915*** -0.751*** -0.749*** -0.748*** 
 (-5.906) (-5.937) (-5.968) (-5.264) (-5.226) (-5.253) 
HERF3 -0.816 -1.039* -0.964* -1.536*** -1.689*** -1.620*** 
 (-1.640) (-1.862) (-1.701) (-2.870) (-2.922) (-2.762) 
SD_LNSALE 4.324*** 4.285*** 4.281*** 3.625*** 3.594*** 3.588*** 
 (6.389) (6.288) (6.451) (5.751) (5.645) (5.865) 
MTB 0.091 0.139 0.132 0.086 0.135 0.126 
 (1.108) (1.217) (1.245) (1.040) (1.179) (1.189) 
CONSTANT 6.874*** 5.408** 5.461** 4.195** 3.260 3.431 
 (3.551) (2.423) (2.536) (2.168) (1.464) (1.592) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 
R2_A 0.255 0.256 0.257 0.298 0.300 0.301 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table is discussing the relation between the 
deviation and the CON. In this table, AD is the considered dummy to affect the DEF and CON 
relationship. ABSDEF means the absolute value of DEF. ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY is the product of 
ABSDEF and ABOVEDUMMY. ABOVEDUMMY equals to 1 if the target executive ownership not 
exceeds previous EXEOWN. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.8 Relationship between the deviation-DEF and the conservativism with BD effect 
CON (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ABSDEF 12.660*** 12.890*** 12.934*** 29.744*** 30.315*** 30.373*** 
 (4.194) (4.217) (4.230) (5.562) (5.644) (5.665) 
BD 0.839*** 0.766*** 0.773*** 1.066*** 1.025*** 1.032*** 
 (3.243) (2.862) (2.880) (4.391) (4.027) (4.028) 
ABSDEFBD -9.492*** -9.404*** -9.440*** -21.654*** -21.530*** -21.615*** 
 (-4.356) (-4.360) (-4.387) (-5.671) (-5.647) (-5.655) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY    -23.723*** -24.105*** -24.140*** 
    (-5.469) (-5.539) (-5.559) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMYBD    18.213*** 18.202*** 18.268*** 
    (5.621) (5.608) (5.589) 
ABOVEDUMMY    0.670*** 0.509*** 0.513** 
    (3.319) (2.580) (2.578) 
LEVERAGE 1.669*** 1.568*** 1.649*** 0.895* 0.928** 1.020** 
 (3.071) (2.914) (3.069) (1.937) (1.971) (2.205) 
CFOCOVER -0.186** -0.185** -0.186** -0.173** -0.172** -0.172** 
 (-2.497) (-2.503) (-2.515) (-2.330) (-2.326) (-2.341) 
K_AS -0.474* -0.579** -0.675** -1.571*** -1.570*** -1.667*** 
 (-1.789) (-2.037) (-1.976) (-4.402) (-4.291) (-3.839) 
LNTIME 1.159*** 1.177*** 1.189*** 1.357*** 1.430*** 1.441*** 
 (5.302) (5.366) (5.368) (6.177) (6.293) (6.269) 
LNAT -0.526*** -0.451*** -0.446*** -0.419*** -0.386*** -0.383*** 
 (-4.978) (-3.778) (-3.695) (-4.239) (-3.339) (-3.254) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.906*** -0.915*** -0.913*** -0.753*** -0.750*** -0.749*** 
 (-5.888) (-5.917) (-5.947) (-5.258) (-5.219) (-5.245) 
HERF3 -0.843* -1.067* -0.991* -1.558*** -1.708*** -1.635*** 
 (-1.688) (-1.908) (-1.748) (-2.905) (-2.952) (-2.789) 
SD_LNSALE 4.322*** 4.282*** 4.279*** 3.630*** 3.600*** 3.596*** 
 (6.388) (6.287) (6.452) (5.760) (5.656) (5.879) 
MTB 0.093 0.141 0.135 0.087 0.136 0.127 
 (1.136) (1.245) (1.277) (1.062) (1.197) (1.206) 
CONSTANT 6.644*** 5.155** 5.195** 3.955** 3.025 3.188 
 (3.465) (2.330) (2.420) (2.060) (1.370) (1.483) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 
R2_A 0.256 0.256 0.257 0.299 0.301 0.301 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table is discussing the relation between the 
deviation and the CON. In this table, BD is the considered dummy to affect the DEF and CON 
relationship. ABSDEF means the absolute value of DEF. ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY is the product of 
ABSDEF and ABOVEDUMMY. ABOVEDUMMY equals to 1 if the target executive ownership not 
exceeds previous EXEOWN. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.9 Relationship between the deviation-DEF and the conservativism with RD effect 
CON (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ABSDEF 12.254*** 12.475*** 12.519*** 28.919*** 29.492*** 29.550*** 
 (4.166) (4.189) (4.204) (5.448) (5.528) (5.549) 
RD 0.837*** 0.758*** 0.762*** 1.036*** 0.993*** 0.999*** 
 (3.202) (2.804) (2.817) (4.227) (3.869) (3.875) 
ABSDEFRD -9.187*** -9.071*** -9.110*** -20.787*** -20.624*** -20.716*** 
 (-4.351) (-4.348) (-4.385) (-5.510) (-5.479) (-5.498) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY    -23.002*** -23.387*** -23.421*** 
    (-5.359) (-5.427) (-5.448) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMYRD    17.401*** 17.378*** 17.444*** 
    (5.478) (5.459) (5.447) 
ABOVEDUMMY    0.678*** 0.519*** 0.522*** 
    (3.306) (2.596) (2.594) 
LEVERAGE 1.691*** 1.590*** 1.671*** 0.912** 0.944** 1.035** 
 (3.097) (2.943) (3.098) (1.966) (1.998) (2.231) 
CFOCOVER -0.186** -0.185** -0.186** -0.173** -0.172** -0.172** 
 (-2.496) (-2.502) (-2.515) (-2.331) (-2.327) (-2.342) 
K_AS -0.457* -0.561** -0.656* -1.578*** -1.578*** -1.671*** 
 (-1.727) (-1.975) (-1.914) (-4.403) (-4.289) (-3.814) 
LNTIME 1.165*** 1.183*** 1.194*** 1.362*** 1.435*** 1.445*** 
 (5.277) (5.344) (5.347) (6.097) (6.213) (6.192) 
LNAT -0.531*** -0.456*** -0.451*** -0.423*** -0.391*** -0.388*** 
 (-4.962) (-3.761) (-3.665) (-4.221) (-3.322) (-3.227) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.909*** -0.918*** -0.915*** -0.760*** -0.757*** -0.756*** 
 (-5.894) (-5.919) (-5.948) (-5.304) (-5.261) (-5.286) 
HERF3 -0.812 -1.034* -0.959* -1.536*** -1.689*** -1.620*** 
 (-1.630) (-1.846) (-1.690) (-2.854) (-2.901) (-2.747) 
SD_LNSALE 4.334*** 4.294*** 4.289*** 3.655*** 3.624*** 3.619*** 
 (6.388) (6.284) (6.446) (5.795) (5.686) (5.906) 
MTB 0.095 0.143 0.136 0.087 0.136 0.127 
 (1.149) (1.247) (1.280) (1.047) (1.180) (1.189) 
CONSTANT 6.733*** 5.254** 5.291** 4.071** 3.160 3.331 
 (3.464) (2.334) (2.412) (2.079) (1.401) (1.509) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 11,061 
R2_A 0.255 0.255 0.256 0.296 0.298 0.299 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table is discussing the relation between the 
deviation and the CON. In this table, RD is the considered dummy to affect the DEF and CON 
relationship. ABSDEF means the absolute value of DEF. ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY is the product of 
ABSDEF and ABOVEDUMMY. ABOVEDUMMY equals to 1 if the target executive ownership not 
exceeds previous EXEOWN. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.10 The influence of the state dummy on accounting conservatism 
CON (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ABSDEF 9.534*** 9.779*** 9.806*** 25.270*** 25.889*** 25.931*** 
 (3.833) (3.870) (3.876) (4.909) (4.984) (4.998) 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY    -19.638*** -19.984*** -20.013*** 
    (-4.812) (-4.867) (-4.886) 
ABOVEDUMMY    0.774*** 0.613*** 0.616*** 
    (3.378) (2.810) (2.810) 
STATEDUMMY 0.089 0.021 0.015 -0.208 -0.176 -0.186 
 (0.432) (0.090) (0.058) (-1.015) (-0.763) (-0.752) 
LEVERAGE 1.652*** 1.559*** 1.633*** 0.957** 0.997** 1.080** 
 (3.055) (2.930) (3.047) (2.041) (2.100) (2.288) 
CFOCOVER -0.192** -0.192** -0.192** -0.178** -0.176** -0.177** 
 (-2.526) (-2.532) (-2.543) (-2.332) (-2.322) (-2.335) 
K_AS -0.439 -0.518* -0.597** -1.590*** -1.597*** -1.671*** 
 (-1.546) (-1.870) (-1.980) (-4.316) (-4.347) (-4.030) 
LNTIME 1.189*** 1.228*** 1.240*** 1.594*** 1.662*** 1.675*** 
 (5.140) (5.104) (5.076) (5.975) (6.024) (5.964) 
LNAT -0.516*** -0.452*** -0.447*** -0.413*** -0.393*** -0.390*** 
 (-5.323) (-4.250) (-4.166) (-4.490) (-3.767) (-3.684) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.932*** -0.944*** -0.942*** -0.785*** -0.783*** -0.782*** 
 (-5.937) (-5.981) (-6.016) (-5.403) (-5.382) (-5.418) 
HERF3 -0.824 -0.992* -0.918* -1.530*** -1.697*** -1.630*** 
 (-1.625) (-1.871) (-1.672) (-2.851) (-3.041) (-2.833) 
SD_LNSALE 4.355*** 4.314*** 4.309*** 3.653*** 3.625*** 3.616*** 
 (6.306) (6.190) (6.331) (5.728) (5.618) (5.823) 
MTB 0.080 0.120 0.113 0.056 0.099 0.090 
 (1.070) (1.160) (1.192) (0.742) (0.953) (0.948) 
CONSTANT 6.572*** 5.292*** 5.341*** 3.649* 3.009 3.181 
 (3.659) (2.649) (2.757) (1.946) (1.462) (1.586) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
CLUSTER 
STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 10,953 10,953 10,953 10,953 10,953 10,953 
R-SQUARED 0.250 0.252 0.252 0.287 0.290 0.291 
R2_A 0.249 0.250 0.251 0.287 0.289 0.289 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. This table is testing whether the state dummy can 
affect accounting conservatism directly. In this table, STATEDUMMY is the considered dummy to affect 
accounting conservatism. ABSDEF means the absolute value of DEF. ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY is the 
product of ABSDEF and ABOVEDUMMY. ABOVEDUMMY equals to 1 if the target executive ownership 
not exceeds previous EXEOWN. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.11 Robustness check with the asymmetric timeliness measure of accounting conservatism 
Eit (1) (2) 
RETit×NEGit 0.975*** 0.975*** 
 (10.689) (8.096) 
RETit×NEGit×EXEOWNit-1 -0.118* -0.118** 
 (-1.910) (-2.298) 
RETit×NEGit×EXEOWN
2
it-1 0.189** 0.189** 
 (2.124) (2.322) 
RETit×EXEOWNit-1 -0.024 -0.024 
 (-1.151) (-1.076) 
RETit×EXEOWN
2
it-1 0.020 0.020 
 (0.594) (0.570) 
NEGit 0.004 0.004 
 (1.221) (1.286) 
RETit -0.205*** -0.205*** 
 (-5.838) (-4.957) 
RETit×LEVERAGEit-1 0.003 0.003 
 (0.423) (0.417) 
RETit×NEGit×LEVERAGEit-1 0.145*** 0.145*** 
 (5.496) (4.908) 
RETit×LNATit-1 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (6.237) (5.098) 
RETit×NEGit×LNATit-1 -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (-10.620) (-7.998) 
RETit×MTBit-1 0.001 0.001 
 (0.813) (0.796) 
RETit×NEGit×MTBit-1 -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-6.312) (-5.491) 
CONSTANT 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (3.230) (3.566) 
YEAR FE Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE Y Y 
ROBUST R CLUSTER STKCD 
OBSERVATIONS 19,453 19,453 
R2_A 0.0513 0.0513 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 1. The two models use different robust standard errors. 
Model (1) uses common robust standard errors under the regression coefficients. Model (2) uses firm 
clustering standard errors under the regression coefficients. This table is the robustness check with 
accounting conservatism measure of Basu (1997). I follow the method in the paper of Basu et al. (2005) 
and Khan and Watts (2009) make the regression using the Chinese-listed firms. E is the closing net 
income divided by the beginning market value of equity. RET is the closing annual return of the firms. 
NEG is a dummy variable equals to 1 if RET is negative, otherwise 0. T STATISTICS IN 
PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 2.12 The bootstrap regression to eliminate the influence of bias from the measure of executive 
ownership 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CON (1) (2) (3) 
ABSDEF 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (6.845) (3.451) (5.468) 
LEVERAGE 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (6.638) (5.790) (8.235) 
CFOCOVER -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013** 
 (-3.115) (-2.844) (-2.565) 
K_AS -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.027*** 
 (-9.017) (-9.669) (-8.004) 
LNTIME 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (17.996) (15.411) (14.277) 
LNAT -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (-16.305) (-20.130) (-22.199) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.021*** 
 (-10.522) (-6.861) (-8.345) 
HERF3 -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-5.799) (-4.085) (-3.506) 
SD_LNSALE 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 
 (11.542) (7.219) (8.334) 
MTB 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (2.604) (1.560) (0.495) 
CONSTANT 0.252*** 0.265*** 0.283*** 
 (16.693) (21.586) (21.893) 
YEAR FE N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y 
OBSERVATIONS 11,061 11,061 11,061 
T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01. In order to eliminate the 
influence of bias from the measure of executive ownership, I add a new regression, which is the bootstrap 
quantile regression. The bootstrap regression allows the estimation of the sampling distribution of almost 
any statistic using random sampling methods (Varian, 2005). The bootstrap regression can improve the 
estimation accuracy regardless of original sample data distributions. I use STATA to run the regression 
and the results are consistent with the results of Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 to support the U-shaped 
relationship between executive ownership and shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism. 
Therefore, using the bootstrap regression, I can still obtain the results that the shareholders’ demand for 
conservatism can increase along with the increase in the absolute value of executive ownership deviation. 
I added this new robust check in my thesis. 
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Table 2.13 First lag of variables to reduce the risk of endogeneity 
CON (1) (2) (3) 
L.EXEOWN -5.981*** -7.015*** -6.829*** 
 (-3.721) (-4.521) (-4.388) 
L.EXEOWN2 9.976*** 11.133*** 10.966*** 
 (3.970) (4.636) (4.545) 
L.LEVERAGE 3.495*** 3.544*** 3.439*** 
 (3.186) (3.247) (3.041) 
L.CFOCOVER -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.138*** 
 (-4.045) (-4.041) (-4.045) 
L.K_AS -2.705*** -2.599*** -2.110*** 
 (-5.166) (-4.767) (-3.524) 
L.LNTIME 0.685*** 0.660*** 0.650*** 
 (4.334) (4.220) (4.023) 
L.LNAT -0.986*** -0.982*** -0.984*** 
 (-6.092) (-5.492) (-5.417) 
L.SALE_GROWTH -0.501*** -0.495*** -0.494*** 
 (-2.762) (-2.712) (-2.729) 
L.HERF3 -2.219** -2.363** -2.359** 
 (-2.306) (-2.375) (-2.343) 
L.SD_LNSALE 5.546*** 5.548*** 5.419*** 
 (7.871) (7.777) (7.656) 
L.MTB 0.460*** 0.507*** 0.519*** 
 (2.924) (2.746) (2.875) 
Constant 18.069*** 17.583*** 17.517*** 
 (5.417) (4.866) (4.813) 
Year fe N Y Y 
Industry fe N N Y 
Observations 13,932 13,932 13,932 
r2_a 0.164 0.164 0.166 
CON is the dependent variable accounting conservatism. I take first lag of all the independent variables in 
the regression. The results here are consistent with test results in previous tables. T STATISTICS IN 
PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Appendix for Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.1 Variable definitions 
Variables in the paper Explanations 
CON The allowance for uncollectible account divided by firm’s revenue 
EXEOWN executive ownership (executive shares divided by total shares) 
EXEOWN
2
 Square of the executive ownership 
DEXEOWN First difference of EXEOWN 
DEF Expected executive ownership minus previous actual ownership: the 
fitted value (from the regressions to get the target executive 
ownership) minus l. EXEOWN. 
ABSDEF Absolute value of DEF 
ABOVEDUMMY Equals to 1 if the target executive ownership not exceeds previous 
EXEOWN 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY ABSDEF multiplies ABOVEDUMMY 
AD Analyst coverage dummy, equals to 1 if the analyst coverage is 
greater than industry year mean; 0 otherwise 
ABSDEFAD ABSDEF multiplies analyst coverage dummy 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMYAD ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY multiplies analyst coverage dummy 
BD Broker coverage dummy, equals to 1 if the analyst coverage is greater 
than industry year mean; 0 otherwise 
ABSDEFBD ABSDEF multiplies broker coverage dummy 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMYBD ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY multiplies broker coverage dummy 
RD Report coverage dummy, equals to 1 if the analyst coverage is greater 
than industry year mean; 0 otherwise 
ABSDEFRD ABSDEF multiplies report coverage dummy 
ABSDEFABOVEDUMMYRD ABSDEFABOVEDUMMY multiplies report coverage dummy 
CFOCOVER Cash generated from the operating activity divided by operating 
revenue 
LEVERAGE Long term debt divided by the replacement value, firms’ leverage 
ratio 
LNTIME The logarithm of the life time of the firm up to the accounting date 
K_AS PP&E to total book asset 
LNAT Natural logarithm for the total asset of the firm 
HERF3 Herfindahl index top 3 ownership concentration degree 
SALE_GROWTH 
(total operating revenue-l. total operating revenue)/l. total operating 
revenue 
SD_LNSALE 
Volatility of LNSALES: latest three years’ LNSALES standard 
deviation 
MTB Market to book ratio 
STATEDUMMY 
State owned firms according to the CSMAR database, equals to 1 if 
the firm is state owned, otherwise 0. 
E 
The closing net income divided by the beginning market value of 
equity 
RET The closing annual return of the firms 
NEG 
The closing annual return of the firms: NEG is a dummy variable 
equals to 1 if RET is negative, otherwise 0 
INDCD CSMAR industry code, 2=public ware fare; 3=real estate; 4=utility; 
5=manufacture; 6=commerce. Finance firms are excluded. 
ACCPER Year dummy 
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Appendix 2.2 The target value of the executive ownership fitting regression 
EXEOWN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ALL INDCD=2 INDCD=3 INDCD=4 INDCD=5 INDCD=6 
LNAT -0.018 -0.155** 0.066 -0.070 0.001 -0.009 
 (-0.900) (-2.440) (1.409) (-0.392) (0.019) (-0.157) 
LNAT2 0.001 0.004** -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (1.413) (2.563) (-1.477) (0.508) (0.602) (0.095) 
K_S 0.000 0.003 -0.001* 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.200) (1.566) (-1.784) (0.617) (-0.441) (0.915) 
K_S2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.176) (-0.502) (2.791) (-0.475) (-0.110) (-1.147) 
LNSALE 0.008* 0.057*** 0.004 -0.010 -0.010 0.019* 
 (1.682) (3.617) (0.241) (-0.396) (-1.354) (1.714) 
LNSALE2 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 
 (-1.541) (-3.433) (-0.168) (0.476) (1.398) (-1.690) 
I_K -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000* 
 (-4.659) (-2.659) (-1.700) (2.326) (-2.859) (-1.650) 
A_K 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.810) (0.929) (0.625) (-1.572) (1.184) (0.453) 
K_AS -0.032*** -0.027 0.049* 0.018 -0.042*** -0.005 
 (-4.824) (-1.537) (1.881) (0.291) (-4.588) (-0.408) 
HERF3 -0.061*** -0.066** -0.021 -0.002 -0.068*** -0.053*** 
 (-6.635) (-2.099) (-1.247) (-0.031) (-5.622) (-3.699) 
LNEQ -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.021*** 0.001 
 (-3.592) (-2.640) (-0.030) (-0.061) (-3.776) (0.076) 
TO -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.761) (1.502) (-2.484) (0.765) (-1.602) (-0.313) 
SIGMA 0.940*** 1.491*** 0.141 2.031*** 0.761*** 1.373*** 
 (5.878) (2.763) (0.559) (2.622) (3.858) (3.437) 
ROA 0.053*** 0.141** 0.104*** -0.149* 0.047*** -0.054 
 (3.467) (2.361) (2.755) (-1.888) (2.681) (-1.452) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.806) (1.240) (-1.599) (-0.258) (1.120) (0.118) 
SD_LNSALE -0.002 0.004 0.009*** 0.004 -0.008** -0.007 
 (-1.069) (0.575) (2.969) (0.633) (-2.061) (-1.452) 
CASH_LIBILITY 0.002** 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 
 (2.071) (1.486) (-0.363) (-0.282) (0.874) (-1.142) 
LNTIME -0.096*** -0.095*** -0.083*** -0.088*** -0.098*** -0.062*** 
 (-45.355) (-16.051) (-8.413) (-6.980) (-37.763) (-7.330) 
LEVERAGE -0.060*** -0.109*** -0.022 -0.075 -0.064*** -0.022 
 (-4.716) (-3.239) (-0.596) (-1.017) (-3.913) (-0.973) 
CFOCOVER -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.143) (-2.535) (0.263) (0.533) (0.234) (0.584) 
LABOR -0.004*** -0.000 -0.009*** -0.002 -0.006*** 0.001 
 (-3.985) (-0.129) (-4.764) (-0.527) (-3.562) (0.613) 
CONSTANT 0.568*** 1.786*** -0.496 0.836 0.623** 0.069 
 (2.825) (2.677) (-1.049) (0.469) (2.361) (0.111) 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N N N N N 
ROBUST R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 11,629 1,505 774 414 8,020 916 
R2_A 0.422 0.468 0.413 0.374 0.407 0.349 
All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 2.1. The target level of EXEOWN is generated by 
regressing the same variables by industry and year. It can help me to get more precise predicted values. 
But it is not reasonable to display all the regressions here. Therefore, the regression here is displayed 
using the method stated in the table. LNAT is the natural logarithm of total asset. LNAT2 is the square of 
the LNAT. K_S is the PP&E divided by firm sales revenue. K_S2 is the square of K_S. LNSALE is the 
natural logarithm of firm sales. LNSALE2 is the LNSALE square. I_K is the capital expenditure to PP&E. 
A_K is the selling cost to PP&E. K_AS is the PP&E to total book asset. TO represents the sales divided by 
receivables. SIGMA is the S.D. of idiosyncratic risk. ROA is the return of asset. SALE_GROWTH is the 
sales growth rate. SD_LNSALE is the LNSALS volatility. LNTIME is the logarithm of the listing time of 
the firm up to the accounting date. CFOCOVER is the cash generated from the operating activity divided 
by operating revenue. LABOR is the natural logarithm of the number of the employees. T STATISTICS 
IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Appendix 2.3 Hausman test for panel data 
 COEFFICIENTS 
 (b) (B) (b-B) SQRT(DIAG(V_b-V_B)) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CON FE RE DIFFERENCE S.E. 
EXEOWN 
-6.400 -6.546 0.146 . 
EXEOWN2 
10.202 10.325 -0.124 . 
LEVERAGE 
3.790 3.897 -0.107 0.041 
CFOCOVER 
-0.192 -0.193 0.001 0.000 
K_AS 
-1.598 -2.024 0.426 0.109 
LNTIME 
0.643 0.661 -0.018 0.012 
LNAT 
-0.967 -0.972 0.005 0.007 
SALE_GROWTH 
-1.184 -1.184 0.001 . 
HERF3 
-1.790 -1.802 0.011 0.006 
SD_LNSALE 
5.937 6.029 -0.091 0.020 
MTB 
0.499 0.486 0.012 0.005 
YEAR DUMMY INCLUDED 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(20) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 29.78 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0735 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
The results of Hausman tests show that I need to use the fixed effect for the regressions. I therefore use 
the year and industry fixed effect in the regressions for the test of U shape. 
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Chapter 3 THE INFLUENCE OF EXECUTIVE 
OWNERSHIP ON DIVIDEND TUNNELLING IN CHINA 
3.1 Introduction 
Tunnelling, as a specific type of financial fraud, is the controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation on the minority shareholders’ interests. The Chinese stock market is a 
well-suited context for tunnelling research for several reasons. I provide five main 
reasons to explain the severity of tunnelling in China and provide further details in the 
following five paragraphs. First, Jiang et al. (2010) indicate that the Chinese firms do 
not face enough external governance mechanisms (e.g., lack of takeovers, lack of public 
enforcement for tunnelling punishment). Second, minority shareholders have little 
impact on the firm and cannot monitor firms efficiently (Jiang et al., 2010). Third, the 
weak legal system in China cannot regulate the tunnelling behaviours effectively (Kuo 
et al., 2014). Fourth, Jiang et al. (2010) indicate that the controlling shareholders’ 
trading behaviours are highly restricted, which pushes them towards dividend tunnelling. 
Fifth, China, as a developing market, has a weaker corporate governance environment 
compared to the developed markets (Bai et al., 2004). I provide explanations for these 
reasons in the following paragraphs. 
 
For the first reason, Jiang et al. (2010) argue that Chinese-listed firms face very limited 
external governance mechanisms including takeover threats or other forms of investor 
activism. Jiang et al. (2010) also suggest that China lacks public enforcement for 
tunnelling punishment such as very limited fines and prison terms. The lack of external 
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governance mechanisms cannot monitor and constrain the misconduct of the controlling 
shareholders such as tunnelling behaviour. It is because that insufficient supervision, 
enforcement and regulations can result in firms’ lack of motivation to reform and 
employ better corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, Jiang et al. (2010) 
suggest that the low level of institutional ownership (mutual fund ownership) in China 
also limits the monitoring effect of these investors on share prices. 
 
The second reason is that the minority shareholders have almost no channels to take 
actions against the misconduct of the insiders (Jiang et al., 2010). Firth et al. (2016) 
document that most Chinese-listed firms have a dominant controlling shareholder, and 
the minority shareholders cannot participate in the decision-making process. Yuan et al. 
(2008) indicate that controlling shareholders and state-owned shareholders are highly 
likely to be the same in Chinese-listed firms. Wang and Xiao (2009) show that 70% of 
Chinese-listed companies are ultimately controlled by the government. Allen et al. 
(2005) and MacNeil (2002) point out that, traditionally, the law courts in China have 
protected the interests of the state-owned listed firms. Therefore, 70% of Chinese-listed 
companies are protected by the current regulations and law courts against the interests 
of minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders in the remaining 30% of 
Chinese-listed firms also have large advantage in the law court when there are conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, because the relevant 
regulations and supervisions to protect minority shareholders are very weak in China 
(Jiang et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2010; Lv et al., 2012). Jiang et al. (2010) contend that 
the regulations in place to protect the minority shareholders are limited not only because 
of the lack of laws but also because of the weak enforcement mechanisms involved in 
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complying with the laws. The listed firms’ boards of directors and the executive 
management teams who are familiar with the firm information are nominated by the 
controlling shareholders (Cullinan et al., 2012). Therefore, if the law courts summoned 
the managers and directors for detailed information, this still cannot help minority 
shareholders. 
 
The third reason is that the legal systems in China are also weak and cannot effectively 
regulate the misconduct such as tunnelling of firms controlled by the dominant 
state-owned shareholders (Kuo et al., 2014). Allen et al. (2005) point out that the 
development levels of the law and the institutions in the Chinese market are not as 
advanced as those in most countries investigated by La Porta et al. (1997) and Porta et 
al. (1998). The less developed legal systems in China also means that the corporate 
governance mechanism and the investor protection systems are even less efficient (Firth 
et al., 2007b). 
 
The fourth reason is that the trading behaviour of the controlling shareholders is highly 
restricted (Jiang et al., 2010). The Chinese common stocks are classified into two 
groups: the tradeable shares or the non-tradeable shares. The trading of the 
non-tradeable shares is restricted in the market. Wang and Xiao (2009) and Jiang et al. 
(2010) point out that 63.51% total outstanding shares are non-tradeable and mostly 
belong to the controlling shareholders. Therefore, the controlling shareholder cannot 
easily obtain benefits from the price appreciation of the shareholdings like minority 
shareholders do by trading the shares
12
. The controlling shareholders are motivated to 
engage in the dividend tunnelling for their benefits. 
                                                             
12 The capital gain from trading shares is tax-free (Firth et al., 2016). 
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The fifth reason is that China has long been regarded as having a weaker corporate 
governance environment compared to the developed markets (Bai et al., 2004; Braendle 
et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Fan et al., 
2007; Kuo et al., 2014). Most Chinese-listed firms have a dominant controlling 
shareholder, and the minorities have little direct impact on the decision-making process 
(Firth et al., 2016). As a result, controlling shareholders may neglect the minorities’ 
interests and extract firms’ resources to benefit themselves (Chen et al., 2014; Ma et al., 
2013; Wang and Xiao, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014). Under the weaker corporate 
governance environment, Zhang et al. (2014) and Wang and Xiao (2011) also suggest 
that the dominant shareholders and CEOs are in cahoots to do the tunnelling in China. 
 
Previous studies have provided evidence of the tunnelling activities of the controlling 
shareholders. Jiang et al. (2015) find that the controlling shareholders can carry out their 
tunnelling activities through the non-operational funds in the Chinese-listed firms. The 
controlling shareholders can directly take funds away from the listed firms without 
matching any transaction in the firm. Peng et al. (2011) indicate that the controlling 
shareholders can use the related party transactions as a tunnelling method, while Jiang et 
al. (2010) find that the controlling shareholders can also use intercorporate loans as a 
channel of tunnelling. 
 
The Chinese Government has developed regulations to constrain the controlling 
shareholders’ tunnelling behaviours. Jiang et al. (2010) point out that the regulators such 
as the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) have largely restricted the 
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tunnelling activities through intercorporate loans from the market. However, the 
elimination of one particular method of tunnelling can push the controlling shareholders 
to employ other tunnelling methods such as through dividend tunnelling. Chen et al. 
(2009) and Lv et al. (2012) suggest that the controlling shareholders and the executives 
use the dividend payouts for tunnelling purposes. 
 
The studies of Chen et al. (2009), Lv et al. (2012) and others, however, ignore the 
influence of the executives on the tunnelling behaviour and focus only on the 
controlling shareholders (Chen et al., 2009; Gao and Kling, 2008; Jiang et al., 2005; Li, 
2010; Liu and Lu, 2007). However, tunnelling cannot be realised without the support of 
managers. On the one hand, controlling shareholders cannot leave executives to conduct 
tunnelling activities as executives are in charge of firm’s daily operation (Zhang et al., 
2014). On the other hand, most Chinese-listed firms have a dominant controlling 
shareholder (Firth et al., 2016). In China, executives’ appointments and tenure can be 
determined by controlling shareholders (Conyon and He, 2011; Firth et al., 2006a). 
Therefore, the activities of the executives should be consistent with the willingness of 
the controlling shareholders to conduct tunnelling behaviour in the Chinese-listed firms 
(Wang and Xiao, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014). 
 
Florackis et al. (2015) find that the relationship between dividend and managerial 
ownership is negative when the managerial ownership is below a threshold. However, 
the relationship between dividend and managerial ownership is positive when the 
managerial ownership is above a threshold. 
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Firstly, Florackis et al. (2015) indicate that the increase in managerial ownership can 
help align managers’ interests with those of shareholders when managerial ownership is 
below a threshold. It is consistent with the incentive alignment effect which suggests 
that managers who own equity in the firm act as owners and reduce the degree of 
expropriation from other investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, the 
increase in managerial ownership aligns the interests between managers and 
shareholders, which in turn reduces agency cost from the separation of managers’ 
management power and their ownership level. However, Morck et al. (1988) suggest 
that the increase in managerial ownership when managerial ownership exceed the 
threshold level can lead to managerial opportunism and entrenchment behaviour (i.e. 
entrenchment effect). It is because that the above threshold level of managerial 
ownership provides managers more power and influence and not afraid of replacement 
or the discipline of markets and firms (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Morck et al., 
1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). As a result, increase in managerial ownership can 
induce managers’ entrenchment behaviour and increase agency costs. 
 
Secondly, different from the argument of Lv et al. (2012) that dividend payment can be 
a tunnelling method in China, Florackis et al. (2015) and Allen et al. (2000) indicate 
that dividends play a monitoring role and can reduce agency costs in the US market. It 
is because the dividend payout reduces the firm resources which can be abused by 
managers in the US market with relatively balanced shareholder structure (Lv et al., 
2012). 
 
Combining the two reasons, when the managerial ownership is below the threshold of 
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Florackis et al. (2015), their findings support a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and dividends as dividends are the substitute of managerial 
ownership to reduce the agency cost. However, when managerial ownership is above 
the threshold of Florackis et al. (2015), the relationship between dividend and 
managerial ownership is positive and can be explained by the entrenchment effect of 
managerial ownership. First, dividend is a monitoring role and can reduce agency costs 
in the US market (Florackis et al., 2015). Second, entrenchment effect argues that the 
executives are self-interested and can exhibit opportunistic behaviour for their own 
benefit and in turn increase agency cost if their ownership further increases when 
executive ownership is above a threshold (Farinha, 2003; Schooley and Barney, 1994). 
The increase in dividend in U.S firms can enhance the monitoring on the entrenched 
executives when their shareholdings further increase. This is because the ownership in 
the US market is dispersed and thus the dividend payout can benefit all the shareholders 
by constraining executives’ abuse of firm resource. Therefore, the relationship between 
dividend and executive ownership is positive when executive ownership is above a 
threshold. 
 
Due to the five unique characteristics of the Chinese market mentioned at the start of 
this chapter, I investigate the impact of the executive ownership on the dividend policy 
in China. Compared to the arguments of Florackis et al. (2015), I conjecture that the 
dividend policy in China is different from that in the developed markets because the 
environment of the Chinese market is suitable for the tunnelling activities. Even the 
dividend payout can become the channel for the tunnelling by the controlling 
shareholders (Chen et al., 2009; Lv et al., 2012). Since the dividend payout can be used 
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as the channel for the tunnelling, when the executive ownership is low, the executives 
need to issue more dividends as the executive ownership increases. It is because the 
executives need to be consistent with the willingness of the controlling shareholders to 
engage in the tunnelling. In addition, Hu and Kumar (2004) indicate that the executives 
have the intention to increase their ownership in order to gain more control and secure 
their position in the firms. Meanwhile, the controlling shareholders can nominate the 
board members and determine the executives’ remunerations, appointments and 
dismissals (Conyon and He, 2011; Cullinan et al., 2012; Firth et al., 2006a). If the 
executives with low ownership do not help the controlling shareholders in the tunnelling, 
the executives can hamper their own career development. When the executive 
ownership is high, the executives may become self-interested and collude with the 
controlling shareholders to issue more dividends for tunnelling purposes. The 
controlling shareholders of Chinese-listed firms also want to acquire more dividends for 
their benefits (Chen et al., 2009; Lv et al., 2012). Therefore, the activities of the 
executives are consistent with the willingness of the controlling shareholders. My 
results show that both the dividends and the abnormal dividends are positively related to 
the executive ownership. The results support that the executives can extract more than 
expected firms’ resources through the dividend payouts to the controlling shareholders 
and themselves. 
 
My study further looks at the impacts of both the internal factors and the external 
monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between the executive ownership and the 
dividend tunnelling. By evaluating the internal factors like the degree of the ownership 
concentration, the influence of the state ownership, and the traditional tunnelling 
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method, the results show that the internal factors can increase the dividend tunnelling. 
The results in this chapter are consistent with the view that the weak corporate 
governance facilitates the dividend tunnelling. I then consider the external monitoring 
factor such as the analyst coverage to constrain the dividend tunnelling. 
 
Yu (2008) suggests that analysts’ coverage can monitor firms’ activities. Analysts can be 
regarded as the external monitoring mechanism for corporate managers (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Analysts can track financial statements 
regularly and have the substantial financial and industrial background and analytical 
knowledge. As a result, analysts can detect misconduct of corporate managers and 
constrain their misbehaviour. In addition, Degeorge et al. (2013) suggest that analyst 
coverage can help firms to build up good corporate governance because it increases 
external monitoring. Previous studies provide supportive evidence. For instance, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that analysts’ activities are able to reduce agency costs. 
Dyck et al. (2010) document that analysts can monitor fraudulent behaviour in firms 
quickly. Yu (2008) argues that earnings management opportunities can be reduced by 
the increase in analyst coverage. Analysts are trained to analyse the accounting reports 
of firms to monitor the firms’ operations. If analysts cannot produce a good quality 
report which can reflect target firms’ information and financial position accurately, the 
analysts’ reputation can be damaged (Degeorge et al., 2013). Therefore, more analysts 
following a certain firm’s financial reports and the firm’s daily operations can recognize 
the firm’s potentially fraudulent behaviour more efficiently. Dividend tunnelling is a 
method of tunnelling in China suggested by Lv et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2009), and 
thus analyst coverage can monitor fraud including tunnelling behaviour, and dividend 
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tunnelling particularly in China. I undertake a test of the external analyst coverage. If 
the analysts’ coverage is the external monitoring mechanisms to regulate the firm 
behaviour in China, the sensitivity between the dividend tunnelling and the executive 
ownership should be reduced. 
 
I use the data from the CSMAR database with the sample period from 2005 to 2015. I 
first re-confirm that the dividend payouts are treated as the tunnelling method in China 
by running the same regressions as Lv et al. (2012). To provide further supporting 
evidence that the dividend payouts are treated as the method of the dividend tunnelling 
in China, I replace the dividend payouts with the abnormal dividend payouts
13
 and run 
the same regressions. The results support the arguments of Lv et al. (2012). Then I find 
that the increase in the executive ownership can increase the dividend payouts. 
Furthermore, the abnormal dividend payouts are also positively related to the executive 
ownership. It indicates the executives can extract more than expected firms’ resources 
through dividends. Lv et al. (2012) suggest that the dividend payout policy is also a 
channel for tunnelling company funds to the controlling shareholders and the executives. 
Therefore, I conjecture that the executive ownership concentration can increase the 
dividend tunnelling. When adding the other receivable account as the interaction, the 
results show that the dividend tunnelling and the inter-corporate loan tunnelling are 
substitutes for each other. By evaluating the state ownership as the interaction term, I 
find that the increase in the state ownership also increases the sensitivity of managerial 
ownership and dividend tunnelling. After considering the internal factors, I tested the 
                                                             
13 The abnormal dividend payouts are the residuals extracted from the regressions on several dividend determinants 
including the firm performance. The regression is derived from the following two papers. 
Holder, ME, Langrehr, FW, Hexter, JL. Dividend policy determinants: An investigation of the influences of 
stakeholder theory. Financial Management 1998;73-82. 
Rozeff, MS. Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research 
1982;5;249-259. 
101 
 
external factors. I added the analyst number dummy, the report number dummy and the 
broker number dummy into the regressions to examine the influence of the analyst 
coverage on the sensitivity between the dividend tunnelling and the executive 
ownership. The results imply that the analyst coverage is an efficient way to monitor the 
insiders’ behaviour and to reduce the dividend tunnelling. 
 
In this chapter, I make several contributions. Firstly, mine is the first attempt to fill the 
gap in the literature concerning the relationship between the dividend tunnelling and the 
executive ownership. I find that the cash dividend itself is a channel for the tunnelling 
activities. Chen et al. (2009) show that some Chinese firms use high dividends to 
transfer the proceeds of the IPO to the controlling shareholders. However, they focus on 
the dividend tunnelling occurring in the IPOs but do not consider the continuous 
expropriation by the controlling shareholders’ use of the dividend payouts. Lv et al. 
(2012) find evidence that the dividend payout is a tunnelling method in the Chinese 
market but do not investigate the relationship between the dividend payout strategy and 
the executive ownership. I am also the first to use the abnormal dividend payouts to 
investigate the relationship between the dividend tunnelling and the executive 
ownership. The advantage of using the abnormal dividend payout is that I can directly 
argue that the dividend payouts extract more than expected dividends to the controlling 
shareholders in China. Secondly, I contribute to the literature by studying the influences 
of the internal factors like the ownership concentration, the tunnelling of the other 
receivables and the government ownership on the sensitivity between the dividend 
payouts and the executive ownership. Thirdly, I contribute to the field by investigating 
the influence of the analyst coverage on the sensitivity between the dividend tunnelling 
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and the executive ownership. This is consistent with the finding of Ding et al. (2013) 
that the analyst coverage is an effective external monitoring mechanism to improve the 
corporate governance. 
 
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows. The second part outlines the related 
literature. The third part covers hypotheses development. The fourth part consists of the 
data and methodology. While the fifth part provides the results from the regressions, the 
sixth part draws conclusions. 
 
3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 Controlling shareholders and executives 
Prior research reveals a determinant role of the ownership structure in the expropriation 
of minority shareholders by the insiders (Farinha and López-de-Foronda, 2009; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Maury and Pajuste (2005) document that the multiple 
shareholders have a major influencing role in the corporate governance mechanism 
because many shareholders with similar shareholdings can compete with each other and 
keep balanced ownership structure. Berkman et al. (2009) find a negative relationship 
between the private non-controlling shareholder ownership and the likelihood of 
expropriation by a controlling shareholder when studying Chinese company-related 
party loan guarantees. The incentives to monitor the controlling shareholders and the 
willingness to constrain the expropriation of minority shareholders are strongest among 
the private non-controlling shareholders. However, firstly, Jiang et al. (2010) argue that 
the legal system in China affords the minority shareholders little opportunity to take 
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private enforcement actions against the controlling shareholders’ misconduct. Secondly, 
the Chinese firms are not subject to sufficient external governance mechanisms. The 
lack of external governance mechanisms can hide the misconduct of the controlling 
shareholders. The non-competitive environment can lead to a shortage of motivation to 
reform and obtain better corporate governance mechanisms. Thirdly, the weak legal 
system in China cannot regulate the tunnelling behaviours effectively. Fourthly, the 
controlling shareholders’ trading behaviours are highly restricted, which push them into 
the dividend tunnelling. Fifthly, China has a weaker corporate governance environment 
compared to the developed markets. Therefore, I assume that the corporate insiders may 
attempt to expropriate the minorities when the corporate governance remains weak. 
 
Tunnelling activities are pervasive. First, Jiang et al. (2010) suggest that intercorporate 
loans were used by controlling shareholders to siphon tens of billions of RMB from 
Chinese-listed companies during the 1996–2006 period. Inter-corporate loans are 
typically reported as part of ‘‘Other receivables’’ (OREC), which can be found in the 
balance sheets of a majority of Chinese firms and collectively represent a large portion 
of their assets and market values. Then regulatory departments in China found the 
severe problem and required firms to return inter-corporate loans; this continued until 
2006. A joint statement by eight government ministries required the firms with 
tunnelling behaviour to disclose information to the public and to take legal action 
against related persons in firms to stop the abuse of OREC. The forced returning of the 
“other receivables” account had some positive effects; most of the OREC has been 
returned and the related tunnelling ended. The statistic shows that tunnelling related to 
inter-corporate loan abuse amounted to close to 50 billion RMB, and involved over 
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one-third of all listed firms (Jiang et al., 2010). Therefore, before the forced payback, 
these firms exhibited severe tunnelling behaviour through OREC. Second, when 
inter-corporate loans were largely regulated during this period by the government to 
stop tunnelling behaviour, a new method of tunnelling-dividend tunnelling was used. 
Dividend tunnelling is discussed by Chen et al. (2009) and Lv et al. (2012). Lv et al. 
(2012) find that the dividend is negatively related to the minority shareholder protection 
proxy-SBM, and thus the dividend payment does not help to protect minority 
shareholder interests in China. Chen et al. (2009) also provide an example of dividend 
tunnelling: the case of a listed firm, Ufida Software Company (code 600588). Dividend 
was paid to the firm’s controlling shareholder without considering the firm performance, 
and thus the controlling shareholder of Ufida conduct tunnelling behaviour. 
 
The pervasive tunnelling is because of the institutional set-up in the Chinese stock 
markets. There are several explanations for this phenomenon. First of all, most of the 
listed firms in China are carve-outs from large state-owned enterprises or separate from 
them initially (Jiang et al., 2010). After the separation, the state-owned shares still 
occupy a large part of all outstanding shares. Meanwhile, Jiang et al. (2010) and Lv et al. 
(2012) point out that the Chinese Government has declared that the remaining 
state-owned shares or the converted non-tradable shares have more restrictions in 
trading, because Jiang et al. (2010) suggest that the Chinese government has the 
intention to retain control of the listed firms. Yuan et al. (2008) find that the average 
shareholding by the government in the listed firms is very high. As a consequence, the 
level of ownership concentration is very high, and many firms are state-controlled. Yuan 
et al. (2008) suggest that the controlling shareholders and the state-owned shareholders 
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can be the same at most times. The minority shareholders do not have the chance to 
make their voice heard. Secondly, the controlling shareholders have dominant control 
over the firms in China (Zhang et al., 2014). The control is reflected in the firms’ board 
composition and the executive incentives. Cullinan et al. (2012) indicate that the 
controlling shareholders can affect board composition by nominating board members. 
Those nominated and those who successfully remain on the firms’ board may be 
affiliated with the controlling shareholders. Cullinan et al. (2012) find that, in their 
sample, the affiliated directors occupy almost 40% of the board seats. Therefore, even 
though the board contains the supervisory directors, they do not conduct effective 
monitoring in the decision-making process (Firth et al., 2006a). 
 
The large shareholders, who hold a majority of the voting rights, can exert a strong 
influence on firms’ operations in China. Firth et al. (2006a) and Conyon and He (2011) 
conclude that controlling shareholders can control the appointments and tenure of 
executives in the Chinese market. However, managers can assist the controlling 
shareholders in conducting tunnelling activities. Zhang et al. (2014) point out that 
executives manage daily operation and make decisions for all the firm policies and 
investments, and thus controlling shareholders need managers to assist in the tunnelling 
activities. For example, Wang and Xiao (2011) discover that the controlling 
shareholders in Chinese-listed firms collude with executives in tunnelling activities. 
 
3.2.2 Tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholders 
Previously, Johnson et al. (2000) introduced ‘tunnelling’ to describe the controlling 
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shareholder’s behaviour of transferring the company resources for their own benefits. 
There is a wide range of activities associated with tunnelling, including outright theft, 
loan guarantees, and deviation from the market prices when selling assets or products. 
Tunnelling behaviour has been discussed in the literature. For instance, tunnelling 
through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions has been discussed by Jiang 
et al. (2010), Aharony et al. (2010) and Du et al. (2013). Some new methods of 
tunnelling, such as dividend tunnelling, have also been recognized by scholars such as 
Chen et al. (2009) and Lv et al. (2012) in the Chinese market. Since the tunnelling is 
negatively related to effective corporate governance mechanisms (Johnson et al., 2000), 
emerging markets are found to have more serious problems of tunnelling than the 
developed countries do. This is because the firms in emerging countries usually have a 
concentrated ownership structure, less independent boards, inactive external takeover 
markets and low-quality disclosure (Braendle et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Fan et al., 
2007; Firth et al., 2007b; Gao and Kling, 2008; Lin, 2004; Liu and Lu, 2007; Lv et al., 
2012; Tenev et al., 2002; Xu and Wang, 1999). China is the largest emerging market 
country and has weak corporate governance mechanisms particularly in the 
over-concentrated ownership structure. Therefore, China is an important context within 
which to study tunnelling behaviour. 
 
Research on the corporate loans reveals that the aim of the controlling shareholders is to 
extract funds from the Chinese-listed firms for themselves (Jiang et al., 2005; Jiang et 
al., 2010). However, Jiang et al. (2010) point out that the regulators like the CSRC have 
constrained the tunnelling method of the “other receivables account”. Jiang et al. (2010) 
document that the government forces both the top managers and controlling 
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shareholders to pay back the deficits in the “other receivables account”. However, the 
prevention of one particular channel of tunnelling may simply push the controlling 
shareholders to transfer to an alternative channel, dividend payout. Chen et al. (2009) 
and Lv et al. (2012) highlight the role of the tunnelling in the dividend policy. The 
tunnelling theory suggests that dividend payment is a channel by which the controlling 
shareholders can hamper the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Not all dividend payments can be treated as dividend tunnelling as it is subject to 
conditions. Following Lv et al. (2012), dividend policy has been considered as a puzzle 
in the finance literature. Many theories have been developed to explain corporate 
dividend behaviour. Lv et al. (2012) suggested that these dividend theories can be 
categorized into two groups: protection theories and tunnelling theories. The protection 
theories include clientele effect theory (Elton and Gruber, 1970), agency cost theory 
(Easterbrook, 1984), signalling theory (Miller and Rock, 1985), free cash flow theory 
(Jensen, 1986) and catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). Tunnelling theory (Chen 
et al., 2009; Lv et al., 2012) is different from the traditional dividend theories because 
dividend tunnelling theory argues that dividends can be used to expropriate minority 
shareholder interests. 
 
Dividend can be used as a method to tunnel firm resources by the controlling 
shareholders in China where firms’ ownership structure is highly concentrated (Chen et 
al., 2009). Lv et al. (2012) also suggest the dividend payment in China can be explained 
by dividend tunnelling theory. Under tunnelling theory, dividends are employed by 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders. More 
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importantly, the evidence of dividend tunnelling comes mainly from the Chinese market. 
Lv et al. (2012) suggested that dividends can be treated as a method of tunnelling if the 
relationship between the shareholder balancing mechanism (SBM) and the dividend 
payout is negative. SBM measures the strength of minority shareholder protection. Lv et 
al. (2012) suggest that tunnelling can expropriate minority shareholders’ interests, and 
thus they indicate that if dividend is a tunnelling method, the increase in dividend is 
positively related to the expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests (i.e. when 
SBM is lower, or the ownership structure is highly concentrated). The details of SBM 
are in Section 3.4.1. 
 
3.2.3 Analyst coverage 
Analyst coverage can monitor firms and reduce the potential for fraud within firms (Yu, 
2008). Analysts’ reputation is based on the accuracy of their investigations into firms 
(Degeorge et al., 2013). Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that analysts are familiar with 
the relevant financial and industrial knowledge and can investigate firms to write reports 
to guide investors. Therefore, executives’ potential misconduct may be found by 
analysts. However, if there is only one analyst investigating many firms, the analyst 
may not maintain accuracy all the time. Many analysts focusing on a certain firm can 
make the information as transparent as possible. The idea is supported by Yu (2008), 
who argues that earnings management opportunities and related agency cost can be 
reduced by the increase in analyst coverage density (high frequency of analysts’ 
investigations), which means more analyst focus on firms can reduce agency costs 
related to earnings management. The papers of Liu and Lu (2007) and Aharony et al. 
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(2010) argue that earnings management is positively related to the degree of tunnelling 
behaviour because firms’ executives and controlling shareholders need to use managed 
earnings to cover the amount of resources which have been tunnelled out of the firms. 
Therefore, analyst coverage (higher density of analysts’ investigations) can reduce 
executives’ and controlling shareholders’ misconduct and fraudulent behaviour, such as 
tunnelling in firms. Lv et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2009) find that dividend payout can 
be used for tunnelling purposes in China. Therefore, I want to test whether analyst 
coverage can monitor and reduce dividend tunnelling behaviour. I, therefore, discuss the 
relationship between analyst coverage and dividend tunnelling in the Related Literature 
section of my thesis. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
In order to find the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling, I 
need to first follow Lv et al. (2012) to confirm that dividend payment in China is used 
as a tunnelling method to help controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders by introducing split-share reform and SBM (shareholder balancing 
mechanism). Then I further study the relationship between executive ownership and 
dividend tunnelling in Chinese-listed firms. 
 
Lv et al. (2012) point out that many Chinese-listed firms have transferred from previous 
state-owned enterprises. However, the previous controlling shareholders and the 
executives largely remain in place, even following the split-share reform that took place 
in the year 2005 (Firth et al., 2010; Hou et al., 2012; Kuo et al., 2014). I first discuss the 
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background of split-share reform, then I discuss the reform. At last, I discuss the 
remaining restrictions on converted NTS (non-tradeable shares) after split-share reform. 
 
Firstly, according to Kuo et al. (2014), the center of China’s economic reform is the 
privatization of previous state-owned firms both listed and unlisted. Following Kuo et al. 
(2014), the government ownership is mainly formed by the non-tradable shares, while 
the other type of share is the tradable share which is only issued to domestic individuals 
and institutional investors and can be freely traded in stock markets in China. 
 
Before split-share reform, this two-tier stock structure put limits on firms’ profitability 
and efficiency and even declines after the firms’ listing (Chen et al., 2008b; Yu et al., 
2006). NTS (non-tradeable shares) were recognized as an impediment to the growth and 
effective functioning of the stock market. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
corporate control was almost absent as NTS occupied large proportions of shares. The 
high level of state non-tradable shares meant minority shareholders had very little 
decision-making rights in firms. Second, there was serious unfairness between NTS 
(non-tradeable shares) and TS (tradable shares) shareholders because of the differences 
in the tradability and pricing mechanisms. TS are priced based on the market and have 
higher price-earnings ratios than NTS, while NTS are based on the net asset value (Kuo 
et al., 2014). Kuo et al. (2014) document that NTS can only be negotiated to transfer to 
other parties under restrictions of the time period and amount . Consequently, the stock 
price movement cannot have a large impact on NTS value. Therefore, NTS shareholders 
do not have enough market-based incentives to improve the performance or to 
maximize market-based TS value (Chen et al., 2008a; Li et al., 2011). 
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Secondly, Lv et al. (2012) and Kuo et al. (2014) document that split-share reform is to 
solve the problems originated from the two-tier stock structure in Chinese-listed firms 
by removing the differences between NTS and TS gradually. Initially, the Chinese 
government launched the reduction of government ownership and privatized firms in 
2001 in order to achieve the target of split-share reform immediately. However, the 
market responded with a sudden drop over 30% when the initial reform policy was 
issued  as TS investors were concerned about the sudden increase in the supply of 
shares could reduce share price of their shareholdings (Kuo et al., 2014). As a result, the 
initial trial was ended in 2002 to keep the market stable. Then, in 2005, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commissions (CSRC) reopened the trial of split-share reform. 
Kuo et al. (2014) suggest that, different from the initial trial, NTS shareholders were 
required to pay compensation to TS shareholders before trading their NTS. During the 
split-share reform, other methods to keep market stable were also introduced such as 
reducing too much volatility of share price, suspending share trading prior to the public 
announcement of the agreed compensation plans, etc. In 2007, split-share reform was 
completed, and most NTS were converted to TS in Chinese stock market (Firth et al., 
2010). 
 
At last, even after the split-share reform, the converted NTS still have restrictions on 
trading in practice. After the reform, the firms’ operation decisions and powers are still 
controlled by those previous executives, directors and the controlling shareholders. This 
is because that although the split-share reform has solved the legal problems of the 
shares with different trading and price mechanisms, there are still several technical 
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restrictions for the converted non-tradable shares (Lv et al., 2012). For example, Kuo et 
al. (2014) document that the converted NTS need at least a 12-month “lockup” period to 
ease the possible impact of stock overhang on the holdings of TS shareholders. They 
document that CSRC required that converted NTS shareholders with more than 5% of a 
firm’s shares should be restricted for trading with more than 5% and 10% of the firm’s 
total share capital within 12 and 24 months. It is used to prevent the sudden reduction in 
the controlling shareholder ownership. Cheng et al. (2009) indicate that the trading 
restrictions for the converted shares may remain in place for a number of years. As a 
result, the dominant shareholders still exist in the Chinese-listed firms, and thus the 
ownership structure is still less balanced compared to the developed markets. Also, the 
minority shareholder protection can still be insufficient as was the case previously. 
 
To measure the controlling shareholders’ expropriation on minority shareholders and 
confirm the dividend can be used as a tunnelling method, I follow Lv et al. (2012) to use 
SBM as the proxy for minority shareholder protection level. Maury and Pajuste (2005) 
suggest that a balanced shareholder structure with a high SBM (shareholder balancing 
mechanism) can help protect firms’ minority shareholders. The details about SBM are 
explained in the following methodology
14
. 
 
SBM is the sum of the square percentage of the shares held by non-block shareholders 
divided by the square percentage of shares held by controlling shareholders. It is a 
proxy for minority shareholder protection (Lv et al., 2012; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). 
Under tunnelling theory mentioned in Section 3.2.2, dividends are employed by 
corporate controlling shareholders to expropriate the interest of minority shareholders 
                                                             
14 The details are near Equation (3.1.3) 
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(Lv et al., 2012). Therefore, under dividend tunnelling theory, more controlling 
shareholders’ expropriation on minority shareholders means more dividend payouts. 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) document that minority shareholder protection (SBM) has a 
significant negative relationship with the agency conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders such as controlling shareholders expropriation on minority 
shareholders. Therefore, minority shareholders in China have the perception that the 
relationship between minority shareholder protection (SBM) and the dividend payment 
is negative. Following Lv et al. (2012), I conjecture the hypothesis that the relationship 
between dividend and minority protection (SBM) is negative to confirm the dividend 
tunnelling phenomenon in China. In addition, to clarify that controlling shareholders 
can extract the firms’ resources regardless of the firms’ real financial position, I use the 
abnormal dividend payout ratio
15
 and the dividend payout ratio in the regression. I 
conjecture that the controlling shareholders can extract the firms’ resources for their 
own benefits through the dividend payout policy, and thus I make the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: The strength of minority shareholder protection is negatively related to the 
dividend payout ratio in Chinese-listed firms. 
 
Florackis et al. (2015) suggest that the relationship between the managerial ownership 
and the dividend payouts can be explained by the two contradictory theories-the 
alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the entrenchment theory (Morck et 
al., 1988) in the developed markets. The developed markets are recognised as having 
relatively balanced shareholder structure and better minority shareholder protection than 
                                                             
15 The explanation of abnormal dividend is in the Methodology part and in Appendix 3.3. 
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the developing markets have. The alignment theory dominates when the executive 
ownership is lower than the threshold, while the entrenchment theory dominates when 
the executive ownership is higher than a certain threshold (Morck et al., 1988). 
However, the two explanations do not consider the unique characteristics in the Chinese 
market. 
 
Lv et al. (2012) point out that the dividend tunnelling is high when the ownership 
concentration is high. The Chinese-listed firms often have a dominant controlling 
shareholder (Jiang et al., 2010). Zhang et al. (2014) suggest that the firms’ controlling 
shareholders can control the Chinese-listed firms. The control mainly affects the firms’ 
board composition and the executive incentives. Firth et al. (2006a) and Conyon and He 
(2011) conclude that the controlling shareholder in China can decide the executives’ 
remuneration, appointments and dismissals. In addition, Jiang et al. (2010) argue that 
the legal system in China provides little protection to the minority shareholders; 
however, Firth et al. (2016) indicate that the minority shareholders have limited impact 
on firms’ decision-making processes in China. Therefore, the executives may not take 
into account the minorities’ interests. Hu and Kumar (2004) indicate that the increase in 
the executive ownership can enhance the CEO power which can reduce the risk of CEO 
replacement and turnover, and thus the executives have the intention to hold more 
shares. If the executives with low ownership do not help the controlling shareholders in 
the tunnelling, the executives can hamper their own career development. Consequently, 
in China, the executives may collude with the controlling shareholders’ willingness 
which is to issue more than expected dividends while the executive ownership 
increases. 
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The entrenchment theory proposed by Morck et al. (1988) indicate that when the 
executive ownership is higher than the threshold, the executives may engage in 
self-interested behaviours. When the executive ownership is high in the Chinese-listed 
firms, the executives may become self-interested and collude with the controlling 
shareholders to issue more dividends for tunnelling purposes. The controlling 
shareholders of Chinese-listed firms also want to make more dividends for their benefit 
(Chen et al., 2009; Lv et al., 2012). Therefore, the activities of the executives are 
consistent with the willingness of the controlling shareholders. In summary, the 
executives may increase the dividend (both the dividend and the abnormal dividend) 
when executive ownership increases, no matter executive ownership is below or above 
the threshold. 
 
Hu and Kumar (2004) indicate that the executives have the intention to hold more 
shares to obtain power and stay in charge of the firms. Lv et al. (2012) use the SBM as 
the measure of the minority shareholder protection to examine whether the dividend 
payouts are employed by controlling shareholders to expropriate the minorities in China. 
Lv et al. (2012) point out that minority shareholders may sell shares when dividend 
payouts increase because the minority shareholders consider that as expropriation of 
their interests. In China, the capital gain from trading shares is tax-free (Firth et al., 
2016). And Lv et al. (2012) suggest that the minority shareholders do not have trading 
restrictions. The minority shareholders sell shares while the large shareholders and the 
executives buy shares. This mechanism can further increase the level of ownership 
concentration. Therefore, the executives have the intention to issue more than expected 
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dividends under tunnelling. The executives can use the mechanism to gain more power. 
I then conjecture the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: A higher level of dividend payout is related to a higher level of executive ownership 
for the dividend tunnelling. 
 
The lower SBM indicates that the minority protection is lower. Previous studies only 
discuss the dividend tunnelling as the controlling shareholders’ expropriation on the 
minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2009; Lv et al., 2012). However, the executives and 
the controlling shareholders may collude to conduct the tunnelling (Zhang et al., 2014). 
SBM is calculated as the sum of squares of the second to fifth shareholders’ holdings 
divided by the controlling shareholder’s holding square. The reciprocal of SBM reveals 
the controlling shareholders’ dominance degree compared to the non-controlling 
shareholders from the second to the fifth. The less protection of minority indicates the 
lower SBM and the higher reciprocal of SBM. A higher reciprocal of SBM reveals the 
dominance of controlling shareholder over the other shareholders. If the executives 
collude with the controlling shareholders in dividend tunnelling, I expect that the 
reciprocal of SBM (RSBM) would have a positive incremental effect on the relationship 
between the dividend payout and executive ownership. I then have the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: The reciprocal of SBM (RSBM) and executive ownership interaction is positively 
related to the dividend payout for dividend tunnelling. 
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In China, the traditional way of tunnelling firm resources to the insiders is through the 
inter-corporate loan which is provided in the balance sheet as the “other receivables” 
(OREC) (Jiang et al., 2010). The inter-corporate loans have been used by controlling 
shareholders to siphon a large amount of firm resources in Chinese-listed firms as 
mentioned in Section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3 of my revised thesis. After 2006, tunnelling 
through inter-corporate loan is largely regulated by the Chinese government. However, 
in Section 3.2.1, I also mention that tunnelling is pervasive in China, the old method of 
tunnelling may be replaced by the new method of tunnelling (dividend tunnelling). 
Dividend tunnelling is recognized and discussed by Chen et al. (2009) and Lv et al. 
(2012). Lv et al. (2012) find that dividend payments in China can be treated as a method 
of tunnelling. After the regulation to constrain previous tunnelling method, controlling 
shareholders still tunnel firm resources through dividend tunnelling. Therefore, I 
conjecture that dividend tunnelling is a substitute of the traditional inter-corporate loan 
tunnelling. 
 
I provide two reasons to explain why the traditional inter-corporate loan can be replaced 
by dividend tunnelling. First, the reason why inter-corporate loan related tunnelling can 
be disclosed and regulated is that inter-corporate loan is recorded as “other receivables” 
in the balance sheet and often has a large amount (Jiang et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2010). 
If there is any investigation on the tunnelling behaviour, this can be easily detected. 
Second, dividend tunnelling is through the dividend payments which can be more 
difficult to be investigated because both controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders can receive dividends by investing in the firms. However, controlling 
shareholders in Chinese-listed firms can take advantage of minority shareholders during 
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the issuance of dividend. It is supported by the evidence that, in China, under dividend 
tunnelling theory, dividend payments are negatively related to the minority shareholders’ 
protection mechanism (Lv et al., 2012). As a result, I make the following hypothesis. 
 
H4: Firms’ other receivables are negatively related to the dividend payout for the 
dividend tunnelling if dividend tunnelling is a substitute of inter-corporate loan related 
tunnelling. 
 
Prior literature focuses on the influences of the analysts’ forecasts on share prices and 
investors’ decisions. Few studies have looked at the external governance effect of 
analysts. I am interested in the effects of analysts on managers’ behaviour, and I 
examine whether analysts play a monitoring role over managers’ decision-making. In 
the context of dividend tunnelling, this chapter examines the effect of analyst coverage 
on the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling. Analysts can 
be regarded as the external monitoring mechanism for corporate managers (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Analysts can track financial statements 
regularly and have substantial financial and industrial background knowledge. As a 
result, analysts can detect misconduct of corporate managers and constrain their 
expropriation. 
 
Degeorge et al. (2013) suggest that the analyst coverage can promote the firms to 
improve corporate governance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that the analysts’ 
activities are able to reduce the agency costs, while Yu (2008) argues that the earnings 
management activities can be reduced by the analyst coverage. Meanwhile, Dyck et al. 
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(2010) document that the financial analysts can monitor the fraud behaviours of 
companies effectively as they are trained to analyse the accounting reports of firms and 
thus can monitor the firms’ actions. If financial analysts cannot play an effective 
monitoring role and provide a reliable suggestion, the analysts’ reputation may be 
damaged (Degeorge et al., 2013). Since the dividend payout may be used as a tunnelling 
method in China, I conjecture that analyst coverage can reduce the positive impact of 
the executive ownership on dividend tunnelling. The analysts can be considered as 
external monitors for all companies. The external monitoring of the analyst coverage is 
important in China because the Chinese-listed firms commonly have concentrated 
ownership structure and the internal corporate governance is weak and ineffective. The 
more analyst coverage there is, the more transparency the firms have (Yu, 2008). The 
implication is that the firms may not be able to expropriate minority shareholders when 
there are a large number of strong external monitors. Therefore, I have the hypothesis 
below. 
 
H5: The analyst coverage can reduce the dividend payout for dividend tunnelling. 
 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 The regression model for the dividend tunnelling test: 
Chen et al. (2009) and Lv et al. (2012) find that the dividend is used as another dividend 
tunnelling method. Following Lv et al. (2012), I have the first two regression models. 
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The dependent variables are DIV and ABDPR. DIV is the dividend payout ratio of the 
firm. ABDPR is the abnormal dividend payout ratio of the firm. The rest are the control 
variables. FRSIZE is the firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of the total asset. 
FASSET is the fixed asset scaled by the total asset. LEVERAGE is the ratio of the total 
liability of the firm divided by the total asset. PAY is the natural logarithm of the 
average of the three top managers’ emoluments. CFLW is the cash and cash equivalents 
scaled by the total asset. CAPEXTA is the capital expenditure scaled by the total asset. 
MTB is the market-to-book ratio of the firm. LNTIME is the natural logarithm of the 
firm listing time. CA_CL is the ratio of the current asset to the current liability. WC is 
the working capital scaled by the total asset. PROFITABILITY is the EBITDA divided 
by the operating revenue. These are the control variables widely used in the corporate 
governance literature. SBM is the shareholder balancing scheme used to measure the 
strength of the minority shareholder interest protection (Lv et al., 2012; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005). The SBM is calculated as follows. 
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The notations 𝑙2, 𝑙3, 𝑙4 and 𝑙5 are the proportions of the shares held by the second to 
the fifth largest shareholders. The numerator is the sum of the square of the 
shareholding fractions of the non-controlling shareholders from the second to the fifth. 
The denominator is the square of the shareholding fraction of the controlling 
shareholder. 
 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that a balanced shareholder structure with a high 
SBM (shareholder balancing mechanism) can help protect firms’ minority shareholders 
and reduce the potential tunnelling behaviour. Therefore, a low SBM indicates the 
expropriation of minority shareholder interests. The notations l2, l3, l4 and l5 are the 
proportions of the shares held by the second to the fifth largest shareholders. The 
numerator is the sum of the square of the shareholding fractions of the non-controlling 
shareholders from the second to the fifth. The denominator is the square of the 
shareholding fraction of the controlling shareholder. The low SBM means the square of 
shareholdings of the controlling shareholder is more than the square sum of the rest of 
the shareholders’ shareholdings. It means that the ownership concentration is high. 
Following Maury and Pajuste (2005), I use SBM to measure minority shareholder 
protection. According to Maury and Pajuste (2005), it is because that high 
shareholdings of multiple shareholders (l2, l3, l4, l5), indicating a high degree of 
corporate SBM, play an important role in corporate governance, as competition among 
largest shareholders can limit the expropriation of minority shareholders. On referring 
to prior research on the agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, 
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a significant negative relation was found between the SBM (shareholder balancing 
mechanism) and the controlling shareholder’s expropriation. It has been shown that a 
balanced ownership structure plays an important role in reducing insider expropriation 
on minority shareholders (Farinha and López-de-Foronda, 2009; Lemmon and Lins, 
2003). Consequently, a low SBM means the controlling shareholders can expropriate 
the minority shareholders and increase tunnelling risk. 
 
I use Equation (3.1.2) to further verify that the more unbalanced ownership structure 
can lead to more abnormal dividend payouts. Therefore, the firms’ resources are 
tunnelled to the controlling shareholders. ABDPR is the abnormal dividend payouts. The 
abnormal dividend payout is the residuals from the following regressions. Following 
Holder et al. (1998) and Rozeff (1982), the regression is used to determine the expected 
dividend payouts which is the fitted value given by the regressions. I obtain the 
residuals from the regressions in the industry-year group and considering the dividend 
smoothing effect. I also control for the influence of the firm performance. The abnormal 
dividend payouts to the shareholders then indicate that the firms can issue more 
dividends than the amount that they should. Therefore, I can further test whether the 
dividend is used as a tunnelling method by using the abnormal dividend payout as a new 
dependent variable. The regression results and the regression equation are in Appendix 
3.3. 
 
3.4.2 The regression models for the executive ownership and the internal factors: 
I examine the relationship between executive ownership and dividend tunnelling using 
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Equation (3.2.1) and Equation (3.2.2). Zhang et al. (2014) find evidence of collusion 
between the managers and the controlling shareholders. They argue that tunnelling 
behaviour cannot be executed without the help of managers. Therefore, the paper 
confirms that the traditional tunnelling is not only related to the controlling shareholders 
but also related to the managers. According to Hypothesis 2, I run the regressions below 
to test whether the executive ownership concentration can enhance the dividend 
tunnelling.  
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In the regressions, I follow Chen et al. (2009) to use the dividend payout ratio as the 
dependent variable DIV. Lv et al. (2012) find that cash dividend payout is recognised as 
a channel of tunnelling in China, and thus the coefficient of EXEOWN (𝛽1) is expected 
to be positive and significant. The reason is that I need to consider more 
executive-related features in the firms, because the main explanatory variable is 
changed from SBM to EXEOWN. I need to design different equations to test the 
relationship between the executive ownership and the dividend tunnelling. Therefore, I 
include several different control variables to capture the influences on the executive 
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decisions in the firms rather than only the variables for the firms’ financial positions. 
Equation (3.2.1) and Equation (3.2.2) combined can show that the increase of the 
executive ownership can prompt the firms to issue more than expected dividends to 
tunnel the firms’ resources to the controlling shareholders. ABDPR is the abnormal 
dividend payouts. The significant coefficients of the explanatory variables support the 
fact that the executives can extract the firms’ resources to the controlling shareholders. 
 
The control variables FRSIZE, FASSET, CFLW and MTB are the same as those 
mentioned above. OLEVE is the operating leverage of the firm which measures how 
risky the operating income can be. Lev (2009) investigates the relationship between the 
operating leverage and the firms’ stock return risks and finds a positive relationship. Lev 
(2009) also points out that the managers’ decisions can change the firms’ operating 
leverage substantially. The increase in the executive ownership can increase the 
executive discretion power (Morck et al., 1988), which can make the executives’ 
decisions more powerful. The financial leverage is the measure of the debtors’ 
supervision of the controlling shareholders (Lv et al., 2012). It reveals the firms’ capital 
structure but does not directly relate to the executives’ discretionary power. Therefore, it 
is more appropriate to use the operating leverage as the control variable to study the 
relationship between the dividend tunnelling and the executive ownership. I replace the 
financial leverage with the operating leverage in the following regressions. The 
operating leverage is also used as the control variable in many papers with the dividend 
payout or ownership structure topics (Farinha, 2003; Moh'd et al., 1995, 1998). 
 
TOP1 is the shareholding fraction of the controlling shareholders. The positive sign of 
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the TOP1 coefficient can partially suggest that more dividends can be issued by 
tunnelling firms’ resources when both the executive ownership and the controlling 
ownership increase. ASSET_GROWTH is the total asset growth rate. Chino (2016) uses 
the asset growth rate as the control variable to study the influence of the labour union on 
the dividend policy and finds that the asset growth rate is negatively related to the 
dividend payouts. This is because further investments in the firms can reduce the funds 
used to issue the dividends. Following Kuo et al. (2014), I also include the board of 
directors’ features as the control variables. DINDSIZE_DUM is the independent director 
dummy. It equals 1 if the number of the independent directors is larger than the 
industry-year median. DBSIZE_DUM is the dummy variable which equals one if the 
size of the board of directors is larger than the industry-year median, otherwise zero. 
DMEET_DUM is the annual board meeting frequency dummy. It equals one if the 
frequency is higher than the industry-year median, otherwise zero. These are the 
corporate governance mechanisms in the firms to regulate the executives’ decisions. I 
also consider the influence of the 2008 financial crisis and use the dummy variable 
FCRI to capture the market risk in that year. The control variables for the rest of the 
regressions are the same because they all discuss the same topic. 
 
I also investigate whether the more concentrated controlling shareholder ownership over 
the non-controlling shareholder can enhance the sensitivity between the executive 
ownership and the dividend tunnelling behaviour. This indicates that the controlling 
shareholders can expropriate the minorities because the shareholder ownership balance 
is distorted. In Hypothesis 3, the positive coefficient of the interaction of the reciprocal 
of SBM and the EXEOWN can support the fact that the more concentrated the 
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controlling shareholder ownership is, the more dividend tunnelling can take place when 
the executive ownership increases. Furthermore, since the two explanatory variables are 
continuous variables, I follow Adams and Jiang (2016) to centralise the interaction 
terms in order to make the explanation simple and accurate. The regression models are 
in Equation (3.3.1) and Equation (3.3.2). 
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ABDPR is the abnormal dividend payouts. RSBMit-1 is the reciprocal of SBM which can 
measure the degree of concentration of the controlling shareholders. The significant 
coefficients of the explanatory variables lend support to the fact that the executives can 
extract the firms’ resources to the controlling shareholders. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I discuss the internal factors which can affect the 
relationship between the executive ownership and the dividend tunnelling. Firstly, I 
include ORECTA (other receivable to the total asset) as the interaction. This regression 
is to test whether the two kinds of tunnelling have substitute features. ORECTA is the 
proxy for the traditional inter-corporate loan tunnelling discussed by Jiang et al. (2010). 
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A more covered-up method of tunnelling is dividend tunnelling, researched by Lv et al. 
(2012). The regression model and the idea of using interaction is similar to the model in 
the paper of Jiang et al. (2010). The modified regression is in Equation (3.4.1) and 
Equation (3.4.2). ORECTA and EXEOWN are centralised for their industry-year means. 
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If the dividend payment is used as a channel for tunnelling the resource, the coefficients 
of the interactions of ORECTA and EXEOWN (𝛽2 and 𝛽3) would be negative because 
the dividend tunnelling is a substitute for the traditional tunnelling method. ABDPR is 
the abnormal dividend payouts. 
 
Secondly, the state ownership is another internal factor that I test in the regressions. 
Even though the country has been economically reforming for over 30 years, state 
ownership still plays a major role in the Chinese stock markets. Accordingly, I 
incorporate the state ownership and its interaction term with executive ownership to test 
the sensitivity between the dividend tunnelling and the executive ownership. The 
regression equations are Equation (3.5.1) and Equation (3.5.2). 
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STAOWN is the fraction of the state-owned shares. STAOWN and EXEOWN are 
centralised for their industry-year means. The higher state-owned shares’ fraction should 
have higher dividend payouts (Bradford et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2011). If the 
coefficients of interaction terms are positive in both regressions, they indicate how state 
ownership concentration increases the sensitivity between the executive ownership and 
the dividend tunnelling behaviour. ABDPR is the abnormal dividend payouts. 
 
3.4.3 The regression models for the external monitoring-analyst coverage: 
The following regressions are designed to test whether the external analysts and brokers, 
and the forecast reports they issue can monitor firms’ behaviours. The Chinese-listed 
firms are recognised as having weak minority protection and weak corporate 
governance. It is important to test whether the external monitoring can introduce a good 
monitoring mechanism into the market. Therefore, I consider the influence of the 
analyst coverage on the tunnelling behaviour. 
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I test the analyst coverage using Equation (3.6.1) and Equation (3.6.2). ANALYST is the 
dummy variable which equals one if the number of analysts focus on the firms is above 
the industry-year mean, otherwise zero. Firms followed by more analyst are under more 
monitoring, and the expropriation on minority shareholders from controlling 
shareholders can be constrained because of the high monitoring pressure (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the minority shareholders can be protected when more 
analysts follow a certain firm. Healy and Palepu (2001) point out that analysts can help 
shareholders to detect the misbehaviour of the managerial team and the insiders. Dyck 
et al. (2010) document that financial analysts can monitor fraud behaviour of companies 
effectively as they are trained to analyse the accounting reports of firms and thus can 
monitor the firms’ actions. As a consequence, those firms are more likely to reduce the 
abuse of company resources and protect minority interests. Tunnelling behaviour is 
positively related to the controlling shareholders’ expropriation on the minority 
shareholders and the firm resources abuse in China (Jiang et al., 2010). Consequently, if 
more analysts follow a certain firm, the tunnelling behaviour can be detected more 
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easily and help protect minority shareholders’ interests. Therefore, the coefficient of the 
interaction (𝛽2) should be negative, which indicates that dividend tunnelling is reduced 
when there is more external monitoring. ABDPR is the abnormal dividend payouts. 
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I replace ANALYST by BROKER in Equation (3.7.1) and Equation (3.7.2). Just as the 
number of analysts denotes the strength of monitoring of a firm, the number of brokers 
cover the width of monitoring on a certain firm. Many analysts may review one firm. If 
the analysts are from the same brokerage companies, they may have very similar ideas 
in the forecasts; however, the repeated versions of reports with similar ideas are not very 
efficient for the investors to extract useful information. Therefore, I use the broker 
number dummy-BROKER. The monitoring results of the forecasts can then be more 
trustworthy. BROKER is the dummy variable that equals one if the number of brokers is 
larger than the industry-year mean, otherwise zero. 
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Equation (3.8.1) and Equation (3.8.2) replace ANALYST with a REPORT. The number 
of reports indicates the strength of the monitoring in the same way as the number of 
analysts do. It also indicates the frequency of forecast results. How often a certain firm 
is reviewed can be explained by the number of reports. I consider this measure because 
analysts are divided into different groups to compile the reports. Even though the 
number of analysts is sometimes very high, they may just issue one version of the 
forecast report. Therefore, it is necessary to include the number of reports measure. 
REPORT is the dummy variable that equals one if the number of reports is larger than 
the industry-year mean, otherwise zero. 
 
In order to reduce the potential endogeneity problem, I use similar methods in Chapter 2. 
McCarthy et al. (2017) document that endogeneity occurs when the independent 
variable of interest is correlated with the error term. Sources of endogeneity include 
omitted variables, measurement errors, and simultaneity (McCarthy et al., 2017). In this 
chapter, I use many control variables to minimise the omitted variable problems. I then 
consider the industry and year-fixed effect in each table to further include the 
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unobservable factors in the regressions. The Hausman test indicates that I need to use 
the year-and-industry-fixed effect. The Hausman test results are in Appendix 3.2. I also 
use bootstrap regressions to reduce the influence of executive ownership distribution 
bias. The details are discussed in the section of Empirical Results, and the results are 
reported in Table 3.12. In addition, I use both dividend payout ratio and abnormal 
dividend payout ratio as two dependent variables to conduct the robustness check. I 
include two different measures of the dependent variable, and thus we can reduce the 
impact of measurement errors (McCarthy et al., 2017). The value of abnormal dividend 
contains the influence of firm performance as shown in the regression table in Appendix 
3.3, and thus we can recognize whether the dividend is paid based on the firm 
performance and provide more accurate regression results. Furthermore, I use one lag of 
the independent variables to deal with the simultaneity issue. The details are provided in 
the section of Empirical Results, and the results are reported in Table 3.14. 
 
3.4.4 Data and variables 
I collect the data from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database. This dataset has been used widely for Chinese studies in the literature (Firth et 
al., 2006a, b, 2007a, b; Firth et al., 2016; Firth et al., 2012). I collect my data of the 
listed firms from both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE), excluding all financial and banking firms. The sample period of my 
data is from 2005 to 2015. The maximum observation is 19957 firm-years. The 
observation is derived from the whole sample with control variables available. 
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[Insert Table 3.1 around here] 
 
Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics for the variables used in this chapter. The first 
variable is the dividend payout ratio, or DIV. ABDPR is the abnormal dividend payout 
ratio. Lv et al. (2012) use the cash dividend payments as the dependent variable to 
identify that the controlling shareholders conceal the tunnelling behaviour in the 
dividend payment in China. The dividend tunnelling in my case differs from previous 
literature, which argues for inter-firm transactions and inter-corporate loans as the main 
forms of tunnelling (Jiang et al., 2010). Therefore, I use DIV as the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, ABDPR reveals that the tunnelling behaviour is concealed in the dividend 
payouts. The total observation for DIV is 19957 from 2005 to 2015. The dividend 
payout ratio average number is 0.228. The median is 0.152, and the standard deviation 
is 0.291. 
 
The main explanatory variable is EXEOWN. It is the short form for executive ownership 
in the firm, and is calculated as the executive-held shares divided by total shares. Zhang 
et al. (2014) find that managers and controlling shareholders work together to 
expropriate the minority interests and this view indicates the fact that controlling 
shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour can be executed by the managers. Therefore, I use 
EXEOWN in the regression as the main influential factor of the dividend tunnelling. The 
observation from 2005 to 2015 is 19956, and the average number is 0.055. This means 
that the firms have 5.5% of shares in the hands of executives on average. The median is 
much less than the mean. The detailed distribution of the executive ownership is 
displayed in Table 3.2. 
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[Insert Table 3.2 around here] 
 
The majority of the executive ownership is located in the domain from 0 to 1%, which 
is consistent with the literature that the executive ownership is small (Coles et al., 2012; 
Core and Larcker, 2002; Mehran, 1995). However, the executive ownership that is 
larger than 50% has 630 observations in the sample, and accounts for approximately 3% 
of the total executive ownership observations. The other observations are distributed 
evenly across the middle ranges. The total number of the non-zero observations of the 
executive ownership is 7845 which accounts for almost 40% of the sample population. 
Therefore, the amount is adequate for the study and I expect to extract meaningful 
results from the data. 
 
In Table 3.1, ORECTA is a proxy for the traditional method of tunnelling. It is used by 
Jiang et al. (2010) to scrutinise the tunnelling hypothesis through China’s related party 
trading. It is the short form for other receivable accounts. ORECTA is calculated as the 
other receivable account balance divided by the total asset to control for the firm size 
bias. I use the other receivable account in the CSMAR database derived from the 
financial footnote catalogue. The average of the ORECTA is 0.026, which means the 
other receivables on average account for 2.6% of the total asset among the listed firms. 
The median is 0.010 which is less than mean. However, the standard deviation is very 
small (0.052). This indicates the stability of the data and the slightly right-skewed 
feature. 
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The next internal governance variable is the state ownership-STAOWN. It is the 
fundamental feature of the listed firms in China. Papers on different topics about China 
use this as the benchmark against which to assess the government’s controlling power 
over firms. Wang et al. (2008) note the differences of the auditor choices between 
state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms. It is natural to bring state ownership as an 
influencing factor into consideration. The state ownership is calculated as the state 
shares divided by the total shares outstanding. The state-owned shares used to be 
non-tradable shares
16
, but since the reform (2005-2008) they can be traded under very 
strict regulations (Hou et al., 2012; Lv et al., 2012). I introduce state ownership in this 
chapter as an interactive term to test the impacts on the executive ownership and 
dividend tunnelling relationship. 
 
The Chinese market has been recognised to have weak corporate governance system, 
and thus the external monitoring mechanism may play an important role to protect the 
minorities. ANALYST is the number of analysts following the listed firms to issue the 
forecasts. BROKER is the brokerage number that the analysts work in. REPORT is the 
number of reports issued by the analysts to forecast the firms being tracked. Previous 
papers mainly use the number of analysts as the measure. Sun (2011) studies analyst 
coverage and the income-smoothing relationship, while Chan and Hameed (2006) study 
the synchronicity and the analyst coverage relationship. Yu (2008) tests the relationship 
between the earnings management and the analyst coverage, but only uses one measure 
and the findings sometimes lack robustness. Furthermore, the three measures are not the 
same. I follow Xu et al. (2013) and Ding et al. (2013) to use all three measures of the 
                                                             
16 Non-tradable shares were introduced by the state control firms of China in the early ages and were used to protect 
state control firms throughout the whole market. However, the non-tradebale shares can lead to many problems in the 
secondary markets. 
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analyst coverage. Ding et al. (2013) suggest that the number of analysts can identify the 
intensity of the monitoring of firms. The number of brokers has the ability to reflect the 
range and scope of monitoring on the target firms. Hong and Kubik (2003) point to the 
fact that brokerage firms sometimes have a relationship with the target firms, for 
example, underwriting the stocks, which means that the analyst from the same 
brokerage firm cannot act independently. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the 
number of brokers to help reduce the biases caused by the business relationship with the 
brokerage firms. The number of reports is the frequency of the targets, which means 
how often they issue the earnings forecast on the firms. The dummy variables ANALYST, 
BROKER and REPORT have 19957 observations each. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3 around here] 
 
Table 3.3 is the correlation table for all the variables. ABDPR and DIV are positively 
related because they naturally have the same features. The three aspects of the external 
analyst coverage (ANALYST, BROKER and REPORT) are highly related because they 
have similar features and measure the same monitoring power from outside the firm. 
SBM and TOP1 are highly related because they can both measure the controlling 
shareholding concentration. 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
Table 3.4 displays the results of testing the relationship between the dividend payout 
ratio and the abnormal dividend payout ratio, and the shareholder balancing mechanism. 
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However, I not only use the dividend payout ratio as the dependent variable but also the 
abnormal dividend payout ratio. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that the dividend should be 
higher when the minority protection is lower. Lv et al. (2012) argue there is a negative 
relationship between the dividend payouts and the minority shareholder protection 
(SBM) if the dividend is used for tunnelling. Their research results support their 
arguments. I confirm the same hypothesis with additional and new evidence that 
ABDPR (the abnormal dividend payout ratio) has the same relationship to SBM (the 
shareholder balancing mechanism) as the dividend payout ratio does. Therefore, the 
dividend payouts can extract the firms’ resources to the shareholders. However, the 
minority shareholders in a weak protection environment take the dividend issuing as a 
signal of the expropriation of the minority interest (Lv et al., 2012). The minority sell 
their shares to avoid further expropriations and make the shareholder balance even 
worse. Therefore, the benefits all go to the controlling shareholders’ pocket. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4 around here] 
 
The coefficients of SBM in most of the regression models are negative and significant at 
the 1% level. My results further support that the dividend payouts in China can be 
regarded as the tunnelling method because the abnormal dividend payouts are 
negatively related to the minority protection as discussed above. Table 3.4 also shows 
the models considering the year and industry fixed effects and with robust standard 
errors. 
 
The regression results of the relationship between the executive ownership and the 
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dividend tunnelling are reported in Table 3.5. The results support my Hypothesis 2 that 
the executive ownership concentration is positively related to dividend tunnelling. Both 
ABDPR and DIV are positively related to the executive ownership. This indicates that 
not only does the dividend payout increase when the executive ownership increases, but 
so does the abnormal dividend payout. Therefore, this dividend is not a pure and simple 
way to share the firm profit with the shareholders, because the abnormal dividend 
payouts can extract the firms’ resources to the controlling shareholders and heavily 
restrict future investment ability. Lv et al. (2012) contend that the dividend payment is 
the vehicle of dividend tunnelling: combining my results and the argument of Lv et al. 
(2012), I conclude that the executive ownership concentration increases the dividend 
tunnelling. 
 
[Insert Table 3.5 around here] 
 
In Table 3.5, the first three models have the dependent variable ABDPR. I do not include 
the industry and year dummies in the first model, but I do include them in the second 
and third models. The last three models have the same structure but with the dependent 
variable DIV. The results are consistent in all six regression models. The coefficients of 
the executive ownership are all positive and significant at the 1% level. The variable 
TOP1 is the controlling shareholder ownership. The results show that TOP1 is 
positively related to both the abnormal dividend and the dividend payouts at the 1% 
significance level. The results support the fact that the controlling shareholders have the 
same target in issuing the dividends to tunnel the firms’ resources. 
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[Insert Table 3.6 around here] 
 
I use the reciprocal of SBM as the interaction to test whether the executives have the 
same target with the controlling shareholders when issuing dividends for tunnelling 
purposes. Table 3.6 shows that the reciprocal of the shareholder balancing mechanism 
can not only increase the sensitivity of the executive ownership and the dividend payout 
ratio, but also the abnormal dividend payout ratio. SBM is calculated as the sum of the 
square of the top four non-controlling shareholders’ ownership divided by the 
controlling shareholding fraction. Therefore, the reciprocal of SBM can reflect the bias 
of the ownership structure towards the controlling shareholder ownership concentration. 
Lv et al. (2012) suggest that the tunnelling view of the dividend payout strategy 
indicates that the more biased the ownership is towards the controlling shareholders; the 
more dividend can be paid out for the tunnelling purposes. The results in Table 3.6 
imply that the more shares concentrated among the controlling shareholders, the more 
sensitivity can be observed between the executive ownership and the dividend 
tunnelling. Therefore, the results show that the executives are aligned with the 
controlling shareholders to issue more than expected dividends for tunnelling purposes. 
The results are significant and consistent in all six models. The structure of Table 3.6 is 
the same as that of the previous tables. 
 
[Insert Table 3.7 around here] 
 
Table 3.7 shows the relationship between EXEOWN and DIV along with ABDPR under 
the influence of ORECTA. Table 3.7 has the same structure as the previous tables have. 
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In Table 3.7, all the executive ownership coefficients in six models are positive at the 1% 
significance level, while the ORECTA coefficients are negative at the 1% significance 
level in all six models. The coefficients of the interaction terms are also significantly 
negative in all six models. Therefore, I conclude that the dividend tunnelling method is 
the substitute for the traditional tunnelling method through inter-corporate loans and 
related party transaction. The significantly negative coefficients of the interaction terms 
imply that the executive ownership concentration enhances the substitute effect of the 
two tunnelling methods. In other words, under the influence of the executive ownership, 
firms just need to reduce some traditional methods of tunnelling to derive greater 
tunnelling benefits from a concealed tunnelling method via dividend payouts. Therefore, 
there is a strong motivation for the executives and the controlling shareholders to 
conduct dividend tunnelling. 
 
[Insert Table 3.8 around here] 
 
The results shown in Table 3.8 are used to test the influence of the state ownership on 
the sensitivity between the dividend tunnelling and the executive ownership. STAOWN 
is the short form for the state ownership. The coefficients of the state ownership are 
positive at the 1% significance level in all six models, which implies that the state 
ownership concentration has positive direct effects on the firms’ dividend payout 
strategy. The results are consistent with the results in the papers of Wang et al. (2011) 
and Bradford et al. (2013). The coefficients of the interaction terms are positive at the 1% 
significance level in all six models. The results imply that the executives are encouraged 
by the state shareholders to issue not only more dividends but also more abnormal 
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dividends when the executive ownership is increasing. Therefore, the results in Table 
3.8 indicate that the state shareholders encourage the dividend tunnelling. The CSRC 
made regulations to forbid the inter-corporate loan tunnelling (Jiang et al., 2010; Lv et 
al., 2012). The controlling shareholders can still search for a concealed way to tunnel 
funds because of the weak Chinese corporate governance feature and the 
underdeveloped regulated legal systems. The dividend tunnelling is one concealed 
method to tunnel the internal funds outside the firms. Therefore, I conclude that the 
state ownership increases the sensitivity of the executive ownership and its relationship 
with the dividend tunnelling. 
 
The previous tables discuss the internal factors and their effects on the dividend 
tunnelling under the executive control. Table 3.9, Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 show the 
influence of the external monitoring (analyst coverage) on the dividend tunnelling under 
the executive control. 
 
[Insert Table 3.9 around here] 
 
Table 3.9 reports the results by using ANALYST as the interaction term. ANALYST is the 
short form for the analyst number dummy; it equals one if the number of analysts is 
greater than the industry-year mean, otherwise zero. The number of analysts can 
measure the intensity of the analyst coverage. The results in Table 3.9 show that the 
coefficients of the interaction terms are negatively related to the dividend payouts in all 
six models. The executive ownership is still positively related to the dividend tunnelling 
behaviour. Therefore, I can conclude that the firms with a high level of analyst focus are 
142 
 
less likely to conduct dividend tunnelling behaviours because the high level of the 
analysts’ focus can monitor the executives’ power. Therefore, the results in this table can 
support Hypothesis 5. However, the results also show that the analyst number dummy is 
positively related to both the dividend payouts and the abnormal dividend payouts. A 
possible reason for this is that the analysts’ over-monitoring can exert pressure on the 
executives to fulfil the analysts’ forecast expectations (Degeorge et al., 1999; Yu, 2008). 
The forecasts’ expectations may contain the requirements for the dividend payout ratio 
because the CSRC has imposed many regulations on the firms to pay more dividends 
(Lv et al., 2012). However, the CSRC does not realise that the dividend payouts have 
already been transferred into a tunnelling method. 
 
[Insert Table 3.10 around here] 
 
Table 3.10 shows the results of the influence of the broker number dummy on the 
sensitivity between the executive ownership and the dividend tunnelling behaviours. 
DIV is the short form of the dividend payout. ABDPR is the short form of the abnormal 
dividend payout ratio. The number of brokers measures the scope of the analyst 
coverage. BROKER is the short form for the broker number dummy. The coefficients of 
the interaction terms of BROKER and EXEOWN are significantly negative in all six 
models. Therefore, I can conclude that the high level of the scope of the analyst 
coverage (BROKER) can protect the minority shareholders from abuse by the dividend 
tunnelling. BROKER coefficients also show that the broker number dummy is positively 
related to both the dividend payouts and the abnormal dividend payouts. The reason is 
the same as that mentioned in the results of Table 3.9. 
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[Insert Table 3.11 around here] 
 
Table 3.11 shows the results by using REPORT as the interaction term to test the 
external monitoring efficiency on the sensitivity between the executive ownership and 
the dividend tunnelling. The number of reports measures the frequency of the analyst 
coverage. REPORT is the short form for the report number dummy. The interaction term 
coefficients of REPORT and EXEOWN are significantly negative in all six models. 
Therefore, I can conclude that the large number of reports of a certain firm can reduce 
the sensitivity between the executive ownership and dividend tunnelling. This indicates 
that the analyst coverage can efficiently monitor the firms to ensure they behave well 
and thus protect the minorities. REPORT coefficients still show that the report number 
dummy is positively related to both the dividend payouts and the abnormal dividend 
payouts. The reason is the same that as mentioned in the results of Table 3.9. Together, 
the results from Table 3.9, Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 indicate that the external 
monitoring is effective in reducing the chance of tunnelling via dividend payouts. 
 
[Insert Table 3.12 around here] 
 
Table 3.12 is the robustness check for the relationship between executive ownership and 
dividend tunnelling. I use the bootstrap regression to reduce the effect of biased 
distribution of executive ownership and to test whether the results are robust. Bootstrap 
regression does not require normal distribution assumptions and can provide more 
accurate inferences when the data are not normally distributed or when the sample size 
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is small (Fox, 2002), and thus I can reduce the potential bias problem from the 
measurement of executive ownership which is not normally distributed. I find that the 
results in Table 3.12 are consistent with those I obtained from the previous tables. 
 
[Insert Table 3.13 around here] 
 
Table 3.13 is the sensitivity analysis by adding the tradeable shares ownership into the 
regressions. The tradeable shares are the exchangeable shares in the secondary market 
while the non-tradeable shares are the privileged shares held by the top managers and 
the controlling shareholders in the Chinese-listed firms (Kuo et al., 2014; Lv et al., 
2012). The tradeable shares allow the shareholders to exchange their shares when they 
realise that the shares are no longer beneficial to them. Therefore, in the context of the 
dividend tunnelling, the tradeable shareholders recognise the dividend payments as the 
tunnelling signal and may trade their shares out to avoid further expropriation by the 
controlling shareholders. I include the variable which is the tradeable shares ownership 
to capture its impact on the original regressions. The results show that the more 
tradeable shares ownership can lead to the more dividend tunnelling. I try to explain this 
phenomenon in two aspects. Since the dividend tunnelling already exists in the Chinese 
stock market, once the investors find they have been expropriated they can trade the 
stocks with new investors (Lv et al., 2012). The more tradable shares ensure the 
liquidity of the shares. As a result, there are new investors continuously been 
expropriated through holding the small amount of shares. Secondly, the minority 
shareholders have very limited rights in determining the firm strategies (Jiang et al., 
2010). Meanwhile, the minority shareholders can still obtain benefits through untaxed 
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capital gains from share tradings (Firth et al., 2016). Therefore, the minority 
shareholders do not have enough motivations to monitor the controlling shareholders. 
As a consequence, the dividend tunnelling can be more severe when there are more 
tradable shares. 
 
[Insert Table 3.14 around here] 
 
Table 3.14 shows the regression results of using one lag of all the independent variables 
in order to reduce the potential endogeneity problem. To address endogeneity concerns, 
Duchin et al. (2010) measure firms’ financial position with the lags of variables to 
ensure there is no chance the dependent variables and the independent variables can 
affect each other. Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) design their regressions to have 
independent variables with lagged one year to control for potential endogeneity 
problems. Similarly, McCarthy et al. (2017) use the regressions with one lag of all 
independent variables to avoid simultaneity which can cause potential endogeneity. The 
variables definitions are the same as the previous regressions, but with “L.” indicating 
one lag of the variables. The results in Table 3.14 are consistent with the findings in the 
previous regressions, and thus my results are consistent across different models. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Lv et al. (2012) document that there are many dividend policies developed to explain 
the dividend payout strategies. Most of these theories are developed in the U.S. market, 
and those theories argue that dividend is a method to protect minority shareholders 
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(Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Easterbrook, 1984; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Jensen, 1986; 
Miller and Rock, 1985). However, these theories are established based on the U.S. 
market conditions. The market conditions in other countries can be very different. For 
example, in China, the dividend can be changed into a method to tunnel firm resources 
to controlling shareholders (Chen et al., 2009). Lv et al. (2012) then suggest that 
dividend payment in China can be explained by dividend tunnelling theory. Under 
tunnelling theory, dividends are employed by corporate controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the minority shareholders’ interests. If SBM (shareholder balancing 
mechanism) is negatively associated with corporate cash dividends, the dividend is 
regarded as a method of tunnelling (Lv et al., 2012). 
 
SBM is a proxy of the minority shareholder protection strength (Lv et al., 2012; Maury 
and Pajuste, 2005). Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Lv et al. (2012) suggest that a high 
SBM (shareholder balancing mechanism) is the result of a dispersed and balanced 
shareholder structure, which indicates there is no controlling shareholder and less 
tunnelling behaviour. However, a low SBM indicates that controlling shareholders can 
expropriate minority shareholders’ interests (Lv et al., 2012; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). 
Some other papers about agency conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders also support this view. For example, Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Farinha 
and López-de-Foronda (2009) both have shown that a balanced ownership structure is 
important in reducing insiders’ potential expropriation on minority shareholders. Since 
most Chinese-listed firms have a dominant controlling shareholder (Firth et al., 2016), 
the SBM is very low. As a result, tunnelling exists and the controlling shareholders can 
expropriate the minorities in China. 
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Due to the different market and regulation context in China compared to the developed 
markets, dividend payment in China becomes a tunnelling method. In this chapter, I 
investigate the relationship between the dividend tunnelling and the executive 
ownership. I also test the influences of the internal factors and the external factors on 
the relationship between the executive ownership and the dividend tunnelling. The data 
are obtained from the CSMAR database. The research sample period is from 2005 to 
2015. All the firms studied are listed on the Chinese stock exchange, excluding financial 
firms. 
 
I design further regressions to test whether the abnormal dividend payouts have the 
same results as the dividend payouts. This is to confirm that the dividend payout 
strategy is used as the tunnelling method in China, as suggested by Lv et al. (2012). The 
results show that the executive ownership concentration can lead to the increase of not 
only the dividend payouts but also the abnormal dividend payouts. The regression 
results of the abnormal dividend payout reveal that the executive ownership 
concentration can make the firms pay more than expected dividends. However, the 
over-payment of the dividend can impose constraints on the funds for future investment 
and make the value of the company shares decrease in the future. Therefore, the 
minority shareholders regard the dividend payouts as the expropriation of their interests 
and sell the shares when there is a dividend increase to stop the further expropriation. 
However, the minorities’ actions can worsen the existing shareholder imbalance 
because the insiders have the motivation to buy back the shares and enhance their 
power. 
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The results show that the executives are aligned with the controlling shareholders’ 
interests to issue more than expected dividends when the executive ownership increases. 
The results also show the dividend tunnelling has a negative relationship with the 
traditional tunnelling methods; this indicates that since the CSRC has taken actions to 
stop intercorporate loan tunnelling, more firms have the intention to use the concealed 
tunnelling methods, such as dividend tunnelling, to escape monitoring. The results 
reveal that the dividend tunnelling is the substitute for the tunnelling through the 
inter-corporate loans and the related party transactions. Furthermore, I find that the state 
ownership concentration can increase the dividend tunnelling opportunity. 
 
In comparison with the weak governance inside the firms, the external monitoring via 
analyst coverage is more effective to regulate the behaviours of the executives and the 
controlling shareholders. The analyst coverage can reduce the sensitivity between the 
executive ownership and the dividend tunnelling. Therefore, if I need to strengthen the 
internal corporate governance to reduce the potential tunnelling behaviour, the 
regulators need to reduce the state control and make the ownership structure more 
balanced. From the external view, the monitoring mechanism of the analyst coverage is 
more useful than the improvement of the internal corporate governance. Therefore, the 
regulators need to encourage more third-party investigations and monitoring in the 
financial market. 
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Regression tables for Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
VARIABLES N MEAN SD P25 P50 P75 
ABDPR 13947 0.019 0.197 -0.137 -0.025 0.131 
DIV 19957 0.229 0.291 0.000 0.155 0.341 
SBM 19957 0.264 0.395 0.009 0.074 0.363 
EXEOWN 19956 0.057 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.001 
ORECTA 19957 0.026 0.053 0.004 0.010 0.024 
STAOWN 19957 0.117 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.170 
A0D 19957 0.354 0.478 0 0 1 
B0D 19957 0.359 0.480 0 0 1 
R0D 19957 0.327 0.469 0 0 1 
FRSIZE 19957 21.792 1.287 20.908 21.649 22.506 
FASSET 19957 0.255 0.180 0.113 0.221 0.367 
LEVERAGE 19957 0.482 0.241 0.308 0.480 0.636 
PAY 19897 12.758 0.821 12.274 12.799 13.298 
CFLW 19957 0.179 0.137 0.083 0.141 0.234 
CAPEXTA 19936 0.057 0.055 0.016 0.040 0.080 
MTB 19957 2.584 2.037 1.351 1.927 2.993 
LNTIME 19677 1.970 0.837 1.386 2.197 2.639 
CA_CL 19957 2.135 2.511 0.945 1.385 2.213 
WC 19957 0.155 0.289 -0.024 0.154 0.347 
PROFITABILITY 19939 0.157 0.247 0.075 0.139 0.228 
TOP1 19957 0.363 0.154 0.240 0.343 0.477 
OLEVE 19957 1.473 0.946 1.134 1.335 1.680 
ASSET_GROWTH 19957 0.142 0.320 0.006 0.093 0.209 
DINDSIZXE_DUM 19957 0.899 0.302 1 1 1 
DBSIZE_DUM 19957 0.714 0.452 0 1 1 
DMEET_DUM 19957 0.585 0.493 0 1 1 
FCRI 19957 0.138 0.345 0 0 0 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. The year range is from 2005 to 2015. Dividend payout ratio 
and the ABDPR (abnormal dividend payout ratio) is the dependent variable. 
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Table 3.2 The distribution of the executive ownership 
EXEOWN 0<EXE<=1% 1%<EXE<=10% 10%<EXE<=30% 30%<EXE<=50% EXE >50% N 
OBSERVATION 3544 1240 1245 1186 630 7845 
YEAR 2005 76 0 1 0 0 77 
YEAR 2006 270 14 4 0 0 288 
YEAR 2007 253 19 10 0 1 283 
YEAR 2008 282 53 26 5 6 372 
YEAR 2009 319 71 41 12 7 450 
YEAR 2010 317 93 74 56 44 584 
YEAR 2011 344 150 127 135 123 879 
YEAR 2012 387 171 164 206 191 1119 
YEAR 2013 406 194 216 261 138 1215 
YEAR 2014 425 212 255 265 65 1222 
YEAR 2015 465 263 327 246 55 1356 
EXEOWN is the executive ownership. This table gives the information of the non-zero executive 
ownership distribution in each year I investigated in this chapter. 
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Table 3.3 Correlation coefficients 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 1.000 
            
2 0.638 1.000 
           
3 0.005 0.024 1.000 
          
4 0.060 0.128 0.191 1.000 
         
5 -0.144 -0.156 0.028 -0.100 1.000 
        
6 0.094 -0.004 -0.121 -0.222 0.042 1.000 
       
7 0.183 0.131 0.012 0.091 -0.150 0.002 1.000 
      
8 0.190 0.136 0.012 0.094 -0.154 0.008 0.916 1.000 
     
9 0.172 0.119 0.012 0.085 -0.140 0.005 0.863 0.860 1.000 
    
10 0.136 0.083 -0.106 -0.176 -0.193 0.084 0.364 0.361 0.348 1.000 
   
11 0.051 -0.009 -0.035 -0.166 -0.088 0.191 -0.019 -0.018 -0.021 0.074 1.000 
  
12 -0.228 -0.246 -0.089 -0.316 0.298 0.094 -0.105 -0.103 -0.099 0.231 0.104 1.000 
 
13 0.181 0.175 0.059 0.064 -0.231 -0.189 0.335 0.330 0.315 0.485 -0.173 -0.099 1.000 
14 0.104 0.171 0.085 0.285 -0.148 -0.089 0.114 0.120 0.118 -0.155 -0.370 -0.407 0.134 
15 0.140 0.080 0.032 0.099 -0.157 0.049 0.203 0.205 0.199 0.053 0.275 -0.124 0.041 
16 -0.049 -0.061 0.093 0.136 0.086 -0.137 0.027 0.018 0.037 -0.422 -0.150 -0.124 -0.042 
17 -0.250 -0.199 -0.152 -0.507 0.105 0.013 -0.138 -0.144 -0.139 0.215 0.050 0.347 0.043 
18 0.128 0.179 0.118 0.364 -0.101 -0.125 0.048 0.054 0.044 -0.221 -0.279 -0.580 0.066 
19 0.164 0.206 0.074 0.340 -0.190 -0.152 0.126 0.129 0.119 -0.119 -0.536 -0.714 0.214 
20 0.096 0.109 0.011 0.031 -0.191 0.026 0.148 0.144 0.141 0.134 0.028 -0.267 0.146 
21 0.150 0.111 -0.539 -0.083 -0.102 0.334 0.101 0.106 0.096 0.268 0.065 0.005 0.033 
22 0.039 0.087 -0.015 -0.035 -0.053 0.034 -0.062 -0.063 -0.065 0.029 0.189 -0.056 -0.040 
23 0.036 0.020 0.028 0.073 -0.144 0.042 0.156 0.156 0.151 0.179 -0.150 -0.057 0.135 
24 -0.008 0.006 -0.006 0.007 0.001 0.042 0.005 0.013 0.013 -0.078 0.060 -0.021 -0.085 
25 0.082 0.037 0.015 -0.129 -0.050 0.133 0.080 0.079 0.076 0.137 0.123 0.062 0.038 
26 -0.052 -0.057 0.015 0.023 0.024 -0.019 0.061 0.059 0.063 0.093 -0.051 0.085 0.068 
27 0.045 -0.057 -0.025 -0.146 0.022 0.243 -0.020 -0.011 -0.017 -0.078 0.071 0.070 -0.167 
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
14 1.000 
             
15 -0.038 1.000 
            
16 0.184 -0.053 1.000 
           
17 -0.311 -0.272 -0.047 1.000 
          
18 0.573 -0.008 0.193 -0.337 1.000 
         
19 0.574 -0.091 0.097 -0.338 0.657 1.000 
        
20 0.075 0.127 0.012 -0.025 0.125 0.153 1.000 
       
21 -0.006 0.049 -0.129 -0.085 -0.035 0.013 0.071 1.000 
      
22 -0.083 0.067 -0.082 0.024 -0.053 -0.064 0.070 0.010 1.000 
     
23 0.107 0.141 -0.002 -0.032 0.032 0.145 0.209 0.075 -0.035 1.000 
    
24 0.052 0.090 -0.072 -0.077 0.013 -0.025 -0.002 0.013 0.004 -0.029 1.000 
   
25 -0.052 0.062 -0.149 0.035 -0.096 -0.086 0.023 0.006 0.010 0.014 -0.141 1.000 
  
26 -0.039 0.046 -0.014 -0.001 -0.065 -0.033 0.006 -0.022 -0.028 0.099 0.021 -0.023 1.000 
 
27 -0.079 0.039 0.000 0.009 -0.101 -0.116 0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.006 0.086 0.057 -0.018 1.000 
The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2015. The correlation coefficients in BOLD style are statistically significant at 5% degree. The variable definitions are in 
Appendix 3.1. 
1=ABDPR 2=DIV 3=SBM 4=EXEOWN 5=ORECTA 6=STAOWN 7=A0D 8=B0D 9=R0D 10=FRSIZE 11=FASSET 12=LEVERAGE 13=PAY 14=CFLW 
15=CAPEXTA 16=MTB 17=LNTIME 18=CA_CL 19=WC 20=PROFITABILITY 21=TOP1 22=OLEVE 23=ASSET_GROWTH 24=DINDSIZE_DUM 
25=DBSIZE_DUM 26=DMEET_DUM 27=FCRI
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Table 3.4 Regression of the dividend payout ratio and shareholder balancing mechanism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
SBMt-1 -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.014** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (-3.147) (-4.131) (-4.105) (-2.531) (-2.740) (-2.723) 
FRSIZE t-1 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (8.681) (10.042) (9.809) (9.446) (9.877) (9.793) 
FASSET t-1 0.034*** 0.028** 0.028** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.046*** 
 (2.872) (2.410) (2.343) (3.793) (3.901) (3.084) 
LEVERAGE t-1 -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.210*** -0.202*** -0.203*** -0.201*** 
 (-18.758) (-19.034) (-18.703) (-15.323) (-15.442) (-14.789) 
PAY t-1 0.035*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
 (15.705) (19.781) (19.511) (14.120) (14.011) (14.100) 
CFLW t-1 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.121*** 
 (5.504) (5.747) (5.783) (6.319) (6.355) (6.029) 
CAPEXTA t-1 0.110*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.029 0.018 0.005 
 (3.535) (3.898) (3.919) (0.722) (0.442) (0.129) 
MTB t-1 -0.003*** 0.000 0.000 -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-3.069) (0.194) (0.231) (-6.773) (-4.443) (-4.147) 
LNTIME t-1 -0.084*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (-27.722) (-25.190) (-25.081) (-14.500) (-13.898) (-13.792) 
CA_CL t-1 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.207) (2.583) (2.569) (2.426) (2.211) (2.347) 
WC t-1 -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 
 (-6.042) (-5.819) (-5.913) (-1.371) (-1.356) (-1.282) 
PROFITABILITY t-1 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.045*** 
 (4.158) (4.070) (4.011) (5.585) (5.768) (7.165) 
CONSTANT -0.466*** -0.618*** -0.610*** -0.598*** -0.629*** -0.657*** 
 (-14.516) (-18.119) (-17.572) (-14.848) (-14.427) (-14.856) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 14,049 14,049 14,049 18,513 18,513 18,513 
R2_A 0.161 0.179 0.179 0.109 0.112 0.113 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend payout 
ratio and shareholder balancing mechanism. The regression results are calculated by the pooled OLS 
and year-industry fixed effect regression. SBM is the shareholder balancing mechanism. T-statistics in 
parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.5 Regression of the dividend payout ratio and EXEOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
EXEOWN 0.244*** 0.250*** 0.240*** 0.244*** 0.219*** 0.210*** 
 (10.351) (10.465) (10.014) (15.612) (13.690) (13.067) 
FRSIZE 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 (12.493) (12.671) (13.072) (10.883) (8.627) (9.288) 
TOP1 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
 (13.505) (13.217) (12.988) (12.697) (13.017) (12.900) 
FASSET 0.075*** 0.066*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.023* 
 (8.027) (7.085) (3.999) (4.490) (4.818) (1.859) 
OLEVE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (3.541) (3.439) (3.082) (9.371) (9.255) (9.025) 
ASSET_GROWTH -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.016*** -0.012** -0.012** 
 (-0.217) (0.014) (-0.164) (-3.040) (-2.173) (-2.184) 
CFLW 0.238*** 0.248*** 0.237*** 0.377*** 0.389*** 0.378*** 
 (15.485) (16.130) (15.208) (22.523) (23.124) (22.211) 
MTB 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.917) (0.450) (-0.162) (-6.947) (-7.024) (-7.117) 
DINDSIZE_DUM 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.023*** 0.013* 
 (0.297) (1.609) (0.466) (0.497) (3.106) (1.686) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
 (7.799) (8.029) (7.616) (5.616) (6.829) (6.322) 
DMEET_DUM -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (-6.367) (-7.328) (-7.501) (-7.583) (-7.338) (-7.677) 
FCRI 0.037*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.020*** -0.018 -0.020* 
 (7.916) (-3.083) (-3.244) (-3.524) (-1.607) (-1.740) 
CONSTANT -0.524*** -0.503*** -0.485*** -0.362*** -0.326*** -0.342*** 
 (-15.737) (-14.713) (-14.018) (-9.139) (-7.967) (-8.274) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 19,956 19,956 19,956 
R2_A 0.069 0.081 0.084 0.078 0.082 0.085 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend payout 
ratio and managers’ ownership. The regression results are calculated by the pooled OLS and year-industry 
fixed effect regression. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.6 Regression on the dividend payout ratio, RSBM and EXEOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
EXEOWN 0.268*** 0.203*** 0.245*** 0.243*** 0.236*** 0.240*** 
 (11.424) (8.347) (9.754) (12.310) (11.795) (11.975) 
RSBMt-1*EXEOWN 0.007** 0.005* 0.007** 0.009** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (2.394) (1.752) (2.149) (2.458) (2.954) (3.109) 
RSBMt-1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.212) (-0.212) (0.056) (-0.934) (-0.834) (-0.722) 
FRSIZE 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
 (13.284) (12.037) (12.774) (11.475) (8.077) (9.050) 
TOP1 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.180*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 
 (13.472) (13.267) (13.141) (12.796) (13.707) (13.568) 
FASSET 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.024* 
 (8.783) (7.852) (4.047) (4.652) (5.534) (1.913) 
OLEVE 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (3.898) (3.690) (3.219) (9.573) (9.426) (9.160) 
ASSET_GROWTH -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.016*** -0.012** -0.013** 
 (-0.314) (0.107) (-0.260) (-2.954) (-2.267) (-2.441) 
CFLW 0.242*** 0.249*** 0.236*** 0.393*** 0.395*** 0.377*** 
 (15.658) (16.161) (15.118) (23.700) (23.564) (22.144) 
MTB 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (1.529) (0.542) (-0.313) (-6.066) (-7.103) (-7.413) 
DINDSIZE_DUM 0.002 0.012** 0.004 0.004 0.026*** 0.014* 
 (0.461) (2.112) (0.734) (0.596) (3.509) (1.866) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
 (7.485) (8.022) (7.586) (5.069) (6.835) (6.290) 
DMEET_DUM -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.032*** 
 (-6.763) (-7.207) (-7.553) (-7.703) (-7.302) (-7.746) 
FCRI 0.018*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.014 -0.016 
 (3.768) (-2.792) (-2.986) (-6.610) (-1.186) (-1.360) 
CONSTANT -0.537*** -0.493*** -0.476*** -0.375*** -0.319*** -0.337*** 
 (-16.093) (-14.375) (-13.763) (-9.441) (-7.792) (-8.165) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 19,952 19,952 19,952 
R2_A 0.071 0.079 0.084 0.075 0.082 0.085 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend payout 
ratio and managers’ ownership and the reciprocal of SBMt-1 (RSBMt-1 is divided by 100% to enlarge the 
coefficient). The regression results are calculated by the pooled OLS and year-industry fixed effect 
regression. The first three explanatory variables in the regressions are centralized for industry-year means. 
T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.7 Regression on the dividend payout ratio, ORECTA and EXEOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
EXEOWN 0.238*** 0.175*** 0.216*** 0.205*** 0.193*** 0.195*** 
 (10.749) (7.690) (9.205) (12.924) (12.020) (12.182) 
ORECTA*EXEOWN -1.369** -1.418*** -1.370*** -1.337*** -1.320** -1.308** 
 (-2.548) (-2.755) (-2.636) (-2.605) (-2.569) (-2.531) 
ORECTA -0.471*** -0.470*** -0.490*** -0.515*** -0.512*** -0.534*** 
 (-11.876) (-12.416) (-12.823) (-16.594) (-16.365) (-16.905) 
FRSIZE 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 
 (12.411) (11.424) (12.202) (10.322) (7.340) (8.336) 
TOP1 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.154*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 
 (12.443) (12.284) (12.070) (11.490) (12.235) (12.042) 
FASSET 0.068*** 0.059*** 0.022** 0.033*** 0.043*** -0.001 
 (7.153) (6.215) (2.188) (2.864) (3.701) (-0.051) 
OLEVE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (3.599) (3.414) (2.893) (9.236) (9.097) (8.801) 
ASSET_GROWTH -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (-1.189) (-0.763) (-1.199) (-4.343) (-3.549) (-3.811) 
CFLW 0.216*** 0.223*** 0.207*** 0.360*** 0.362*** 0.341*** 
 (13.882) (14.384) (13.200) (21.260) (21.225) (19.684) 
MTB 0.003*** 0.002* 0.001 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (2.706) (1.784) (0.991) (-4.639) (-5.317) (-5.567) 
DINDSIZE_DUM 0.003 0.013** 0.004 0.005 0.026*** 0.013* 
 (0.653) (2.178) (0.598) (0.736) (3.489) (1.675) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 
 (7.302) (7.754) (7.245) (4.720) (6.399) (5.778) 
DMEET_DUM -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.030*** 
 (-6.194) (-6.685) (-7.026) (-7.246) (-6.830) (-7.281) 
FCRI 0.019*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.017 -0.020* 
 (3.868) (-2.972) (-3.196) (-6.684) (-1.521) (-1.714) 
CONSTANT -0.498*** -0.457*** -0.437*** -0.316*** -0.266*** -0.281*** 
 (-14.852) (-13.299) (-12.620) (-7.870) (-6.443) (-6.751) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 19,956 19,956 19,956 
R2_A 0.080 0.088 0.094 0.081 0.088 0.092 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend per 
share and other receivable account behaviour under managers’ ownership influence. The regression 
results are calculated by the pooled OLS and year-industry fixed effect regression. ORECTA*EXEOWN is 
the product of ORECTA multiplying EXEOWN. The first three explanatory variables in the regressions are 
centralized for industry-year means. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.8 Regression on the dividend payout ratio, STAOWN and EXEOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
EXEOWN 0.311*** 0.251*** 0.298*** 0.275*** 0.267*** 0.274*** 
 (13.679) (10.658) (12.253) (15.522) (14.897) (15.182) 
STAOWN*EXEOWN 2.112*** 1.962*** 2.098*** 1.418*** 1.520*** 1.597*** 
 (10.682) (9.874) (10.580) (7.870) (8.366) (8.718) 
STAOWN 0.109*** 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 
 (6.815) (6.243) (6.801) (2.888) (3.185) (3.514) 
FRSIZE 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 (13.722) (12.256) (12.984) (11.759) (8.309) (9.284) 
TOP1 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.167*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 
 (11.867) (11.946) (11.632) (11.881) (12.705) (12.474) 
FASSET 0.086*** 0.079*** 0.044*** 0.058*** 0.069*** 0.027** 
 (9.116) (8.293) (4.348) (4.997) (5.944) (2.166) 
OLEVE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (3.676) (3.495) (2.986) (9.432) (9.274) (8.995) 
ASSET_GROWTH 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.012** -0.008 -0.009* 
 (0.359) (0.756) (0.388) (-2.224) (-1.512) (-1.726) 
CFLW 0.238*** 0.246*** 0.232*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.380*** 
 (15.463) (15.945) (14.892) (24.093) (23.921) (22.417) 
MTB 0.002* 0.001 -0.000 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (1.677) (0.650) (-0.281) (-5.972) (-6.972) (-7.407) 
DINDSIZE_DUM 0.004 0.014** 0.006 0.006 0.028*** 0.015** 
 (0.741) (2.399) (0.981) (0.842) (3.714) (2.028) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 
 (7.492) (8.100) (7.632) (5.234) (7.023) (6.453) 
DMEET_DUM -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.032*** 
 (-6.747) (-7.138) (-7.485) (-7.728) (-7.277) (-7.723) 
FCRI 0.014*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.039*** -0.013 -0.015 
 (2.924) (-2.621) (-2.818) (-7.007) (-1.146) (-1.319) 
CONSTANT -0.540*** -0.497*** -0.476*** -0.383*** -0.326*** -0.338*** 
 (-16.092) (-14.406) (-13.679) (-9.566) (-7.907) (-8.132) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 19,956 19,956 19,956 
R2_A 0.077 0.084 0.091 0.077 0.084 0.087 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend payout 
ratio and state ownership under managers’ ownership influence. The regression results are calculated by 
the pooled OLS and year-industry fixed effect regression. STAOWN*EXEOWN is the product of STAOWN 
multiplying EXEOWN. The first three explanatory variables in the regressions are centralized for 
industry-year means. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.9 Regression on the dividend payout ratio, analyst above average monitoring and EXEOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
EXEOWN 0.260*** 0.195*** 0.234*** 0.272*** 0.261*** 0.262*** 
 (8.731) (6.296) (7.405) (11.788) (11.222) (11.249) 
ANALYST*EXEOWN -0.105** -0.094** -0.099** -0.195*** -0.203*** -0.198*** 
 (-2.493) (-2.258) (-2.373) (-6.618) (-6.862) (-6.714) 
ANALYST 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 
 (10.601) (11.213) (10.627) (11.778) (12.688) (12.152) 
FRSIZE 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003 0.005** 
 (5.386) (4.023) (4.769) (4.774) (1.220) (2.204) 
TOP1 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.162*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
 (13.327) (13.378) (13.150) (12.088) (13.121) (12.946) 
FASSET 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.056*** 0.022* 
 (8.101) (7.202) (3.984) (3.950) (4.852) (1.745) 
OLEVE 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (4.417) (4.196) (3.761) (9.929) (9.775) (9.522) 
ASSET_GROWTH -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-0.433) (-0.052) (-0.381) (-3.261) (-2.631) (-2.750) 
CFLW 0.221*** 0.229*** 0.220*** 0.368*** 0.369*** 0.355*** 
 (14.291) (14.768) (14.046) (21.972) (21.816) (20.761) 
MTB -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-1.227) (-2.614) (-3.273) (-8.702) (-10.382) (-10.477) 
DINDSIZE_DUM -0.001 0.011* 0.005 -0.001 0.023*** 0.013* 
 (-0.250) (1.885) (0.799) (-0.167) (3.177) (1.761) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 (6.545) (7.257) (6.931) (4.327) (6.249) (5.792) 
DMEET_DUM -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (-6.785) (-7.219) (-7.489) (-7.746) (-7.309) (-7.687) 
FCRI 0.017*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.014 -0.016 
 (3.599) (-2.778) (-2.950) (-6.793) (-1.220) (-1.382) 
CONSTANT -0.304*** -0.240*** -0.231*** -0.134*** -0.045 -0.071 
 (-8.068) (-6.207) (-5.928) (-3.045) (-0.991) (-1.558) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 19,956 19,956 19,956 
R2_A 0.082 0.091 0.095 0.083 0.090 0.093 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend payout 
ratio and analyst number dummy under managers’ influence. The regression results are calculated by the 
pooled OLS and year-industry fixed effect regression. ANALYST*EXEOWN is the product of ANALYST 
multiplying EXEOWN. The first three explanatory variables in the regressions are centralized for 
industry-year means. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.10 Regression on the dividend payout ratio, broker above average monitoring and EXEOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
EXEOWN 0.253*** 0.190*** 0.229*** 0.263*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 
 (8.405) (6.077) (7.199) (11.340) (10.808) (10.826) 
BROKER*EXEOWN -0.096** -0.091** -0.097** -0.175*** -0.185*** -0.179*** 
 (-2.293) (-2.184) (-2.314) (-5.884) (-6.173) (-6.012) 
BROKER 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 
 (11.224) (11.794) (11.182) (12.214) (13.187) (12.653) 
FRSIZE 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.002 0.004** 
 (5.282) (3.790) (4.534) (4.670) (1.024) (2.004) 
TOP1 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.161*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 
 (13.229) (13.313) (13.087) (12.024) (13.069) (12.898) 
FASSET 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.021* 
 (8.081) (7.191) (3.996) (3.921) (4.825) (1.720) 
OLEVE 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (4.476) (4.250) (3.818) (9.961) (9.811) (9.559) 
ASSET_GROWTH -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (-0.434) (-0.052) (-0.380) (-3.327) (-2.709) (-2.829) 
CFLW 0.219*** 0.227*** 0.217*** 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.353*** 
 (14.150) (14.617) (13.902) (21.804) (21.630) (20.587) 
MTB -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-1.135) (-2.634) (-3.297) (-8.662) (-10.487) (-10.591) 
DINDSIZE_DUM -0.002 0.011* 0.005 -0.002 0.023*** 0.013* 
 (-0.402) (1.888) (0.808) (-0.278) (3.176) (1.754) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 (6.509) (7.277) (6.952) (4.286) (6.243) (5.783) 
DMEET_DUM -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (-6.712) (-7.127) (-7.397) (-7.752) (-7.305) (-7.683) 
FCRI 0.017*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.039*** -0.015 -0.017 
 (3.528) (-2.661) (-2.837) (-6.908) (-1.291) (-1.449) 
CONSTANT -0.298*** -0.233*** -0.223*** -0.129*** -0.036 -0.062 
 (-7.981) (-6.039) (-5.752) (-2.940) (-0.798) (-1.356) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 19,956 19,956 19,956 
R2_A 0.083 0.092 0.096 0.083 0.091 0.093 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend payout 
ratio and broker number dummy under managers’ influence. The regression results are calculated by the 
pooled OLS and year-industry fixed effect regression. BROKER*EXEOWN is the product of BROKER 
multiplying EXEOWN. The first three explanatory variables in the regressions are centralized for 
industry-year means. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.11 Regression on dividend payout ratio, report above average monitoring and EXEOWN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABDPR DIV 
EXEOWN 0.260*** 0.197*** 0.238*** 0.272*** 0.260*** 0.261*** 
 (8.758) (6.424) (7.537) (12.162) (11.580) (11.618) 
REPORT*EXEOWN -0.101** -0.097** -0.104** -0.197*** -0.206*** -0.201*** 
 (-2.410) (-2.320) (-2.480) (-6.734) (-7.016) (-6.852) 
REPORT 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 
 (9.529) (10.092) (9.318) (10.265) (11.490) (10.790) 
FRSIZE 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.004** 0.006*** 
 (6.360) (4.893) (5.678) (5.725) (1.962) (2.969) 
TOP1 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.162*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 
 (13.331) (13.385) (13.153) (12.118) (13.166) (12.984) 
FASSET 0.077*** 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.058*** 0.024* 
 (8.215) (7.334) (4.136) (4.084) (5.002) (1.928) 
OLEVE 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (4.374) (4.155) (3.717) (9.889) (9.751) (9.496) 
ASSET_GROWTH -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.016*** -0.013** -0.014*** 
 (-0.430) (-0.030) (-0.347) (-3.172) (-2.547) (-2.655) 
CFLW 0.222*** 0.229*** 0.220*** 0.372*** 0.371*** 0.359*** 
 (14.260) (14.727) (14.036) (22.100) (21.875) (20.870) 
MTB -0.001 -0.003** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-0.939) (-2.311) (-2.918) (-8.284) (-10.048) (-10.096) 
DINDSIZE_DUM -0.002 0.011* 0.004 -0.001 0.023*** 0.013* 
 (-0.322) (1.816) (0.739) (-0.164) (3.146) (1.753) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (6.626) (7.350) (7.033) (4.437) (6.361) (5.913) 
DMEET_DUM -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (-6.858) (-7.282) (-7.544) (-7.757) (-7.320) (-7.689) 
FCRI 0.017*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.038*** -0.013 -0.015 
 (3.597) (-2.692) (-2.866) (-6.791) (-1.137) (-1.302) 
CONSTANT -0.334*** -0.271*** -0.265*** -0.171*** -0.078* -0.106** 
 (-8.967) (-7.051) (-6.818) (-3.920) (-1.716) (-2.314) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE N N Y N N Y 
ROBUST TYPE R R R R R R 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 19,956 19,956 19,956 
R2_A 0.080 0.088 0.093 0.081 0.089 0.092 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between dividend payout 
ratio and report number dummy under managers’ influence. The regression results are calculated by the 
pooled OLS and year-industry fixed effect regression. REPORT*EXEOWN is the product of REPORT 
multiplying EXEOWN. The first three explanatory variables in the regressions are centralized for 
industry-year means. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.12 Robust check using bootstrap regressions with the ABDPR as dependent variable 
ABDPR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EXEOWN 0.317*** 0.264*** 0.350*** 0.265*** 0.257*** 0.268*** 
 (9.832) (11.198) (12.296) (4.999) (8.086) (7.956) 
RSBMt-1*EXEOWN 0.012***      
 (2.963)      
RSBMt-1 0.000      
 (0.456)      
ORECTA*EXEOWN  -1.366**     
  (-2.050)     
ORECTA  -0.349***     
  (-9.794)     
STAOWN*EXEOWN   2.455***    
   (10.279)    
STAOWN   0.145***    
   (7.370)    
ANALYST*EXEOWN    -0.099*   
    (-1.848)   
ANALYST    0.054***   
    (10.185)   
BROKER*EXEOWN     -0.088***  
     (-2.702)  
EROKER     0.058***  
     (11.060)  
REPORT*EXEOWN      -0.082* 
      (-1.769) 
REPORT      0.051*** 
      (10.193) 
FRSIZE 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 
 (16.486) (16.709) (14.903) (6.854) (5.468) (8.435) 
TOP1 0.151*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 
 (8.770) (8.846) (11.565) (14.352) (13.834) (14.833) 
FASSET 0.047*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (3.506) (3.028) (4.629) (4.246) (3.797) (3.912) 
OLEVE 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004** 0.004** 0.003* 
 (1.580) (0.364) (0.888) (2.094) (2.184) (1.783) 
ASSET_GROWTH 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 
 (0.771) (0.401) (1.381) (1.361) (0.772) (0.738) 
CFLW 0.258*** 0.240*** 0.247*** 0.229*** 0.226*** 0.228*** 
 (14.162) (13.061) (13.920) (12.758) (15.092) (12.397) 
MTB -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (-0.369) (0.428) (-0.945) (-4.381) (-4.259) (-4.312) 
DINDSIZE_DUM 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.009** 0.008 0.009 
 (0.568) (0.599) (0.843) (1.979) (1.245) (1.638) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (7.261) (7.883) (6.995) (7.204) (6.621) (4.944) 
DMEET_DUM -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 (-9.488) (-10.086) (-9.958) (-8.091) (-7.502) (-6.409) 
FCRI -0.013 -0.010 -0.013 -0.030** -0.031*** -0.029*** 
 (-1.277) (-1.105) (-1.345) (-2.556) (-3.346) (-3.750) 
CONSTANT -0.762*** -0.723*** -0.744*** -0.456*** -0.446*** -0.494*** 
 (-21.446) (-19.841) (-17.877) (-9.045) (-8.322) (-11.103) 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 13,947 13,947 13,947 
PSEUDO R2 0.070 0.073 0.074 0.078 0.079 0.077 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between the abnormal 
dividend payout ratio and all the interested variables using bootstrap regression. RSBMt-1 is the reciprocal of 
SBMt-1 and divided by 100% to enlarge the coefficient. The regression results are calculated by the pooled 
OLS. The interaction terms are centralized for their industry-year means. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 
0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.13 Robust check including the tradeable shares ownership into the regressions 
ABDPR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EXEOWN 0.291*** 0.254*** 0.332*** 0.270*** 0.264*** 0.274*** 
 (11.051) (10.347) (12.996) (8.344) (8.104) (8.502) 
RSBMt-1*EXEOWN 0.008**      
 (2.505)      
RSBMt-1 0.000      
 (0.218)      
ORECTA*EXEOWN  -1.335**     
  (-2.557)     
ORECTA  -0.483***     
  (-12.551)     
STAOWN*EXEOWN   1.867***    
   (9.093)    
STAOWN   0.126***    
   (7.684)    
ANALYST*EXEOWN    -0.100**   
    (-2.388)   
ANALYST    0.047***   
    (10.349)   
BROKER*EXEOWN     -0.097**  
     (-2.321)  
EROKER     0.049***  
     (10.884)  
REPORT*EXEOWN      -0.105** 
      (-2.501) 
REPORT      0.041*** 
      (9.032) 
TRADEOWN 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 
 (5.711) (5.002) (4.094) (4.716) (4.582) (4.795) 
FRSIZE 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 
 (12.624) (12.089) (12.597) (4.810) (4.589) (5.723) 
TOP1 0.174*** 0.149*** 0.141*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.160*** 
 (14.117) (12.899) (12.046) (13.836) (13.735) (13.858) 
FASSET 0.044*** 0.025** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 
 (4.324) (2.448) (4.317) (4.209) (4.214) (4.363) 
OLEVE 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (3.208) (2.879) (2.940) (3.731) (3.786) (3.685) 
ASSET_GROWTH 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 (1.377) (0.347) (1.526) (1.041) (1.002) (1.096) 
CFLW 0.234*** 0.206*** 0.230*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.219*** 
 (15.015) (13.143) (14.777) (13.988) (13.850) (13.981) 
MTB 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** 
 (0.184) (1.417) (0.110) (-2.780) (-2.812) (-2.416) 
DINDSIZE_DUM 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.698) (0.569) (0.942) (0.770) (0.778) (0.710) 
DBSIZE_DUM 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (7.709) (7.366) (7.579) (7.054) (7.072) (7.158) 
DMEET_DUM -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (-7.216) (-6.725) (-7.152) (-7.195) (-7.112) (-7.244) 
FCRI -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (-3.732) (-3.853) (-3.492) (-3.565) (-3.438) (-3.494) 
CONSTANT -0.506*** -0.464*** -0.491*** -0.261*** -0.253*** -0.295*** 
 (-14.480) (-13.249) (-14.067) (-6.601) (-6.421) (-7.503) 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
OBSERVATIONS 13,947 13,947 13,947 13,947 13,947 13,947 
R2_A 0.086 0.095 0.092 0.096 0.097 0.094 
All variables definitions are in Appendix 3.1. This table reports the relationships between the abnormal 
dividend payout ratio and all the interested variables by adding the tradeable shares ownership 
(TRADEOWN) as a control variable. RSBMt-1 is the reciprocal of SBMt-1 and divided by 100% to enlarge the 
coefficient. The regression results are calculated by the pooled OLS. The interaction terms are centralized 
for their industry-year means. T-statistics in parentheses, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 3.14 First lag of variables to reduce the risk of endogeneity 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ABDPR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
L.EXEOWN 0.222***       
 (10.513)       
L.CEXEOWN  0.233*** 0.199*** 0.289*** 0.233*** 0.228*** 0.238*** 
  (10.317) (9.614) (13.253) (8.397) (8.156) (8.671) 
L.C_LSBMEXE  0.000***      
  (2.692)      
L.C_LSBM  -0.000      
  (-0.544)      
L.CORECEXE   -1.229**     
   (-2.457)     
L.CORECTA   -0.564***     
   (-17.605)     
L.CSTAEXE    1.973***    
    (11.159)    
L.CSTAOWN    0.083***    
    (6.291)    
L.CA0DEXE     -0.144***   
     (-3.838)   
L.A0D     0.055***   
     (12.850)   
L.CB0DEXE      -0.131***  
      (-3.477)  
L.B0D      0.056***  
      (13.296)  
L.CR0DEXE       -0.151*** 
       (-4.027) 
L.R0D       0.047*** 
       (10.923) 
L.FRSIZE 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.007*** 
 (11.809) (11.472) (10.414) (11.843) (2.599) (2.536) (3.813) 
L.TOP1 0.155*** 0.168*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 
 (14.034) (14.401) (12.920) (12.353) (14.188) (14.050) (14.178) 
L.FASSET 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.035*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 
 (6.088) (6.166) (3.467) (6.420) (5.886) (5.854) (6.063) 
L.OLEVE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (3.314) (3.509) (2.826) (3.218) (4.116) (4.219) (4.058) 
L.ASSET_GROWTH 0.002 0.001 -0.007 0.006 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.329) (0.141) (-1.491) (1.154) (-0.056) (-0.048) (0.035) 
L.CFLW 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.185*** 0.224*** 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.209*** 
 (14.632) (14.556) (11.786) (14.320) (13.218) (13.094) (13.317) 
L.MTB 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.063) (-0.133) (1.527) (0.109) (-4.021) (-3.920) (-3.463) 
L.DINDSIZE_DUM 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.013* 0.008 0.009 0.009 
 (0.984) (1.426) (1.128) (1.766) (1.082) (1.193) (1.169) 
L.DBSIZE_DUM 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (8.224) (8.158) (7.665) (8.177) (7.384) (7.401) (7.531) 
L.DMEET_DUM -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (-7.989) (-8.070) (-7.510) (-8.072) (-8.106) (-8.038) (-8.075) 
L.FCRI -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 (-3.755) (-3.383) (-3.874) (-3.389) (-3.278) (-3.367) (-3.202) 
CONSTANT -0.462*** -0.456*** -0.389*** -0.458*** -0.171*** -0.168*** -0.216*** 
 (-13.570) (-13.392) (-11.452) (-13.391) (-4.454) (-4.407) (-5.678) 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
OBSERVATIONS 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 
R2_A 0.0834 0.0839 0.101 0.0903 0.0984 0.0989 0.0946 
ABDPR is the dependent variable abnormal dividend payout ratio. I take first lag of all the independent 
variables in the regression. The results here are consistent with test results in previous tables. T 
STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1 Variable definitions 
Variable Explanation 
DIVPAYOUTRATIO Dividend per share 
ABDPR The residuals of the regressions to get the abnormal dividend payout ratios 
SBM Shareholder balancing mechanism 
ORECTA Other receivable account scaled by total asset 
STAOWN Government owned shares divided by total shares 
ROE Return on equity 
EXEOWN Executive ownership, executive shares divided by total shares 
A0D Equals 1 if the value of number of analysts is greater than industry year mean 
B0D Equals 1 if the value of number of brokers is greater than industry year mean 
R0D Equals 1 if the value of number of reports is greater than industry year mean 
FRSIZE Natural logarithm of total asset 
FASSET Fixed asset scaled by total asset 
LEVERAGE Ratio of liability to asset 
CA_CL The ratio of current asset to current liability 
WC Working capital scaled by total asset 
PROFITABILITY EBITDA divided by OPERATING REVENUE 
TOP1 The controlling shareholder holding percentage of all outstanding shares 
OLEVE Operating leverage 
DINDSIZXE_DUM 
Independent directors dummy, equals to 1 if the value is greater than industry 
year median 
DBSIZE_DUM 
The board size dummy, equals to 1 if the value is greater than industry year 
median 
DMEET_DUM 
Annual board meeting frequency dummy, equals to 1 if the value is greater than 
industry year median 
FCRI Financial crisis dummy, equals 1 if year equals to 2008 
PAY Natural logarithm of the average of top 3 managers’ emoluments  
CFLW Cash and cash equivalent scaled by total asset 
CAPEXTA Capital expenditure scaled by total asset 
ASSET_GROWTH Total asset growth rate 
MTB Market to book value 
LNTIME Natural logarithm of the listing time of a firm 
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Appendix 3.2 Hausman test for panel data 
 COEFFICIENTS 
 (b) (B) (b-B) SQRT(DIAG(V_b-V_B)) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ABDPR FE RE DIFFERENCE S.E. 
EXEOWN 
0.240 0.250 -0.009 0.002 
FRSIZE 
0.021 0.020 0.001 0.000 
TOP1 
0.145 0.146 -0.001 0.001 
FASSET 
0.041 0.066 -0.025 0.004 
OLEVE 
0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.000 
ASSET_GROWTH 
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 . 
CFLW 
0.237 0.248 -0.011 0.002 
MTB 
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
DINDSIZE_DUM 
0.003 0.009 -0.007 0.001 
DBSIZE_DUM 
0.028 0.030 -0.001 0.000 
DMEET_DUM 
-0.025 -0.024 -0.001 . 
FCRI 
-0.029 -0.027 -0.001 . 
YEAR DUMMY INCLUDED 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(20) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 46.46 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0007 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
The results of Hausman tests for my main regressions show that I need to use the fixed effect for the 
regressions. I therefore use the year and industry fixed effect in the regressions. 
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Appendix 3.3 Regression to obtain expected dividend, the residual is abnormal dividend 
VARIABLES DP 
EXEOWN 0.368*** 
 (14.965) 
GROW -0.073*** 
 (-10.058) 
BETA 0.051*** 
 (7.472) 
NSHAREHOLDER -0.015*** 
 (-6.749) 
FCF 0.000*** 
 (10.686) 
LNSALES 0.037*** 
 (29.974) 
ROE 0.089*** 
 (13.144) 
CONSTANT -0.504*** 
 (-18.000) 
YEAR FE EFFECT Y 
INDUSTRY FE EFFECT Y 
OBSERVATIONS 14,495 
R2_A 0.0971 
The regression is to obtain the expected dividend payout ratio (fitted value). The abnormal dividend is the 
residual from the regression. It is the residuals derived from the regressions to determine the expected 
dividend payouts (Holder et al., 1998; Rozeff, 1982). Following Holder et al. (1998) and Rozeff (1982), I 
include the same variables and some more variables in the regressions. I obtain the residuals by running 
the regressions in the industry-year group and considering the dividend smoothing effect as the previous 
papers. However, it can be too long to provide all the regression results in different industry-year groups. 
Therefore, I use the regression which is controlled for the year and industry fixed effect to show the 
variables and formats of the real regressions. A similar method is also used in the paper of Jiang and Lie 
(2016). EXEOWN is the measure of executive ownership. GROW is the average growth rate of revenues 
defined by Rozeff (1982). BETA is the yearly Beta value of firms in China. NSHAREHOLDER is the 
number of shareholders. FCF is the free cash flow. LNSALES is the natural logarithm of sales. ROE is 
the return on equity. T-statistics in parentheses, * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01. The equation is as 
follows. 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6 7
( _ )DP dividend dpayout EXEOWN GROW BETA
NSHAREHOLDER FCF LNSALES ROE
   
    
    
   
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Chapter 4 CEO OVER-CONFIDENCE AND THE CASH 
ADJUSTMENT SPEED 
4.1 Introduction 
The influence of over-confidence has been widely documented in the literature, but 
there is mixed evidence of over-confidence related to firm performance and investment 
results. There are risks of being over-confident. Malmendier and Tate (2008) suggest 
that over-confident CEOs can overestimate their ability about generating returns when 
making acquisitions and mergers, and thus overpayment for M&As happens and results 
in value-destroying mergers. Heaton (2002) suggests that over-confident managers can 
mistakenly treat negative NPV (net present value) investment as positive NPV 
investment. This in turns reduces firm value. Schrand and Zechman (2012) also suggest 
that over-confident managers can misreport financial statements and carry out financial 
fraud. 
 
There are also positive effects of being over-confident. Kyle and Wang (1997) show that 
over-confident traders are more likely to gain high returns in secondary markets since 
over-confidence can act as a commitment device in a standard Cournot duopoly. They 
introduce the Nash equilibrium of a two-fund game (Prisoner’s Dilemma) to explain the 
phenomenon that over-confident managers can persist and survive in the long run. Some 
studies indicate that the expected returns on trading activities given by over-confident 
investors may be greater than those given by rational investors because over-confident 
investors tend to take more risks than rational investors (Daniel et al., 1998; De Long et 
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al., 1990; De Long et al., 1991). These papers support that investors’ over-confidence 
can affect their trading behaviour. If the individual is the top manager of a firm, then the 
top managers’ psychological characteristics (e.g., over-confident) can affect the 
decision-making process in the firm (Heaton, 2002). 
 
CEOs are in charge of corporate strategies for their firms and manage the daily 
operations (Zhang et al., 2014). A CEO’s personality and emotion biases such as 
over-confidence can affect corporate policies and in turn their firms’ development and 
performance (Heaton, 2002). In this chapter, I attempt to fill a research gap by 
investigating the influence of CEOs’ over-confidence on firms’ cash adjustment 
strategies. 
 
Following the literature, Libby and Rennekamp (2012) indicate that the two key aspects 
of over-confidence are over-optimism (over-confident) and miscalibration. I first 
introduce over-optimism. The over-optimism aspect of the CEOs’ over-confidence 
refers to CEOs’ excessive level of optimism for assessing uncertainty (Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2013; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Over-optimism reflects two 
features of over-confident CEOs. Firstly, over-optimistic CEOs perceive that they 
possess better than average ability to manage their corporations and consequently their 
performance should outperform other firms in the market (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
Secondly, over-optimistic CEOs have a feeling of so-called “illusion of control”, 
implying that they believe in their own ability to control uncertainty (Larwood and 
Whittaker, 1977). Therefore, over-optimistic (over-confident) CEOs hold the view that 
firms under their controls are expected to have better growth opportunities and higher 
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future earnings than other firms. Over-optimistic CEOs also believe that the market may 
underestimate their profitability and firm value (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). I then 
introduce the other aspect of CEO over-confidence, i.e. miscalibration, which means 
CEOs are likely to underestimate the risk and uncertainty degree of an event. The 
miscalibration is reflected in the investment process. Over-confident CEOs can 
under-estimate the risk of potential investment projects and make aggressive decisions 
in the investment process (Englmaier, 2010; Heaton, 2002). Thompson (1999) suggest 
that the illusion of control is the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to 
control events and occurs when someone feels a sense of control over outcomes which 
he or she actually cannot affect. Vyse (2013) indicates that the illusion of control is 
thought to affect gambling behaviour. Staw (1997) point out that escalation of 
commitment is irrational human behaviour. This behaviour makes an individual faces 
increasingly negative outcomes from some decision, action, or investment nevertheless, 
but the individual continues the same behaviour without choosing alternatives. 
 
Although miscalibration, the illusion of control and escalation of commitment may lead 
to several problems including misstatements, earnings management, excessive 
risk-taking, and fraud, shareholders still have reasons to hire and promote 
over-confident CEOs. I provide some reasons as follows. 
 
Goel and Thakor (2008) suggest that over-confident managers are more likely to be 
promoted as CEOs. The first reason is that over-confident candidates are more likely to 
outperform competitors. To be promoted as a CEO, one must have a higher 
performance than other competitors. Over-confident candidates have a tendency to 
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underestimate project risk (Goel and Thakor, 2008). Those candidates’ over-confident 
characteristics, such as underestimating risk and overestimating self-ability, are just as 
suggested by Malmendier and Tate (2005), Englmaier (2010) and Heaton (2002). Goel 
and Thakor (2008) suggest that since over-confident managers underestimate project 
risk, and are willing to make more investments than rational managers. Goel and Thakor 
(2008) document that higher risk is related to higher performance. Therefore, after the 
competition for the title of CEO, an over-confident manager is more likely to 
outperform others and get promoted to CEO by the shareholders because over-confident 
managers can bring more profit if they succeed. The second reason is that a risk-averse 
CEO underinvests in projects relative to the shareholders’ optimum (Goel and Thakor, 
2008). As a result, underinvestment reduces the firm value. More importantly, 
risk-averse CEOs may disappoint the shareholders and lose their trust. Goel and Thakor 
(2008) show that underinvestment can easily be solved by over-confident CEOs. Goel 
and Thakor (2008) explain that over-confident CEOs can overestimate the precision of 
private information and overreact to it. Therefore, over-confident CEOs can invest in 
projects even where there is limited positive information about future profitability. 
Consequently, if a firm has an over-confident CEO, the probability of underinvestment 
is low and the potential reduction in the firm value related to the underinvestment is 
low. 
 
Furthermore, even though over-confident managers are more likely to be promoted as 
CEOs, the negative effects of over-confidence still need mitigation. For instance, 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) and Heaton (2002) argue that external monitoring can 
mitigate the negative effects of managerial optimism (over-confidence). Banerjee et al. 
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(2015) suggest that adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by 
independent board members can also mitigate the negative effects of CEO 
over-confidence. Kolasinski and Li (2013) indicate that strong and independent boards 
can help over-confident CEOs to avoid the negative effects of being over-confident in 
mergers and acquisitions. Hartzell and Starks (2003) point out that institutional 
investors can serve as a monitoring role in mitigating the agency costs between 
managers and shareholders, including over-confident CEOs. 
 
Recently, several studies have focused on the effect of over-confidence on corporate 
decisions. Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) investigate the 
effect of CEOs’ over-confidence on both investment decisions and merger & acquisition 
decisions. They find that over-confidence can lead to value-destroying mergers and bad 
investment performance. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find that accounting 
conservatism is negatively related to CEOs’ over-confidence because accounting 
conservatism monitors over-confident CEOs’ inappropriate behaviour. Hirshleifer et al. 
(2012) find evidence to support that firm innovation is accompanied by CEO 
over-confidence. Schrand and Zechman (2012) suggest that the earnings of firms 
controlled by over-confident CEOs are exposed to the risk of misstatement. Therefore, 
the cash strategy may also be affected by CEO over-confidence. 
 
Cash policy forms an important part of corporate policies. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007) provide three main reasons to explain the importance of cash. Firstly, reserved 
cash is more easily accessible to management because the use of cash is subject to little 
scrutiny, and CEOs can use cash at their discretion. Secondly, cash reserve and the 
172 
 
value of the cash holdings represent a significant fraction of all corporate wealth. The 
cash holdings of firms in the US have increased considerably in recent decades (Bates et 
al., 2009). The increase in cash holding results from the increase in the risk of firms’ 
cash flows and R&D intensity, and a decrease in inventories and capital expenditures. In 
other words, firms’ cash policy affects most aspects of corporate operations. Thirdly, the 
adjustment of cash level is substantial over time. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
suggest that there is a large variation in firm-level cash holdings over time and cash 
level may be more sensitive to the impact of over-confidence. 
 
A number of previous studies have investigated the influence of CEO over-confidence 
on the cash holding levels of firms. Heaton (2002) investigates corporate finance under 
the influence of over-confident CEOs and find that over-confident CEOs have the 
preference for internal funds such as cash. Huang-Meier et al. (2015) examine the effect 
of CEOs’ optimism on managerial motivations to increase cash holdings and find that 
optimistic managers have a preference to reserve cash for future growth opportunities. 
Over-confident CEOs have the perception that firms under their control are undervalued 
by the market because over-confident CEOs believe their management can increase 
their firms’ earnings in the future (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Malmendier et al., 
2011). However, these papers do not discuss the influence of CEO over-confidence on 
cash adjustment speed which can show the feature of cash to revert to the target cash 
level. To the best of my knowledge, I make the first attempt to examine the influence of 
CEO over-confidence on the cash adjustment speed. 
 
Previous papers have discussed the importance of the adjustment speed. The original 
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studies focus on the adjustment speed of firm’s capital structure (Cook and Tang, 2010; 
Elsas and Florysiak, 2015; Huang and Ritter, 2009). Their studies find that firm value 
can be decreased when the capital structures are not at optimal leverage level. Firms 
need to adjust their biased leverages to target leverage level to increase market values. 
Therefore, the adjustment speed is an important research topic. Similarly, firms cash 
reserve also have a target level. Bates et al. (2009) and Fritz Foley et al. (2007) find that 
firms need to balance their liquidity demand and their risk of overinvestment if there is 
excess cash. This is because the cost can be high both below and above the target level 
of cash reserve. Holding more cash can provide firms with economic method of 
financing and do not incur costly external capitals (Jiang and Lie, 2016). However, they 
also point out that excess level of cash allows firms to squander cash reserves if there is 
poorly designed disciplinary mechanisms. Therefore, firm top executives need to keep a 
balance between the benefits and costs and adjust the cash level to the target level to 
reduce the cost of holding excessive cash. 
 
There is a potential conflict between over-confident CEOs and shareholders about the 
level of cash reserve. Over-confident CEOs have a preference for cash over other types 
of assets (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). However, too much cash reserved 
can lead to some overinvestment which cannot provide positive future cash flow but 
only help managers to extract benefit to themselves (Jensen, 1986; Opler et al., 1999). 
Therefore, too much cash reserved may lead to inefficient investment. Inefficient 
investment means the investment cannot provide positive returns. Opler et al. (1999) 
and Jensen (1986) suggest that too much cash reserves increase the risk of 
overinvestment even in negative NPV (net present value) project which can reduce firm 
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value. When the CEOs are over-confident, they have systematic overestimations of 
future returns for investment projects (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
Heaton (2002) indicates that over-confident managers can mistakenly perceive that they 
make positive returns from negative NPV projects due to their over-confidence. 
Consequently, CEO over-confidence may lead to overinvestment and engagement in 
more value-destroying investment, mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005, 2008). Nikolov and Whited (2010) suggest that an increase in cash holding by 22% 
can result in a 6% decrease in shareholders’ value in the US market according to their 
regression results. Shareholders may try to prevent over-confident CEOs from keeping 
excessive cash to make overinvestment (Bates et al., 2009; Fritz Foley et al., 2007; 
Jiang and Lie, 2016). To balance the preference of more cash by firm CEOs and 
shareholders’ concerns of overinvestment using excess cash, I conjecture that 
over-confident CEOs may reduce the firm’s cash adjustment speed which can make 
excess cash revert to the target cash level in firms. This is because that less reduction in 
cash reserve can still ensure over-confident CEOs’ discretion to make investments in 
risky projects. At the same time, over-confident CEOs can show shareholders that they 
can distribute a reasonable amount of the cash to the stakeholders to release the 
suspicion of being self-interested CEOs. 
 
In this chapter
17
, I make three contributions to the literature. Firstly, my results show 
that the cash adjustment speed may be decelerated by CEO over-confidence. Secondly, I 
further find that over-confident CEOs are more likely to reduce firms’ cash adjustment 
speed when there is excess cash, while CEO over-confidence does not show a 
                                                             
17
 I need to clarify that cash adjustment speed is the speed of cash adjustment from the current level to the target cash 
level. Excess cash means the current cash level is above target cash level, while insufficient cash means the current 
cash level is below the target cash level. 
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significant effect on firms’ cash adjustment speed when the cash is insufficient. Thirdly, 
the cash reserves of over-confident CEOs are for future dissipation rather than cash 
accumulation. Moreover, I further extend my empirical investigation and show that 
over-confident CEOs can dissipate cash through future investments rather than dividend 
payouts or debt retirements. 
 
In this study, I employ two main over-confidence measures. They are 
OVERCONFIDENCE1 (HOLDER67)
18
 and OVERCONFIDENCE2 (OVER_INVEST)
19
 
to test the CEO over-confidence effect on firms’ cash level and the cash adjustment 
speed to the target cash level. The two measures have been widely used by studies 
related to CEO over-confidence. The measure of OVERCONFIDENCE1 (HOLDER67) 
is based on the exercise timing of the stock options of CEOs to identify whether CEOs 
are over-confident or not (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). The measure of 
OVERCONFIDENCE2 (OVER_INVEST) is based on the overinvestment decisions of 
CEOs. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and Campbell et al. (2011) show that the 
investment decisions of firms are connected to over-confidence, which indicates that the 
investment decisions contain information about the over-confidence level. Ahmed and 
Duellman (2013) further suggest that faster growth in the total assets than the sales can 
reveal the managers’ overinvestment behaviour compared to their peers. Campbell et al. 
(2011) adopt both of the measures to investigate the relationship between the forced 
                                                             
18 Detailed information is provided in the methodology and data section. 
Hirshleifer, D, Low, A, Teoh, SH. Are overconfident CEOs better innovators? The Journal of Finance 
2012;67;1457-1498. 
Campbell, TC, Gallmeyer, M, Johnson, SA, Rutherford, J, Stanley, BW. CEO optimism and forced turnover. Journal 
of financial Economics 2011;101;695-712. 
19 Detailed information is provided in the methodology and data section. 
Ben-David, I, Graham, JR, Harvey, CR. Managerial miscalibration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2013;qjt023. 
Campbell, TC, Gallmeyer, M, Johnson, SA, Rutherford, J, Stanley, BW. CEO optimism and forced turnover. Journal 
of financial Economics 2011;101;695-712. 
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turnover of CEOs and the influence of CEO over-confidence. 
 
I collect data from COMPUSTAT and EXECUCOMP for the firms listed in the US 
stock market excluding the financial firms. The sample period is from 1993 to 2014. 
Firstly, I examine whether CEO over-confidence can affect firms’ cash level. The results 
show that over-confident CEOs are more likely to increase their firms’ cash level to 
keep an adequate or excess amount of cash since they can avoid the monitoring given 
by other forms of financial resources like debt and shareholders’ capital. Secondly, I 
apply the concept of cash adjustment speed and examine whether over-confident CEOs 
may accumulate or reduce their firms’ cash level when there is excess cash held for their 
firms. Over-confident CEOs retain a certain level of cash to maintain their discretionary 
power in the firm, while their shareholders may prefer to obtain dividends and reduce 
excess cash to avoid various forms of overinvestment. I also examine whether 
over-confident CEOs have consistent behaviour when firms suffer from insufficient 
cash or have excess cash reserves. The regression results reveal that CEOs are very 
sensitive to cash level deduction especially when there is excess cash in the firm. 
Over-confident CEOs have intentions to keep more excess cash and reduce the cash 
adjustment speed to the target cash level in order to maintain their discretion in the firm 
management. The results are consistent with the finding for cash level because the 
reduction in the adjustment speed of the excess cash can delay the decrease in the 
excess cash amount and ensure the discretionary power of over-confident CEOs. Thirdly, 
I examine whether the cash reserves are kept just for accumulation purposes or for 
future dissipation purposes. The results show that the cash reserved by over-confident 
CEOs is not for the purposes of future cash accumulation but for future dissipation. I 
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then further investigate the directions of the future dissipation of the reserved cash 
under the influence of over-confident CEOs. Over-confident CEOs dissipate the 
reserved cash in future investment opportunities rather than dividend payouts or debt 
retirements. Future investments include future capital expenditure, future acquisition 
events and future research and development expenses. 
 
This chapter has the following structure. Section 4.1 is the Introduction. In Section 4.2, I 
review the literature related to my research questions and develop my hypotheses for 
this chapter. In the following section, I provide the detailed methodology for the 
regressions and the data used in the regressions in this chapter. The fourth section 
displays the empirical results of the influence of CEO over-confidence on cash level and 
cash adjustment speed. The last section is the Conclusion for the chapter. 
 
4.2 Related literature and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Cash levels and cash adjustment 
Following the argument of Harford et al. (2008) and Gao et al. (2013), the cash reserve 
behaviour may have agency-based reasons apart from the precautionary reasons. The 
precautionary reason for the firms to hold more cash including avoiding greater 
information asymmetry with external capital providers, avoiding the increase of the cash 
flow uncertainty, and supporting large research and development projects (Bates et al., 
2009; Duchin, 2010; Gao et al., 2013; McLean, 2011; Opler et al., 1999). Therefore, 
firms’ cash is reserved against the potentially volatile and unexpected environments 
faced by the firms. The other one is the agency-based explanations related to top 
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managers’ preference in the financing process (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Dittmar 
et al., 2003; Harford et al., 2008; Jensen, 1986; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). 
 
Firstly, Opler et al. (1999) indicate that firms have precautionary motivations to have 
cash reserves especially when there is large information asymmetry between the internal 
managers and the external investors. Other studies also provide supportive evidence for 
the precautionary motivations to hold more cash. Gao et al. (2013) suggest that the 
behaviour of holding more cash can help protect firms from adverse cash flow shocks 
during risky periods in the future. More importantly, the reserved cash can reduce the 
chance of missing investment opportunities due to cash shortage and constraints on 
using external financing. Bates et al. (2009) provide some plausible explanations for the 
behaviour of holding more cash among the US firms and argue that the behaviour of 
having more cash reserve results from reduced inventories in the warehouse, decrease in 
capital expenditures, risk increase of the firm’s cash flow and increase in the investment 
of research and development (R&D). Furthermore, McLean (2011) shows that firms 
with large R&D expenditures and high volatility of cash flow prefer to keep a large 
amount of cash. High R&D expenditure and high volatility of cash flow are the 
precautionary reasons for firms to hold cash. 
 
In addition, other studies find supporting evidence from private firms in different 
countries. Brav (2009) shows that the cash holding strategies of UK private firms have 
more sensitivity to operating cash flows than those of public-listed firms. Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010) indicate that those public-listed firms with a high level of cash holdings 
may go private in the US because of firm information and liquidity considerations. 
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Saunders and Steffen (2011) point out that the borrowing cost for private firms is higher 
than that of public-listed firms in the UK which leads private firms to store more cash 
than public firms. 
 
Secondly, apart from the precautionary motivations of holding more cash, there are 
agency-based explanations (Jensen, 1986). Many other studies also hold the view that 
the behaviour of holding more cash can be explained by agency-based perspectives 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Dittmar et al., 2003; Harford et al., 2008; Pinkowitz et 
al., 2006). They argue that the excess cash derived from models with precautionary 
motivations for holding more cash can make the agency problems worse when the 
managers have a large pool of accumulated cash. This is because the executives want to 
keep cash to secure their discretionary power while the shareholders want to reduce the 
over-reserved cash for more shareholder wealth (Jiang and Lie, 2016; Nikolov and 
Whited, 2010). Harford et al. (2008) argue that not well-governed firms spend more 
cash than better-governed firms. This is because the better-governed firms have lower 
cash reserves. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) suggest that CEO’s desire can lead to 
the relatively high reserve of cash because of CEOs’ preference for internal funds. 
 
Managers prefer cash reserve, but their behaviour of keeping too much cash in firms 
conflicts with their shareholders’ interests. Opler et al. (1999) argue that managers 
inherently wish to accumulate excess cash (i.e., cash in excess of the level that 
maximizes firm value) because they want greater flexibility to pursue personal 
objectives. CEOs’ demand for excess cash can be stronger when CEOs are 
over-confident. This is because over-confident CEOs have intentions to hold more cash 
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to increase their discretion, in particular when there are investment opportunities 
(Huang-Meier et al., 2015). Jensen (1986) argues that self-interested managers are 
inclined to invest cash inefficiently, particularly when there is excess cash. These 
managers’ self-interested behaviour can reduce the firm value and harm the wealth of 
shareholders. If the level of cash reserved is high, shareholders may raise their concerns 
about potential abuse in cash and the decrease in firm value and shareholder wealth. 
Some studies indicate that too much cash may lead to potential firm value reduction. 
Fritz Foley et al. (2007) and Bates et al. (2009) presume that firms trade off the benefits 
of liquid assets, such as ensuring funds for investments without having to incur costly 
external capital transactions, versus potential costs, such as overinvestment even in 
negative NPV (net present value) projects, which can reduce firm value (Opler et al., 
1999). For instance, Apple might hold cash primarily to seize strategic opportunities as 
they arise, whereas its competitor RIM might hold cash as an insurance policy against 
demand uncertainty. However, Jiang and Lie (2016) suggest that both Apple and RIM 
may squander the cash if it is excessive, especially when disciplinary mechanisms are 
not strict. 
 
Cash should be kept to balance its benefits such as ensuring funds without incurring 
costly external capital and costs such as agency problems originating from concern 
about overinvestment and shareholder wealth reduction (Jiang and Lie, 2016; Opler et 
al., 1999). As a consequence, it is of interest to examine whether cash level can revert to 
target cash level and speed of adjustment if there is a reverse mechanism. Jiang and Lie 
(2016) argue that there are two different views about cash holding strategies. Firstly, 
under tradeoff theory, it is necessary for corporate managers to compare and balance 
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costs and benefits of holding more cash, and thus there should be an optimal cash 
holding level which can be pursued in firms under tradeoff theory. The optimal value is 
usually called the target cash level. Secondly, Jiang and Lie (2016) suggest that there is 
an alternative view to trade-off theory and argue that holding more cash is secondary to 
other firm targets. The targets include equity raising when there is overpriced equity, 
and minimising transaction cost by cash without external financing. Following Jiang 
and Lie (2016), this dynamic view of cash strategy and the trade-off theory are not 
mutually exclusive. Therefore, they suggest that firms can optimally deviate from their 
target cash level. Furthermore, they suggest that the cash adjustment speed at which can 
close the deviations may depend on the relative priority of the two views of cash 
strategies. If trade-off theory is more important than the dynamic view, the cash 
adjustment speed can be higher, otherwise not. 
 
4.2.2 CEO over-confidence 
Roll (1986) introduces the concept of CEO over-confidence and argues that the hubris is 
an accompanying feature and is one of the main drivers for value-destroying mergers 
and acquisitions. This study shows that managerial over-confidence may result in an 
overpayment for target firms in mergers and acquisitions. Following Heaton (2002) and 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), over-confident CEOs are considered to be CEOs who 
have systematic overestimations of future returns for investment projects or who have 
systematic overestimations of benefits from favourable events. Heaton (2002) provides 
evidence that over-confident managers make overvaluation for investment projects. 
Futhermore, Heaton (2002) indicates that over-confident managers can mistakenly 
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perceive that they make positive NPVs (net present values) from negative NPV projects. 
CEO over-confidence may lead to overinvestment and engagement in more 
value-destroying mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Some 
studies look at the over-confidence effect on firm investment, firm financing choice and 
dividend policy (Baker and Wurgler, 2011; Deshmukh et al., 2013). More specifically, 
Deshmukh et al. (2013) find that over-confident managers intend to pay lower dividends 
and reduce shareholder wealth. All aforementioned studies reach the conclusion that 
managerial over-confidence can distort financial policies in firms (Malmendier et al., 
2011). 
 
In addition, managerial over-confidence is examined through its effects on earnings 
forecast activities of managers (Hilary and Hsu, 2011; Hribar and Yang, 2016; Libby 
and Rennekamp, 2012). The investigation of the relationship between managers’ 
over-confidence and earnings forecast show that over-confident managers tend to 
overestimate their contributions for better firm performance. Managerial 
over-confidence is shown as having a positive relationship with a probability of 
misreporting and financial statement fraud which cannot be reduced by either internal or 
external monitoring mechanisms (Schrand and Zechman, 2012). 
 
Previous studies indicate that the cash level of firms can be affected by firms’ financial 
constraint conditions (Acharya et al., 2007; Almeida et al., 2004), corporate governance 
systems (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) and shareholder protection (Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia, 2014). However, some previous studies only point out that cash is preferred as a 
financing method for investment by over-confident managers (Ferris et al., 2013; 
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Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011) and very few studies pay 
attention to the effect of CEOs’ beliefs on cash reserve behaviour. Huang-Meier et al. 
(2015) make the first attempt to show that a higher level of firms’ cash is more likely to 
be reserved by over-confident CEOs. As a consequence, motivated by Huang-Meier et 
al. (2015) , my study aims to fill the gap and investigate whether CEO over-confidence 
can affect cash adjustment mechanism to target cash level and how over-confident 
CEOs react to dissipate reserved cash. 
 
4.2.3 Hypothesis development 
Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2005) indicate that over-confident managers 
are more likely to overestimate their capability of investment choice and underestimate 
risk embedded in investment projects. Furthermore, over-confident CEOs tend to 
overestimate their firms’ future cash flows and hold the view that their firms under their 
management can outperform others. However, the outsiders – financial analysts and 
investors – may not hold the same view as over-confident CEOs. As a consequence, 
over-confident CEOs may have perceived that the market value of their firms is 
under-estimated (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011). Huang-Meier et 
al. (2015) argue that over-confident CEOs intend to hoard cash for growth opportunities. 
This is because over-confident CEOs are reluctant to seek external funds, as 
over-confident CEOs perceive that the firm under their control is undervalued by 
external financing suppliers, and thus over-confident CEOs perceive that the external 
financing suppliers may provide higher cost of external financing than over-confident 
CEOs expected. 
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Bates et al. (2009) document that the increase in cash flow risk is connected to the 
increase in the idiosyncratic risk of firms. Furthermore, Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et 
al. (2009) suggest that firms with strong growth opportunities tend to hold more cash. 
Over-confident CEOs perceive that firms under their control have better performance 
and better future earning expectation (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). And 
over-confident CEOs hoard more cash to finance the firms’ investment opportunities to 
obtain future growth (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Therefore, 
over-confident CEOs intend to hoard more cash to finance growth opportunities. 
 
To sum up, following the aforementioned findings and arguments, I conjecture that 
over-confident CEOs are motivated to hold more cash rather than external funds. 
 
H1: CEO over-confidence is positively related to firm cash holding. 
 
In imperfect capital markets, Leary and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
and Tsyplakov (2008) argue that firms may not be able to instantly adapt themselves to 
changes in market conditions due to financing and investment frictions. Several studies 
indicate that firms’ ability to manage liquidity assets like cash can also be influenced by 
similar frictions to deviate from target cash level (Gao et al., 2013; Jiang and Lie, 2016). 
They also suggest that cash deviations from target level can be corrected over time by 
making tradeoffs to balance benefits and costs of holding liquidity assets. However, they 
do not examine the influence of CEO over-confidence on cash adjustment speed. 
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Huang-Meier et al. (2015) show that level of cash holding may be influenced by CEO 
over-confidence, but they did not look at the optimal level of firms’ cash holding (Gao 
et al., 2013; Opler et al., 1999). There are several motivations for corporations to hold 
more cash. More specifically, cash is retained for lowering transaction costs, reducing 
taxes associated with payouts and investment opportunities (Bates et al., 2009; Opler et 
al., 1999). Over-confident CEOs pay fewer dividends to shareholders than ordinary 
CEOs (Deshmukh et al., 2013). However, excess cash reserve without efficient 
investment and reasonable payouts may increase costs of holding a higher level of cash. 
The balance between the benefits and costs of holding cash may determine the optimal 
level of cash for corporations. Jiang and Lie (2016) indicate that cash and other internally 
generated funds can offer a cheap method of financing. This kind of financing does not 
incur costly external capitals. However, Jiang and Lie (2016) also indicate that firms with 
excessive cash level and absence of well-built regulations can face cash extravagancy. 
Therefore, the arguments imply that a firm’s cash level may have an optimal value to 
balance the costs and benefits. 
 
More importantly, holding a higher level of cash may lead to suspicions of shareholders 
and debtors about CEOs’ self-interest, and their shareholders may put pressure on CEOs 
since external financing has monitoring power to constrain managerial opportunism 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). Therefore, it is interesting to look at how CEO 
over-confidence may affect the adjustment speed of cash holding. Since there are strong 
motivations for over-confident CEOs to hold more cash, I conjecture that over-confident 
CEOs may tend to reduce the cash adjustment speed to the target cash level and thus 
have the following hypotheses: 
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H2: The adjustment speed of cash holding to the target level is negatively associated 
with the level of CEO over-confidence. 
 
H3: The cash adjustment speed to the target cash level is reduced by CEO 
over-confidence when there is excess cash. 
 
Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that optimistic managers have a 
preference for internal funds rather than external funds for financing firms’ investment. 
The external funds include debt and newly introduced shareholder capital. If the 
external funds are not in priority as perceived by over-confident CEOs, the costs of the 
external funds such as debt interests and dividends are not preferred by over-confident 
CEOs. As a consequence, consistent with Deshmukh et al. (2013), over-confident CEOs 
tend to pay fewer dividends to shareholders because Jensen (1986) suggests that 
payouts to shareholders can reduce resources controlled by managers, which in turn 
decreases managers’ power and constrains their investment capability. Introducing 
external funds can not only incur the cost of dividends but also raise monitoring from 
outsiders (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). Financing with internally generated funds 
can avoid monitoring and high explicit prices of external funds. Therefore, 
over-confident CEOs tend to pay fewer dividends and interests and prefer cash. If 
payouts to shareholders and debt retirement have been reduced, over-confident CEOs 
can increase firms’ cash for future investment opportunities. Furthermore, Griffin and 
Tversky (1992) argue that individuals tend to accept they are over-confident when they 
obtain good performance on difficult tasks. Over-confident CEOs are self-confident in 
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their abilities in investments described as “illusion of control” (Larwood and Whittaker, 
1977). Therefore, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) indicate that over-confident CEOs can be 
attracted by risky and challenging investment opportunities for firm growth to reach 
their self-actualization. The risks and challenges of risky investments can be 
under-estimated by over-confident CEOs (Libby and Rennekamp, 2012). In other words, 
over-confident CEOs need to retain a higher level of cash for future investment 
opportunities. I then make the following hypothesis. 
 
H4: Over-confident CEOs tend to make future cash dissipation on investment, not 
dividend payment or debt retirement. 
 
4.3 Methodology and data 
4.3.1 CEO over-confidence measures 
I have used two different measures of CEO over-confidence. The first measure is based 
on the exercise timing of CEOs’ options, and the second measure is based on the 
overinvestment behaviour conducted by CEOs. The establishment of them is explained 
as follows. 
 
Ahmed and Duellman (2013) suggest that CEOs are considered to have a less 
diversified portfolio of their shareholdings. CEOs then suffer from the idiosyncratic risk 
of the firms’ shares. CEOs have the motivation to overcome the less diversification 
portfolio problems through exercising their options held or selling the shares from the 
exercised options, and thus, the idiosyncratic risk of holding a less diversified portfolio 
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can be reduced. However, over-confident CEOs over-estimate their own abilities to 
make their firms continuously outperform a hedged portfolio (Ahmed and Duellman, 
2013; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). As a consequence, over-confident CEOs 
intend to postpone the exercise of their options compared to ordinary CEOs. This 
implies that an over-confident CEO may have a higher percentage of options 
in-the-money (OPIM) than rational (ordinary) CEOs. Malmendier and Tate (2005) and 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) first introduce the method to obtain the option-based 
over-confidence measure. Following Campbell et al. (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012) 
and Ahmed and Duellman (2013), I compute the over-confidence measure by using the 
data downloaded from the EXECUCOMP database. 
 
There are four steps to compute the option-based over-confidence measure. In the first 
step, I calculate the average value of CEOs’ options in hand (𝐶̅) by dividing the total 
value of the exercisable options still unexercised by the number of exercisable options 
which are still unexercised. In the second step, the share price (𝑆̅) at the end of the fiscal 
year is subtracted from the average value of CEOs’ options unexercised to get the 
average exercise price (?̅?) of each option held by CEOs. In the third step, the average 
value of each option (𝐶̅) is divided by the average exercise price of each option (?̅?) to 
calcualte the ratios of the options in-the-money (𝐶̅/?̅?). In the fourth step, I define that 
OVERCONFIDENCE1 (HOLDER67) equals one if the ratio of the options 
in-the-money (𝐶̅/?̅?) is not less than 0.67 at least twice in the sample, otherwise, it equals 
zero. CEOs are regarded as over-confident if OVERCONFIDENCE1 (HOLDER67) 
equals one, otherwise zero. The definitions are used by Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
and Campbell et al. (2011). 
189 
 
 
Following Ahmed and Duellman (2013), I provide the procedures to calculate the 
over-confidence measure based on the timing of options exercise with equations. Firstly, 
I need to obtain the average value of each option (𝐶̅). 
 
( _ _ )
( _ _ )
value exercisable options unexercised
C
number exercisable options unexercised

                           (4.1) 
 
The second step is to obtain the average exercise price of each option (?̅?). 
 
X S C                                                            (4.2) 
 
Thirdly, I need to get the ratio of the options in-the-money. 
 
 _  
C
options in the money OPIM
X
  
                                   (4.3) 
 
The last step is to define that OVERCONFIDENCE1 (HOLDER67) equals 1 if 𝐶̅/?̅? is 
not less than 0.67 at least twice in the sample, otherwise zero. A CEO is over-confident 
if OVERCONFIDENCE1 (HOLDER67) equals one, otherwise zero. 
 
The second measure of over-confidence is based on CEOs’ overinvestment decisions as 
in the previous studies. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) show that the investment 
decisions of firms are associated with CEO over-confidence. More specifically, firms’ 
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investment decisions contain information which can reflect the level of CEO 
over-confidence (Campbell et al., 2011). Schrand and Zechman (2012) suggest that the 
overinvestment measure can be extracted from the residuals of the regressions of total 
asset growth on sales growth by the industry-year groups. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) 
further suggest that faster growth in the total assets than the sales can reveal the 
managers’ overinvestment behaviour compared to their peers. I compute the second 
measure of CEO over-confidence in two steps. Firstly, I estimate the regression of total 
asset growth on sales growth by industry and year groups. Secondly, I use the regression 
residuals to define this measure. The second measure of CEO over-confidence is still a 
dummy variable, OVERCONFIDENCE2 (OVER_INVEST), which equals one if the 
residual of the excess investment regression is positive, otherwise zero. 
 
I also provide the equation of the excess investment regression by industry and year 
groups to get the residuals below: 
 
0 1_ _it it itASSET G SALES G                                        (4.4) 
 
The dependent variable ASSET_G is the total asset growth rate in Equation (4.4). 
SALES_G is the independent variable which is the sales growth rate. If the residual is 
positive, I define the CEO as over-confident; otherwise, the CEO is not over-confident. 
 
4.3.2 Over-confidence impact on firm’s cash level 
I follow the regression for evaluating the over-confidence impact on the cash level from 
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Gao et al. (2013). The main variables of over-confidence are discussed in Section 4.3.1. 
I consider the year and industry fixed effect in the following regressions. I also contain 
the firm clustering standard errors of the variables coefficients, which can reflect the 
influence of firm-level heteroskedasticity. The regression of the over-confidence effects 
on the cash level is displayed in Equation (4.5). 
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The dependent variable in Equation (4.5) is the cash ratio (CASH_RATIO). It is the cash 
holding amount in the firm divided by the total assets. The dependent variable is 
calculated using the data from COMPUSTAT. The over-confidence data is calculated 
using the data from EXECUCOMP. The other original variables collected from 
COMPUSTAT are as follows: 
 
Firm size (LN_AT) is defined as the natural logarithm of the total book assets of the firm 
(#6)
20
. Cash flow to assets (CASH_FLOW) measures the cash flow of the firm. To 
calculate it, I first use the income minus the interests to the debtors, the dividends, and 
the taxes but not minus the depreciation. Then I divide the numerator by the total book 
assets. The process is displayed as (#13 – #15 – #16 – #21) / #6 using the notations from 
COMPUSTAT. Bates et al. (2009) suggest that greater cash flow means a stronger 
ability to accumulate the cash reserves if other conditions are the same. It means the 
                                                             
20 The notation in the parenthesis is the item number from the COMPUSTAT database. 
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firm may have more opportunities to finance the investment by cash. Industry cash flow 
risk (INDUSTRY_SIGMA) is expected to be positively related to the cash reserve level 
by Bates et al. (2009). The leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is the sum of the long-term debt 
(#9) and the current debt (#34) together divided by the total book assets (#6). Bates et al. 
(2009) suggest that if external financing like debt is constrained, the firm tend to use the 
cash to decrease the leverage. Therefore, the relationship between the leverage and the 
cash reserve level is negative. However, Acharya et al. (2007) hold a hedging argument 
which indicates that there is a positive relationship between the leverage and the cash 
reserve level. The regression results can show me which of the theories have been 
verified in this chapter. The sales growth rate (SALES_GROWTH) is calculated as sales 
(#12) minus lagged sales together divided by lagged sales. The sales are the revenue 
generated by selling products. The more sales, the more cash can be generated. The 
relationship between sales growth and cash reserve should be positive. Market-to-book 
ratio (MTB) is the total book value of the asset (#6) reduce the book value of equity 
(#60) plus the market value of equity; and use the result to divide the total book value of 
asset. The market value of equity is the production of the price multiplied by the 
outstanding share numbers (#199 ∗ #25) divided by the total book asset (#6). Bates et al. 
(2009) suggest that the market to book ratio measures the investment opportunities. 
They believe that firms who have better investment opportunities take cash reserve to be 
more valuable. Therefore, the relationship between MTB and cash reserve is positive. 
 
Net working capital to assets (NWC) is the working capital (#179) minus the cash (#1) 
then divided by the total assets (#6). Therefore, I conjecture that the relationship 
between NWC and the cash reserve is negative. Capital expenditure for assets (CAPEX) 
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is the ratio of the capital expenditures (#128) divided by the total book assets (#6). 
Riddick and Whited (2009) show that a productivity increase event can push firms to 
invest more in the short term. In turn, it saves less cash temporarily. Therefore, the 
amount of cash reserve can be reduced. The relationship between the capital 
expenditure and the cash level should be negative. Acquisition to assets (ACQUISITION) 
is calculated as the number of acquisitions (#129) divided by the total assets (#6). There 
should be a negative relationship between the cash reserve level and the acquisition 
event because the acquisition event is the cash outflow. R&D to the asset (RND) 
measures the growth opportunities of a firm. R&D is calculated as XRD (#46) divided 
by the total asset (#6). The missing value is kept unchanged in the data set because Koh 
and Reeb (2015) conclude that not every research changes missing R&D data by 
comparing many research papers. Dividend payout dummy (DIV_DUMMY) is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm pays a common dividend (#21). The dividend 
payment reduces cash from the firm. Furthermore, firms paying dividends can attract 
more investors buying their shares which helps to increase market accessibility. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to hold cash reserves. 
 
Apart from the above variables, I use the natural logarithm of the firm age 
(LN_FIRM_AGE), the public debt issuance right (DUMMY_RATING) and the foreign 
sales percentage indicator (MNC) as additional control variables. The definitions are the 
same as those in the papers of Gao et al. (2013) and Jiang and Lie (2016). I also include 
the financial crisis dummy (FRCI) in regression. The dummy of financial crisis equals 
one if the year is 2007 or 2008. 
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4.3.3 Over-confidence impact on firm’s cash adjustment speed 
In order to get the target level of the cash holding, I need to estimate a regression on the 
cash determinants to obtain the fitted value as the target level of firms’ cash holding. 
The determinants are used by Bates et al. (2009). I follow Jiang and Lie (2016) to run 
21 regressions to capture the yearly grouped cash target from 1993 to 2014. This 
method helps to get the cash targets based on the time-varying determinants. I also use 
the firm clustering standard error to reduce firm unique heteroskedasticity problems. 
The fitted value of the regressions is the cash target level. The equation for generating 
the cash target is below in Equation (4.6)
21
. The excess cash means the actual cash level 
is higher than the target cash level. Following Gao et al. (2013) and Jiang and Lie 
(2016), if the firms have excess cash, the target level of cash minus the lagged actual 
level of cash is less than zero. The regression model is defined as follows: 
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Byoun (2008) uses several methods to test the capital structure adjustment speed. The 
method is then used in the research of the cash adjustment speed. For example, the 
transformed method is used in the papers of Gao et al. (2013) and Jiang and Lie (2016). 
In my study, I refer to the estimation procedure of the adjustment speed used by Byoun 
(2008). I conduct the tests in two steps. The first step is to generate the cash target of 
corresponding years. The cash determinants are extracted from Bates et al. (2009). The 
                                                             
21 For brevity, I do not report the results, but they are available upon request. 
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definitions and implications have already been discussed above in Section 3.2. The 
second step is to regress the cash changes on the cash deviation from the target cash 
level. The cash deviation from the target cash level is the current year target cash level 
minus the actual cash level in the previous year. The coefficient is the adjustment speed 
I need to test. This procedure enables potential research when I need to consider 
over-confidence measures as the interaction term. The regression model is as follows: 
 
 1 1_ _ _ _it it it iit tCASH RATIO CASH RATIO CASH RATIO CASH RATIO     
   (4.7) 
 
Equation (4.7) is just the initial version of the regression to test the cash adjustment 
speed. The coefficient of the right-hand side of equation 𝜆 is the cash adjustment speed. 
The dependent variable is the change of the cash level. The independent variable is the 
cash deviation from the target cash level. CASH_RATIO
*
 is the target cash level I 
obtained from Equation (4.6). I need to include the over-confidence measures as the 
interactions to examine the influence of CEO over-confidence on cash adjustment speed. 
Equation (4.8) shows the regression models. 
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  (4.8) 
 
The sum of the coefficients (𝜆 + 𝛾) of the first and second variables in the parenthesis 
of the right-hand side of the equation is the cash adjustment speed under the influence 
of CEO over-confidence. The dependent variable is the change of cash level. The 
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independent variable is the target level minus the lagged cash level. When I discuss the 
influence of CEO over-confidence on cash adjustment speed, I include the 
over-confidence measures as the interactions to the initial regressions. The control 
variables are discussed above. I also include the year and industry fixed effects in the 
regressions. 
 
4.3.4 Over-confidence effects on cash dissipation and accumulation behaviour 
In the next section, I introduce the regressions used by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
to identify whether excess cash is just for accumulation purposes or stored for future 
dissipation. The regressions model is as follows. 
 
Dissipation: 
1 1 2 _ _it it it itDDEV OVERCONFIDENCE INDUSTRY MEAN DDEV          (4.9) 
 
Accumulation: 
1 1 2 1_ _it it it itDDEV OVERCONFIDENCE INDUSTRY MEAN DDEV          (4.10) 
 
The dependent variable in Equation (4.9) is DDEVit+1 which is the forward change of 
the cash deviation from the target cash level. The cash deviation equals the target cash 
level minus the actual cash level in the previous year. The dependent variable in 
Equation (4.10) is DDEVit which is the change of the cash deviation from the target cash 
level. Following Jiang and Lie (2016) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I include 
INDUSTRY_MEAN_DDEV in the two regression equations as the control variable. This 
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is the industry average change in excess cash. By including this variable as the control 
variable, it is not necessary to include previously used control variables because this 
variable has already considered the industry range changes in profitability, the changes 
in investment opportunities and the hedging need as drivers of cash changes (Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) also mention that the 
industry average change is parallel to the firm level change. Therefore, I do not include 
more control variables in the regression. Both dependent variables are about excess cash 
of firms because if the cash reserve is not enough, CEOs’ first task is to gather more 
cash but not discuss how to deal with it. Furthermore, over-confident CEOs have 
intentions to store more cash in the firm to increase their discretion when there are 
investment opportunities (Huang-Meier et al., 2015). I need to find out where the excess 
cash reserved can be used. Therefore, I introduce Equation (4.11), Equation (4.12) and 
Equation (4.13) below. 
 
There are three ways to examine how CEOs dissipate the excess cash. The three main 
ways to dissipate cash are investments, dividend payouts and debt retirements. 
Investments contain capital expenditures and research and development expenses. 
Dividend payouts contain share repurchase and dividend payouts. Following the method 
of Jiang and Lie (2016) and Gao et al. (2013), I design the regressions to test how firms 
dissipate the cash. 
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DPAYOUT is the change of the dividend payment adding the share repurchase. 
FDPAYOUT means the forward value of DPAYOUT. DINVESTMENT is the change of 
the sum of capital expenditure, the acquisition event and R&D expenses. 
FDINVESTMENT is the forward value of DINVESTMENT. DDLTR_AT is the change of 
the long-term debt retirement. FDDLTR_AT is the forward value of DDLTR_AT. All 
these variables are scaled by the firm’s total assets. The control variables are the same as 
those in the paper of Gao et al. (2013) with my additional financial crisis dummy FRCI. 
 
To reduce the potential endogeneity problems, I use several methods. Endogeneity 
comes from omitted variables, measurement errors, and simultaneity (Antonakis et al., 
2010; McCarthy et al., 2017). I use as several control variables to reduce the omitted 
variables problems. To further reduce the omitted variables problems, I use 
year-and-industry-fixed effect model to reduce the unobservable effects (Rossi, 2013). 
The result of Hausman test in Appendix 4.2 confirms that I need to use the 
year-and-industry-fixed effect, and thus I can minimize the endogeneity caused by 
omitted variables. In order to reduce the measurement errors, I follow Jiang and Lie 
(2016) to use cash target level generated by a GMM estimation and calculate the 
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alternative cash deviation. I then estimate the previous regression with the alternative 
cash deviation. Hoque et al. (2013) argue that by using the estimators generated by 
GMM, the dynamic model can deal with the endogeneity problems by considering 
lagged and differenced values of the explanatory variables as internal instruments. 
Following Jiang and Lie (2016), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Flannery and Hankins 
(2013), the equation in Section 4.4.4 is a dynamic panel model used to generate new 
target cash level (i.e. the estimators generated by GMM). The results in Table 4.11 are 
consistent with the main results. The details are included in Section 4.4.4. In addition, I 
use two different measures of over-confidence in all regressions. This also reduces the 
risk of endogeneity from measurement errors. To reduce the endogeneity from 
simultaneity, I include a regression with one lag of independent variables. The details 
are included in Section 4.4.4, and the results are reported in the Table 4.12. In summary, 
the robustness check shows that the results are consistent with the main findings. 
 
4.3.5 Sample selection and summary statistics 
Following Bates et al. (2009), I obtain the variables from COMPUSTAT for the sample 
period 1993 to 2014. The sample firms are required to have positive assets and positive 
sales in this chapter (Bates et al., 2009; Jiang and Lie, 2016). Financial firms (SIC codes 
6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) are not included in my sample. 
Following Gao et al. (2013), I form 48 industry groups and allocate the sample firms 
into the respective industry group. In total, there are 51,767 firm-year observations in 
my regression analysis over the sample period. 
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The data I used is from COMPUSTAT and EXECUCOMP. I obtain firm accounting and 
financial variables for the US firms from COMPUSTAT, while I collect the information 
of the firms’ managerial team characteristics such as salary, bonus and options from 
EXECUCOMP. I download the data from 1980 to 2014. I download for a longer than 
sample period to compute the industry cash volatility which requires data for the 
previous ten years (Bates et al., 2009). I winsorize the variables at 1% and 99% to 
remove the large outliers. 
 
[Insert Table 4.1 around here] 
 
The CASH_RATIO is the main dependent variable. The average level of the firm cash 
ratio is 0.218. It is larger than the median value 0.040. The standard deviation is very 
small. OVERCONFIDENCE1 and OVERCONFIDENCE2 are the measures for CEO 
over-confidence as dummies. OVERCONFIDENCE1 is defined as HOLDER67 with 
14005 observations. OVERCONFIDENCE2 is defined as OVER_INVEST with 14903 
observations. If the CEO is over-confident, the dummy variable equals 1. I find that 
almost half of the US firms are governed by over-confident CEOs as shown by the 
average value of the over-confident measures. OVERCONFIDENCE1 has a mean of 
0.457 and OVERCONFIDENCE2 has a mean of 0.426. 
 
The other variables are the control variables. LN_AT is the measure of the firm size. The 
mean value of the firm size is 5.101 while the median is 3.320. The standard deviation 
is 2.514. The average value of CASH_FLOW is -0.117. The median value of the 
CASH_FLOW is -0.065. INDUSTRY_SIGMA is higher in firms with high cash flow risk. 
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The statistics show that the mean is 0.298 while the median is 0.090. Since the cash 
flow risk is calculated from the standard deviation of the industry cash level in a long 
period, the measure itself reveals a consistency in past cash flow. Therefore, it can 
reflect the long-term cash flow conditions in the firm, which is very closely related to 
the cash level. LEVERAGE is the measure of the firm’s capacity to cover the debt 
payable. The mean is 0.252 while the median is 0.016, which means that the firm has 25% 
debt in the total assets. SALES_GROWTH measures the growth of sales. The mean is 
0.225 while the median is -0.049. 
 
MTB is the market to book ratio. The mean of the MTB is 2.722 while the median is 
1.160. MTB reveals the market perceptions of the firms’ future profitability. NWC is the 
measure of the net working capital. The mean of NWC is -0.016 while the median is 
-0.061. CAPEX is the measure of capital expenditure. The average of CAPEX is 0.048 
while the median is 0.016. The standard deviation is 0.053. The statistics are quite stable 
in the sample. ACQUISITION is the variable which can track whether firms have 
acquisition activities in the year and how much has been spent on it. The resources used 
for acquisition can affect the cash level of a firm. The mean of ACQUISITION is 0.021 
while the median is 0. The summary of the acquisition behaviour shows that merger and 
acquisition take place in less than 25% of all the observations. 
 
RND is the measure for R&D. The mean is 0.104 while the median is 0.005. The 
standard deviation is quite small. Therefore, the statistic is stable. I do not replace the 
original missing R&D data into another amount. Koh and Reeb (2015) argue that a large 
amount of previous literature keeps the missing R&D unchanged. They also suggest that 
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even if there are treatments with the missing R&D, the treatments are not unified in one 
method. Therefore, I would do better to leave it missing to avoid data mining. 
DIV_DUMMY is the dummy variable used to track whether the firms pay dividends to 
their shareholders. The dummy equals one if the firms pay dividends, otherwise 0. MNC 
measures the foreign sales in the firms; it is a dummy variable. It equals one if the 
foreign sales occupy over 20% of the total sales. DUMMY_RATING is the dummy 
variable for evaluating the firm’s ability to obtain external financing. It equals one if the 
firm has been listed in the corporate bond issuing index. LN_FIRM_AGE is a proxy for 
the firms’ listing age in the stock market. LN_FIRM_AGE has an average value of 2.643 
and median 2.079. 
 
A financial crisis dummy is also added to the regressions to capture the influence of the 
market shock on the cash level and the cash adjustment speed. The FRCI denotes the 
financial crisis dummy. It equals one if the year of observations is 2007 or 2008, 
otherwise, the dummy equals 0. The coefficient sign of the financial crisis dummy 
indicates the firm’s activities in crisis time. If the sign of parameter is positive with cash 
level, it means the firm may intend to stay in relatively high cash ratio. However, if the 
sign is negative, it means the firms are likely to reduce the cash level. However, in times 
of financial crisis, it is reasonable to hold more cash to secure daily business. Therefore, 
I can expect a positive sign. Considering the cash change, if a firm needs to keep more 
cash, the cash change should be negatively related to the financial crisis dummy. 
 
[Insert Table 4.2 around here] 
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The correlation matrix is displayed in Table 4.2. The correlation coefficients are bold if 
they are significant at 5% level. All the control variables are statistically significant at 5% 
level. 
 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 The influence of CEO over-confidence on the firm’s cash level 
In Table 4.3, I report the results for testing the relationship between the cash holding 
level and CEO over-confidence. The first three models look at the relationship between 
CASH_RATIO and OVERCONFIDENCE1. The other three models look at the 
relationship between OVERCONFIDENCE2 and CASH_RATIO. The T-statistics are 
shown in the brackets under each coefficient. I use the firm clustering standard errors in 
all the regressions following the paper of Gao et al. (2013). I use firm clustering 
standard errors for taking into account the heteroscedasticity in different firms.  
 
[Insert Table 4.3 around here] 
 
In Model 1 of Table 4.3, I find the coefficient of OVERCONFIDENCE1 is statistically 
significant and positively related to the cash holding level. The first regression uses the 
pooled OLS; it helps me to find the general pattern of CEO over-confidence and cash 
holding level. In Model 2, I control for the year fixed effect to consider the 
macroeconomic features in different years. The result is still a significantly positive 
relation between the cash holding level and the over-confidence measures. In Model 3, I 
control both the year fixed effect and the industry fixed effect. The coefficient of 
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OVERCONFIDENCE1 is still significantly and positively related to the cash level. The 
arrangement of Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 is the same as the first three models. The 
results of OVERCONFIDENCE2 are consistent with the results of 
OVERCONFIDENCE1. The significance levels of OVERCONFIDENCE2 coefficients 
are at 1% and more stable compared to the coefficients of OVERCONFIDENCE1. 
Therefore, I suggest that CEO over-confidence can raise the firms’ cash holding levels. 
It reveals that over-confident CEOs have preferences for accumulating more cash which 
has the least financing cost under the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
 
The results show that LN_AT is negatively related to the cash ratio of the firms. The 
reason is that the larger the size of a firm, the easier it is for the firm to get access to 
other financing choices (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). CASH_FLOW is a variable 
which has similar features to the cash ratio in the cash flow statement, therefore, they 
are positively related. The industry cash volatility appears to not have systematic 
relations to the firm cash ratio. The leverage is negatively related to the cash ratio. 
Firms’ sales growth helps with cash accumulation, as it makes money inflow to the 
firms. 
 
The results also show that the market to book ratio is positively related to the cash ratio, 
which is consistent with Bates et al. (2009). The net working capital is negatively 
related to the cash ratio consistent with Jiang and Lie (2016) and Gao et al. (2013). The 
cash ratio is reduced by the capital expenditure and the acquisition because the two 
activities cost money. The research and development activities have a positive 
relationship with the cash ratio. It means R&D activities can help the firm to gain more 
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profits. Although R&D activities are a current cost of firms, R&D provides firms with 
the probability to gain more cash. The results are consistent with Bates et al. (2009). 
 
The dividend payments reduce the cash of the firm. Therefore, it is negatively related to 
the cash ratio. The public debt issuance right is negatively related to the cash ratio. The 
firms with rights to issue debts have fewer constraints on external financing. Therefore, 
it is not necessary to hold a large amount of cash. The longer the firm is listed on the 
market, the less cash ratio it has. The results are consistent with Jiang and Lie (2016). 
The FRCI is the dummy for the financial crisis dummy. The results suggest that firms 
are likely to hold more cash in periods of financial crisis. This is because firms face 
much more uncertainty in periods of financial crisis. The firms need the cash to secure 
their financial position. Otherwise, firms can go bankrupt due to a shortage of liquidity. 
 
4.4.2 The influence of CEO over-confidence on the firm’s cash adjustment speed 
In Table 4.4, I show the adjustment speed of the cash under the influence of CEO 
over-confidence. There are nine models: the first three models investigate the original 
cash adjustment regressions without the influence of CEO over-confidence; the middle 
three models investigate the cash adjustment speed under the influence of 
OVERCONFIDENCE1; the final three models investigate the cash adjustment speed 
under the influence of OVERCONFIDENCE2. 
 
[Insert Table 4.4 around here] 
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The results show that with or without the influence of CEO over-confidence, the cash 
level reverts to the target level which can support my Hypothesis 2. The observations of 
the first three models are 51763. There are fewer observations in the following six 
models. The reason is that CEO over-confidence observations are limited by the 
EXECUCOMP database resources. In Model 4, the dependent variable is the change of 
cash level. The explanatory variable is the cash deviation. The interaction term is the 
over-confidence measure multiplying the cash deviation (DEVOVERCONF1). In Model 
4, the cash adjustment speed under the influence of over-confidence is 10.9% (19% - 
8.1%). However, if there is no influence of CEO over-confidence, the adjustment speed 
can be 19%. The results are statistically significant at 1% significance level. In Model 5, 
the cash adjustment speed under the over-confident CEO controlled firms is 10.7% 
(18.6% - 7.9%). The cash adjustment speed without the over-confident CEO is 18.6%. 
In Model 6, the cash adjustment speed under the influence of over-confident CEOs is 
11.6% (20.2% - 8.6%). However, without CEO over-confidence, the cash adjustment 
speed is 20.2%. Therefore, I suggest that over-confident CEOs in firms can reduce the 
adjustment speed of the cash to the target level when over-confidence is measured by 
OVERCONFIDENCE1. 
 
In Model 7, the cash adjustment speed under DEVOVERCONF2 is 7.8% (19.1% - 
11.3%). However, if there is no influence of the over-confident CEO, the cash 
adjustment speed can be 19.1%. The results are statistically significant at 1% 
significance level. In Model 8, the cash adjustment speed under the over-confident CEO 
controlled firms is 7.5% (19% - 11.5%). The cash adjustment speed without the 
over-confident CEO is 19%. In Model 9, the cash adjustment speed under the influence 
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of the over-confident CEO is 8.2 % (19.9% - 11.7%). However, without the influence of 
CEO over-confidence, the cash adjustment speed is 19.9 %. Therefore, I conclude that 
over-confident CEOs in firms can reduce the adjustment speed of cash to the target level 
when over-confidence is measured by OVERCONFIDENCE2. The results of both 
measures of CEO over-confidence can support Hypothesis 2. 
 
Apart from the main testing results, the control variable FRCI is negatively related to 
the change of cash ratio. It suggests that the change of the cash level can be reduced by 
the overall market environment during the financial crisis period if the over-confident 
CEO is in charge. Compared with the results in Table 4.3, it reveals that the firms have 
intentions to stay at high cash level and reduce the cash dissipation during periods of 
financial crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 4.5 around here] 
 
Cash reserve behaviour can take two possible methods. The first is to hold more cash. 
The results of the first method are shown in Table 4.3. The second method is to keep the 
cash by reducing the speed of cash adjustment if there is excess cash. The results in 
Table 4.5, Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show that over-confident CEOs can reduce the cash 
adjustment speed which reverts to the target cash level. The results in Table 4.5, Table 
4.6 and Table 4.7 are consistent with the results in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. I provide the 
detailed results and explanations below. 
 
I follow Gao et al. (2013) to sort the cash deviation from the target level (DEV) from 
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low to high into four separate parts. The classification is that DEV-level=1 indicates that 
the firm has excess cash while DEV-level=4 indicates that the firm has insufficient cash. 
By defining the subsample in the lower and the upper quantile, I can avoid the mix of 
the positive and the negative cash deviations in the two middle quantiles and reduce 
sensitivity to the errors in cash target (Gao et al., 2013). 
 
In Table 4.5, I do not consider the influence of over-confidence but only consider the 
original models without the influence of CEO over-confidence. Therefore, the 
observation number is large. Table 4.5 shows the general pattern of the cash reversing 
mechanism when there is excess cash or insufficient cash. The results of the first three 
models suggest that the firm’s actual cash level can revert to the target cash level when 
there is excess cash. The adjustment speed is 0.1%. The shareholders and the other 
stakeholders of firms can be very sensitive to excess cash. The CEOs’ discretion power 
can be strengthened by a large amount of excess cash because the managers have power 
over the firm owned resources like cash (DeAngelo et al., 2002; Harford et al., 2008; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The shareholders force CEOs to allocate the cash as the 
dividend to all the shareholders. Therefore, CEOs can be monitored by the shareholders. 
This is the reason that the excess cash can revert to the target cash level. However, the 
results from the other three models show that the firms’ actual cash level may not revert 
to the target cash level when the cash is insufficient. I also include the financial crisis 
dummy in the regression; the relation between FRCI and DCASH is still negatively 
significant. 
 
[Insert Table 4.6 around here] 
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In Table 4.6, I consider the DEVOVERCONF1 as the interaction term. The structure is 
similar to that in Table 4.5. I find that the results in the first three models are still 
significant as the hypothesis suggested. Therefore, the results show that the cash 
adjustment speed can be reduced by the influence of over-confident CEOs when the 
firms have excess cash. It is consistent with the idea that over-confident CEOs have the 
intention to keep more cash but have to dissipate the cash under the pressure of 
stakeholders’ monitoring. In Model 1, the cash adjustment speed under the influence of 
CEO over-confidence is 8.7%. It is less than the cash adjustment speed 19.9% without 
the influence of CEO over-confidence. In Model 2, the cash adjustment speed under the 
influence of CEO over-confidence is 8.7%. This is less than the cash adjustment speed 
19.8% without the over-confidence influence. In Model 3, the cash adjustment speed 
with CEO over-confidence is 9.3% less than 20.6% without the over-confidence 
influence. 
 
In Models 4, 5 and 6 of Table 4.6, I find that if the cash is insufficient, the firms’ actual 
cash level can revert to the target level under the control of over-confident CEOs. The 
results show that the actual cash holding level rises to the target cash level. However, 
over-confident CEOs cannot decrease or increase the cash adjustment speed to the 
higher target cash level because the interaction term is not significant. Compared to the 
results of Models 4, 5 and 6 in Table 4.5, when the cash is adequate in the firms, I 
suggest that the cash reserve behaviour is more observable under the influence of CEO 
over-confidence. This is because the coefficients of DEV in Models 4, 5 and 6 are 
positive and significant in Table 4.6, but those in Table 4.5 are insignificant. The results 
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indicate that CEO over-confidence may have an indirect influence on the cash 
adjustment speed which can help the insufficient cash to increase to the higher target 
level. 
 
The financial crisis dummy is negatively significant in the first three models. The results 
show that the change of the cash is negatively related to the financial crisis dummy. 
However, when the cash level is already insufficient, the financial crisis dummy does 
not significantly affect the change of the cash level.  
 
[Insert Table 4.7 around here] 
 
The results in Table 4.7 are similar to those in Table 4.6, but the over-confident measure 
is OVERCONFIDENCE2. The results in the first three models show that the cash 
adjustment speed is reduced by over-confident CEOs if there is excess cash in the firms. 
In Model 1, the cash adjustment speed with CEO over-confidence is 7.2% which is less 
than 27.2% without CEO over-confidence. In Model 2, the cash adjustment speed with 
CEO over-confidence is 7.2% which is less than 27.1% without CEO over-confidence. 
In Model 3, the cash adjustment speed with CEO over-confidence is 7.7% which is less 
than 27.6% without CEO over-confidence. The results in Models 4, 5 and 6 are also 
consistent with the results of Models 4, 5 and 6 in Table 4.6. The cash level reverts to 
the target level when there is insufficient cash, but the over-confidence effect is not 
significant. This fact indicates that CEO over-confidence may have an indirect influence 
on the cash adjustment speed when the cash is adequate. 
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4.4.3 The influence of CEO over-confidence on the firm’s excess cash level and the 
adjustment speed of excess cash 
Following Jiang and Lie (2016) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I test the 
dissipation and the accumulation patterns of the excess cash in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. I 
use similar regressions extracted from the previous two papers and include the influence 
of CEO over-confidence as the explanatory variable. 
 
[Insert Table 4.8 & 4.9 around here] 
 
In Table 4.8, the dependent variable in the regression is the forward change of the 
excess cash (DDEVit+1) which is DEVit+1 minus DEVit. INDUSTRY_MEAN_DDEVit is 
the control variable in Table 4.8. The results show that the influences of CEO 
over-confidence are significant and negative in Table 4.8. The results of Models 1, 2 and 
3 in Table 4.8 reveal that OVERCONFIDENCE1 (HOLDER67) can reduce future 
dissipation of the excess cash of the firms. The results in Models 4, 5 and 6 indicate that 
OVERCONFIDENCE2 (OVER_INVEST) can also reduce future dissipation of the 
excess cash. In Table 4.9, the dependent variable is the change of the excess cash 
(DDEVit) which is DEVit minus DEVit-1. The independent variables need to take the 
value of the last year observations which are OVERCONFIDENCE1it-1, 
OVERCONFIDENCE2it-1. INDUSTRY_MEAN_DDEVit-1
22
 is the control variable in 
Table 4.9. The results in Table 4.9 are not significant and indicate that the cash is not 
reserved for accumulation purposes. 
                                                             
22 This variable is the industry average change in excess cash which is used as the control variable in the previous 
paper. 
Jiang, Z, Lie, E. Cash holding adjustments and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance 
2016;36;190-205. 
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Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) suggest that CEO over-confidence can affect the firm 
cash policy by dissipating rather than accumulating the cash. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007) suggest that excess cash accumulation is a result driven by external factors. 
However, excess cash dissipation is the managers’ discretionary choice. The results in 
Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 are consistent with the arguments of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007). The results further confirm that over-confident CEOs can reduce dissipation of 
the cash and encourage CEOs to store cash for discretionary use. 
 
[Insert Table 4.10 around here] 
 
There are three directions I need to examine when I consider CEOs’ actions to dissipate 
excess cash. The three ways to dissipate cash are investments, dividend payouts and 
debt retirement. The investments include capital expenditures, R&D expenses and 
acquisition expenses. Dividend payouts include share repurchase and cash dividend 
payouts. Following the method of Jiang and Lie (2016) and Gao et al. (2013), I design 
the regressions and obtain the results in Table 4.10. The dependent variables are a 
forward change of the investments, forward change of the dividend payouts and forward 
change of debt retirements respectively. 
 
The results in Table 4.10 show that CEO over-confidence is positively related to the 
forward change of the investments. The results are consistent with the arguments of 
Malmendier and Tate (2005). They find that optimistic CEOs have preferences for 
internal funds rather than external funds for investment opportunities. Huang-Meier et 
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al. (2015) and Heaton (2002) confirm these arguments. It implies that over-confident 
CEOs can dissipate cash through investment activities rather than dividend payouts and 
debt retirements. In the first three models, over-confidence is measured by the exercise 
timing of over-confident CEOs’ incentive options. The feature of over-confident CEOs 
is that they are likely to extend the holding period of the options as long as possible 
because they have strong beliefs that the firm can have good growth opportunities in a 
long time under their control (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Therefore, 
over-confident CEOs who hold options are likely to make investments in future 
investments because the investments can ensure the future growth of firm performance. 
Future investments include the costs of R&D, capital expenditure and acquisition. 
Over-confident CEOs need to ensure the continuous growth of the firm rather than 
simply pay out valuable cash or retire the debt. Therefore, CEO over-confidence is not 
significantly related to the change of the payouts and the change of debt retirements. 
 
In the latter three models in Table 4.10, I use the other measures of CEO 
over-confidence to examine the three ways to dissipate the cash. CEO over-confidence 
(OVERCONFIDENCE2-OVER_INVEST) is also positively related to the forward 
change of the investments. The results are consistent with the results in the first three 
models in Table 4.10. The results also indicate that over-confident CEOs hold cash and 
wait for growth opportunities to make future investment. The results also show that 
forward change of the payouts and forward change of the debt retirement are not 
significantly related to CEO over-confidence. Therefore, I suggest that CEO 
over-confidence makes dissipation of cash through investment rather than dividend 
payouts and debt retirements. 
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4.4.4 Robustness check by obtaining GMM generated cash target 
In order to reduce the measurement errors, I follow Jiang and Lie (2016) to use the cash 
target level computed by GMM estimation and recalculate the cash deviation. I follow 
Faulkender et al. (2012) and use the dynamic panel regression to get the cash target 
level. Hoque et al. (2013) argue that using the estimators computed by GMM, the 
dynamic model can handle endogeneity problems by considering the lagged and 
differenced values of the explanatory variables as internal instruments. Following Jiang 
and Lie (2016), I combine Equation (4.7) and Equation (4.14) to obtain Equation (4.15) 
and analyse the cash level with the dynamic panel regression. 
 
1_ it it itCASH RATIO X 

                                        (4.14) 
 
1 1_ (1 ) _it it it itCASH RATIO X CASH RATIO                          (4.15) 
 
Following Bates et al. (2009), the cash determinants variables are the same as those in 
the previous regressions. Follow the method proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Flannery and Hankins (2013), I estimate the alternative cash target level and re-examine 
the cash adjustment speed. 
 
 [Insert Table 4.11 around here] 
 
The results are shown in Table 4.11. GMMDEV is the cash deviation from the target 
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cash level calculated by the GMM regression. It is calculated as the current year target 
cash level minus the actual cash level in the previous year. The GMMDEV coefficients 
are positive and significant for all the regressions. This implies that firms’ cash level 
does revert to the target cash level even when I use the different method to compute the 
cash target. The results show that interaction term between over-confidence and cash 
deviation still has a negative relationship with the changes of the cash level, and thus 
the influence of CEO over-confidence can still reduce the cash adjustment speed if there 
is excess cash in the firms when I use GMM estimation to compute the cash target. 
 
[Insert Table 4.12 around here] 
 
In Table 4.12, the regressions use one lag of variables to reduce the potential 
endogeneity (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014; Duchin et al., 2010). DCASH is the first 
difference of cash level. DEV is the cash deviation which is the target cash level minus 
the first lag of cash level. I include the first lag of all control variables in the regression. 
The results are consistent with the previous main results, and thus my findings are 
consistent with different estimation models. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Many previous studies have pointed out the importance of the pecking order theory. 
Firms need to reserve enough internal funds to finance their investments. However, too 
much cash reserve can incur some inconveniences like strong monitoring from 
stakeholders. CEOs’ psychological features can affect cash strategies. Therefore, I test 
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whether cash reserve behaviour contains the mechanism to revert to the target cash level 
under the influence of CEO over-confidence. Over-confident CEOs need to balance 
their preference to hold more cash and the shareholders’ preferences not to keep too 
much cash in the firm. The main contribution of my study is that I am the first to 
examine the influence of CEO over-confidence on cash adjustment speed and cash level. 
Furthermore, I point out that reserved cash is used for future dissipation through 
investments. 
 
I studied public-listed firms in the US market. I downloaded the data for this chapter 
from COMPUSTAT and EXECUCOMP and showed the data from 1993 to 2014 in the 
summary statistics. I design the research into three parts: the first to test how 
over-confident CEOs affect the firms’ cash level; secondly, I introduce the cash 
adjustment speed to test whether over-confident CEOs have consistent actions to revert 
the cash to the target level when firms have the excess cash or the insufficient cash; 
thirdly, I find the reason why over-confident CEOs make cash reserves. I use two 
over-confidence measures to test the relation of CEO over-confidence with cash 
adjustment speed. The first is based on the exercise timing of the incentive options. The 
second is based on investment behaviours. 
 
In the first part, the regression results reveal that CEOs are very sensitive to cash level 
deduction. They want to increase the firm cash level to keep themselves in an adequate 
cash environment. Therefore, CEOs can avoid extraordinary monitoring from other 
forms of financing, especially external financing. The results support the idea of 
Deshmukh et al. (2013) that over-confident managers save cash for their discretionary 
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use. Heaton (2002) also points out that over-confident CEOs do not have preferences for 
external funds. In the second part, the results of the test for the cash adjustment speed 
support the idea that over-confident CEOs cannot over-reserve cash under pressure of 
keeping a reasonable cash level from shareholders. 
 
However, over-confident CEOs have the features to hold more cash. Therefore, 
over-confident CEOs reduce the adjustment speed of the cash in the firms, especially 
when there is excess cash to keep their discretionary power. In the third part, the 
regression results further support that the cash is not stored just for accumulation. 
However, the cash is still dissipated in the future. In the US market, future cash 
dissipation takes place in future investment opportunities. Over-confident CEOs do not 
have preferences for future cash dissipation in dividend payments or debt retirements. 
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Regression tables for Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
STATS N MEAN SD P25 MEDIAN P75 
CASH_RATIO 51767 0.218 0.228 0.013 0.040 0.132 
OVERCONFIDENCE1 14005 0.457 0.498 0 0 0 
OVERCONFIDENCE2 14903 0.426 0.495 0 0 0 
LN_AT 51767 5.101 2.514 1.943 3.320 5.030 
CASH_FLOW 51767 -0.117 0.579 -0.478 -0.065 0.057 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 51767 0.298 0.322 0.058 0.090 0.159 
LEVERAGE 51767 0.252 0.372 0.000 0.016 0.162 
SALES_GROWTH 51767 0.225 0.923 -0.232 -0.049 0.074 
MTB 51767 2.722 3.718 0.917 1.160 1.640 
NWC 51767 -0.016 0.543 -0.221 -0.061 0.060 
CAPEX 51767 0.048 0.053 0.007 0.016 0.033 
ACQUISITION 51767 0.021 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RND 51767 0.104 0.188 0.000 0.005 0.036 
DIV_DUMMY 51767 0.255 0.436 0 0 0 
MNC 51767 0.606 0.489 0 0 1 
DUMMY_RATING 51767 0.223 0.416 0 0 0 
LN_FIRM_AGE 51767 2.643 0.707 1.792 2.079 2.639 
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The definitions and calculations are listed in 
the Appendix. N is short for the observation number of the variable. MEAN is the average value of the 
variable. SD is the standard deviation of the variable. MIN is the minimum value of the variable. P25 is 
the 25% point of the variable. P75 is the 75% point of the variable. MAX is the maximum value of the 
variable. The data is from 1993 to 2014. 
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Table 4.2 Pairwise correlation 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
CASH_RATIO 1.000 
                
OVERCONFIDENCE1 0.084 1.000 
               
OVERCONFIDENCE2 -0.006 -0.132 1.000 
              
LN_AT -0.217 0.022 0.016 1.000 
             
CASH_FLOW -0.168 0.078 -0.138 0.496 1.000 
            
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.289 0.053 -0.011 -0.078 -0.136 1.000 
           
LEVERAGE -0.206 -0.062 0.083 -0.171 -0.501 0.008 1.000 
          
SALES_GROWTH 0.108 0.071 -0.389 -0.091 -0.101 0.048 0.015 1.000 
         
MTB 0.204 0.167 -0.198 -0.370 -0.672 0.135 0.420 0.145 1.000 
        
NWC -0.097 -0.009 -0.052 0.321 0.716 -0.142 -0.660 -0.058 -0.627 1.000 
       
CAPEX -0.180 0.040 -0.088 0.069 0.027 -0.154 0.031 0.038 0.020 -0.013 1.000 
      
ACQUISITION -0.135 0.050 -0.108 0.151 0.092 0.014 0.014 0.074 -0.065 0.046 -0.065 1.000 
     
RND 0.372 0.011 0.016 -0.399 -0.636 0.226 0.206 0.106 0.494 -0.434 -0.051 -0.086 1.000 
    
DIV_DUMMY -0.240 -0.073 0.054 0.501 0.193 -0.141 -0.067 -0.091 -0.134 0.129 0.045 0.054 -0.227 1.000 
   
MNC 0.091 0.041 -0.055 -0.388 -0.205 -0.022 0.090 0.087 0.145 -0.129 0.071 -0.092 0.126 -0.202 1.000 
  
DUMMY_RATING -0.253 -0.053 0.054 0.637 0.176 -0.104 0.098 -0.066 -0.128 0.067 0.047 0.095 -0.208 0.377 -0.238 1.000 
 
LN_FIRM_AGE -0.209 -0.082 0.117 0.330 0.189 -0.049 -0.034 -0.141 -0.155 0.128 -0.082 0.024 -0.175 0.391 -0.278 0.282 1.000 
1=CASH_RATIO 2=OVERCONFIDENCE1 3=OVERCONFIDENCE2 4=LN_AT 5=CASH_FLOW 6=INDUSTRY_SIGMA 7=LEVERAGE 8=SALES_GROWTH 9=MTB 
10=NWC 11=CAPEX 12=ACQUISITION 13=RND 14=DIV_DUMMY 15=MNC 16=DUMMY_RATING 17=LN_FIRM_AGE. Bold is significant at 5% level. 
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Table 4.3 Over-confidence impact on firms’ level of cash holding (full sample) 
CASH_RATIO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERCONFIDENCE1 0.011*** 0.009** 0.007*    
 (2.686) (2.111) (1.822)    
OVERCONFIDENCE2    0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
    (4.974) (5.382) (5.046) 
LN_AT -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.016*** 
 (-5.129) (-5.647) (-7.256) (-4.269) (-4.762) (-6.327) 
CASH_FLOW 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.100*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.114*** 
 (3.021) (3.115) (2.683) (3.404) (3.487) (2.883) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.041*** 0.033*** -0.004 0.039*** 0.031*** -0.002 
 (4.951) (3.785) (-0.596) (4.824) (3.731) (-0.318) 
LEVERAGE -0.216*** -0.213*** -0.186*** -0.203*** -0.199*** -0.172*** 
 (-10.143) (-10.092) (-8.934) (-9.717) (-9.640) (-8.246) 
SALES_GROWTH 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
 (3.156) (3.311) (3.100) (2.861) (3.048) (2.972) 
MTB 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (6.428) (6.542) (5.926) (7.860) (7.935) (7.275) 
NWC -0.223*** -0.215*** -0.221*** -0.207*** -0.198*** -0.205*** 
 (-7.944) (-7.682) (-6.691) (-8.551) (-8.200) (-7.243) 
CAPEX -0.899*** -0.832*** -0.735*** -0.908*** -0.833*** -0.743*** 
 (-15.734) (-14.290) (-12.657) (-16.066) (-14.432) (-12.773) 
ACQUISITION -0.389*** -0.382*** -0.381*** -0.364*** -0.355*** -0.359*** 
 (-17.252) (-16.934) (-18.315) (-16.478) (-16.153) (-17.395) 
RND 0.685*** 0.702*** 0.428*** 0.675*** 0.691*** 0.425*** 
 (12.815) (12.961) (7.675) (12.222) (12.357) (7.530) 
DIV_DUMMY -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.029*** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.030*** 
 (-9.003) (-8.287) (-5.161) (-9.198) (-8.418) (-5.449) 
MNC 0.002 0.003 0.008 -0.000 0.001 0.007 
 (0.327) (0.476) (1.364) (-0.013) (0.136) (1.057) 
DUMMY_RATING -0.018*** -0.014** -0.008 -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.011* 
 (-2.659) (-2.075) (-1.242) (-3.349) (-2.672) (-1.767) 
LN_FIRM_AGE -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (-3.238) (-3.822) (-3.744) (-3.370) (-3.995) (-3.629) 
FRCI 0.004 0.015** 0.024*** 0.003 0.026*** 0.029*** 
 (0.944) (2.013) (3.406) (0.955) (2.953) (3.301) 
CONSTANT 0.352*** 0.349*** 0.290*** 0.334*** 0.318*** 0.272*** 
 (16.820) (16.445) (7.047) (15.815) (14.185) (7.530) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
IND48 FE N N Y N N Y 
N 14,005 14,005 14,005 14,903 14,903 14,903 
ADJ. R2 0.490 0.494 0.541 0.473 0.478 0.524 
This table reports impact of CEO over-confidence on cash holdings. The dependent variable is the cash 
ratio and the independent variables include firm characteristics. Year and industry dummies (based on 48 
industries categories) are included to control for year and industry fixed effects. T-values based on 
standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are reported in parentheses.
 *
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 
0.01 
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Table 4.4 Over-confidence impact on the cash adjustment speed (full sample) 
DCASH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DEV 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.190*** 0.186*** 0.202*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.199*** 
 (3.662) (3.590) (3.610) (14.819) (14.235) (13.544) (8.162) (8.162) (7.709) 
DEVOVER1    -0.081** -0.079** -0.086**    
    (-2.316) (-2.294) (-2.385)    
DEVOVER2       -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.117*** 
       (-3.580) (-3.783) (-3.492) 
LN_AT 0.000 0.001** 0.001* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (1.246) (2.154) (1.731) (-6.915) (-6.731) (-7.128) (-6.353) (-5.985) (-6.334) 
CASH_FLOW 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.031** 0.032** 0.027* 0.040** 0.042** 0.036* 
 (12.801) (12.572) (12.368) (2.251) (2.385) (1.895) (2.209) (2.308) (1.831) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.002 0.003* 0.010*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.213) (1.894) (4.181) (0.648) (0.425) (0.401) (1.019) (0.727) (0.609) 
LEVERAGE -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 0.013** 0.013** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 
 (-4.254) (-4.342) (-4.619) (2.454) (2.478) (3.095) (2.589) (2.636) (3.115) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 (-8.124) (-7.987) (-7.981) (-4.797) (-4.418) (-4.391) (-5.216) (-4.842) (-4.874) 
MTB 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (9.435) (9.186) (9.343) (3.074) (2.999) (2.689) (3.221) (3.190) (3.021) 
NWC -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.078*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.059*** 
 (-9.899) (-10.066) (-9.519) (-9.267) (-9.372) (-8.172) (-6.163) (-6.149) (-5.560) 
CAPEX -0.372*** -0.374*** -0.391*** -0.222*** -0.221*** -0.204*** -0.218*** -0.214*** -0.202*** 
 (-26.399) (-26.000) (-25.411) (-7.139) (-6.732) (-5.247) (-6.700) (-6.224) (-5.154) 
ACQUISITION -0.484*** -0.482*** -0.481*** -0.361*** -0.360*** -0.356*** -0.357*** -0.354*** -0.354*** 
 (-36.332) (-36.254) (-35.900) (-14.894) (-14.930) (-13.799) (-14.608) (-14.616) (-13.678) 
RND -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.116*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.096*** 
 (-10.140) (-10.006) (-8.767) (-3.085) (-2.961) (-5.523) (-2.861) (-2.754) (-5.113) 
DIV_DUMMY -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (-4.254) (-4.361) (-4.396) (-5.612) (-5.474) (-4.621) (-5.403) (-5.372) (-4.685) 
MNC 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (2.894) (2.280) (1.419) (-4.650) (-4.896) (-4.166) (-4.811) (-5.219) (-4.352) 
DUMMY_RATING 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003* 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (6.192) (5.329) (5.166) (1.660) (1.431) (2.011) (0.801) (0.456) (1.008) 
LN_FIRM_AGE 0.001 0.002*** 0.001** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (1.643) (2.969) (2.085) (4.330) (4.684) (4.220) (3.944) (4.633) (4.098) 
FRCI -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.007*** -0.008* -0.008* -0.008*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (-6.847) (-4.865) (-5.283) (-3.293) (-1.817) (-1.701) (-3.758) (-0.847) (-0.893) 
CONSTANT 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.015 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.026 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.018 
 (7.747) (5.296) (1.613) (7.438) (6.373) (0.959) (6.878) (4.575) (1.057) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
IND48 FE N N Y N N Y N N Y 
N 51,763 51,763 51,763 14,004 14,004 14,004 14,902 14,902 14,902 
ADJ. R2 0.0984 0.101 0.102 0.238 0.242 0.250 0.243 0.248 0.255 
This table reports the whole pattern of the over-confidence impact on the cash adjustment speed. The dependent variable is the cash ratio and the independent variables 
include firm characteristics. Year and industry dummies (based on 48 industries categories) are included to control for year and industry fixed effects. T-values based 
on standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are reported in parentheses.
 *
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 4.5 The adjustment speed of excess and insufficient cash  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DCASH EXCESS CASH INSUFFICIENT CASH 
DEV 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (4.762) (4.674) (5.346) (0.773) (0.795) (0.862) 
LN_AT 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (7.250) (7.048) (6.488) (-2.787) (-2.729) (-2.062) 
CASH_FLOW 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.010** 
 (8.571) (8.432) (8.044) (2.429) (2.358) (2.018) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.009** 0.008* 0.005 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.008 
 (2.301) (1.902) (0.948) (4.771) (4.435) (1.484) 
LEVERAGE 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.062*** 
 (4.809) (4.856) (4.463) (-9.494) (-9.362) (-8.763) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (-9.967) (-9.725) (-9.812) (-6.121) (-6.182) (-6.574) 
MTB 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.221) (-0.004) (0.213) (6.563) (6.222) (5.884) 
NWC -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 (-6.660) (-6.760) (-6.268) (-4.353) (-4.354) (-4.074) 
CAPEX -0.275*** -0.275*** -0.297*** -0.232*** -0.230*** -0.220*** 
 (-13.035) (-12.710) (-12.586) (-3.636) (-3.566) (-3.363) 
ACQUISITION -0.625*** -0.624*** -0.621*** -0.236*** -0.238*** -0.228*** 
 (-32.865) (-32.857) (-32.550) (-5.078) (-5.116) (-4.823) 
RND -0.026** -0.024** -0.034** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.066*** 
 (-2.128) (-1.987) (-2.499) (-5.948) (-5.722) (-6.462) 
DIV_DUMMY -0.008** -0.007** -0.006* -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.017*** 
 (-2.423) (-2.335) (-1.886) (-7.601) (-7.392) (-6.410) 
MNC -0.005* -0.005** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (-1.938) (-2.076) (-2.894) (-0.460) (-0.563) (0.323) 
DUMMY_RATING 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (1.381) (1.202) (1.034) (0.372) (0.221) (-0.115) 
LN_FIRM_AGE 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.003* 
 (5.305) (5.582) (4.994) (-1.331) (-1.346) (-1.686) 
FRCI -0.012*** -0.020** -0.018** -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.028*** 
 (-3.359) (-2.377) (-2.083) (-3.363) (-3.427) (-3.191) 
CONSTANT -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.053 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.058*** 
 (-8.799) (-6.933) (-1.242) (11.916) (10.545) (3.292) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
IND48 FE N N Y N N Y 
N 12,941 12,941 12,941 12,940 12,940 12,940 
ADJ. R2 0.191 0.193 0.198 0.059 0.061 0.063 
This table reports the adjustment speed of original upper and lower quarter of observations. The 
dependent variable is the cash ratio and the independent variables include firm characteristics. Year and 
industry dummies (based on 48 industries categories) are included to control for year and industry fixed 
effects. T-values based on standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are reported in parentheses. * P 
< 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01 
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Table 4.6 OVERCONFIDENCE1 and adjustment speed of excess and insufficient cash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DCASH EXCESS CASH INSUFFICIENT CASH 
DEV 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.206*** 0.082* 0.079* 0.080* 
 (5.060) (5.043) (4.916) (1.882) (1.786) (1.764) 
DEVOVER1 -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 
 (-5.267) (-5.136) (-5.438) (-0.603) (-0.532) (-0.557) 
LN_AT -0.005** -0.004** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (-2.269) (-2.070) (-2.340) (-5.739) (-5.691) (-5.815) 
CASH_FLOW 0.046** 0.049*** 0.048** 0.040* 0.041* 0.041* 
 (2.429) (2.583) (2.383) (1.797) (1.812) (1.769) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA -0.010 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.005 
 (-1.629) (-1.623) (0.295) (1.246) (1.503) (0.873) 
LEVERAGE 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.066*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.070*** 
 (5.518) (5.663) (5.270) (-6.525) (-6.272) (-5.796) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-5.224) (-5.029) (-5.090) (-1.491) (-1.310) (-1.346) 
MTB -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.657) (-0.904) (-0.432) (1.265) (1.192) (0.887) 
NWC -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.101*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.079*** 
 (-3.249) (-3.334) (-2.961) (-4.768) (-4.705) (-4.074) 
CAPEX -0.281*** -0.284*** -0.298*** -0.271*** -0.285*** -0.284*** 
 (-8.873) (-8.426) (-7.513) (-3.273) (-3.226) (-2.945) 
ACQUISITION -0.537*** -0.535*** -0.532*** -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.197*** 
 (-18.570) (-18.760) (-17.998) (-6.642) (-6.344) (-6.192) 
RND -0.069** -0.067** -0.082** -0.077* -0.077* -0.121*** 
 (-2.263) (-2.122) (-2.169) (-1.853) (-1.853) (-2.798) 
DIV_DUMMY -0.008* -0.007 -0.005 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.010*** 
 (-1.757) (-1.615) (-1.169) (-4.745) (-4.678) (-3.642) 
MNC -0.009** -0.009** -0.009* -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-2.242) (-2.293) (-1.925) (-1.244) (-1.410) (-1.186) 
DUMMY_RATING 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (1.288) (0.998) (1.379) (3.435) (3.048) (3.181) 
LN_FIRM_AGE 0.008** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 
 (2.433) (2.998) (2.325) (1.722) (1.888) (1.472) 
FRCI -0.012** -0.028** -0.029** -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-2.308) (-2.266) (-2.260) (-1.584) (-1.080) (-1.052) 
CONSTANT 0.047** 0.048** -0.089*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.099*** 
 (2.385) (2.306) (-3.793) (5.177) (4.794) (3.036) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
IND48 FE N N Y N N Y 
N 3,501 3,501 3,501 3,501 3,501 3,501 
ADJ. R2 0.305 0.312 0.317 0.101 0.103 0.120 
This table reports OVERCONFIDENCE1 impact on the adjustment speed of upper and lower quarter of 
observations. The dependent variable is the cash ratio and the independent variables include firm 
characteristics. Year and industry dummies (based on 48 industries categories) are included to control for 
year and industry fixed effects. T-values based on standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are 
reported in parentheses.
 *
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 4.7 OVERCONFIDENCE2 and adjustment speed of excess and insufficient cash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DCASH EXCESS CASH INSUFFICIENT CASH 
DEV 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.276*** 0.045* 0.046* 0.045* 
 (10.001) (10.037) (9.629) (1.769) (1.790) (1.649) 
DEVOVER2 -0.200*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 0.031 0.026 0.028 
 (-6.919) (-6.874) (-6.703) (1.588) (1.265) (1.393) 
LN_AT -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (-1.635) (-1.538) (-1.875) (-5.395) (-5.186) (-5.249) 
CASH_FLOW 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.037* 0.037** 0.036* 
 (3.048) (3.077) (2.677) (1.957) (2.005) (1.823) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA -0.010* -0.010* 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.003 
 (-1.694) (-1.774) (0.038) (1.162) (1.587) (0.682) 
LEVERAGE 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.049*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.049*** 
 (4.597) (4.750) (4.488) (-4.682) (-4.409) (-4.228) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.017 -0.014 -0.014 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-1.570) (-1.355) (-1.399) (-1.115) (-1.101) (-1.103) 
MTB 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (1.088) (0.807) (1.331) (1.285) (1.321) (0.887) 
NWC -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.056*** 
 (-4.071) (-4.126) (-3.675) (-4.482) (-4.428) (-3.975) 
CAPEX -0.267*** -0.263*** -0.271*** -0.255*** -0.266*** -0.253*** 
 (-8.351) (-7.732) (-7.255) (-4.225) (-4.115) (-3.609) 
ACQUISITION -0.491*** -0.490*** -0.490*** -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.189*** 
 (-18.868) (-18.801) (-18.399) (-6.255) (-6.272) (-5.634) 
RND -0.054* -0.052* -0.081** -0.024 -0.024 -0.064 
 (-1.852) (-1.719) (-2.145) (-0.583) (-0.593) (-1.456) 
DIV_DUMMY -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.008** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (-2.877) (-2.584) (-2.172) (-5.323) (-5.098) (-4.332) 
MNC -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.005* -0.005* -0.005 
 (-2.657) (-2.794) (-2.389) (-1.707) (-1.842) (-1.565) 
DUMMY_RATING 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.008** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.511) (0.294) (0.780) (2.525) (2.028) (2.081) 
LN_FIRM_AGE 0.005 0.006** 0.005 0.004* 0.004** 0.004* 
 (1.522) (1.979) (1.448) (1.913) (2.072) (1.725) 
FRCI -0.011** -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 0.003 0.001 
 (-2.102) (-0.649) (-0.582) (-1.593) (0.580) (0.167) 
CONSTANT 0.044** 0.033 -0.073** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 
 (2.523) (1.350) (-2.533) (6.001) (5.174) (3.136) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
IND48 FE N N Y N N Y 
N 3,726 3,726 3,726 3,725 3,725 3,725 
ADJ. R2 0.318 0.323 0.328 0.0878 0.0918 0.102 
This table reports OVERCONFIDENCE2 impact on the adjustment speed of upper and lower quarter 
of observations. The dependent variable is the cash ratio and the independent variables include firm 
characteristics. Year and industry dummies (based on 48 industries categories) are included to control for 
year and industry fixed effects. T-values based on standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are 
reported in parentheses.
 *
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 4.8 The excess cash dissipation test 
DDEVit+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERCONFIDENCE1 -0.023** -0.021** -0.020**    
 (-2.388) (-2.046) (-2.057)    
OVERCONFIDENCE2    -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
    (-2.683) (-2.628) (-2.734) 
INDUSTRY_MEAN_DDEV 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (1.182) (1.066) (1.496) (0.783) (0.573) (1.075) 
CONSTANT 0.076*** 0.042** 0.025 0.067*** 0.040 0.134** 
 (15.399) (2.398) (0.659) (12.908) (0.881) (2.139) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
IND48 FE N N Y N N Y 
N 3,037 3,037 3,037 3,189 3,189 3,189 
ADJ. R2 0.002 0.014 0.013 0.001 0.009 0.008 
The dependent variable is the cash ratio and the independent variables include firm characteristics. Year 
and industry dummies (based on 48 industries categories) are included to control for year and industry 
fixed effects. T-values based on standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are reported in 
parentheses.
 *
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 4.9 The excess cash accumulation test 
DDEVit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L.OVERCONFIDENCE1 0.002 0.002 0.002    
 (0.164) (0.198) (0.188)    
L.OVERCONFIDENCE2    0.007 0.002 0.002 
    (1.110) (0.353) (0.267) 
L.INDUSTRY_MEAN_DDEV 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.621) (0.865) (0.746) (0.249) (0.627) (0.460) 
CONSTANT -0.077*** -0.062* -0.182** -0.077*** -0.082** -0.170*** 
 (-16.773) (-1.836) (-2.425) (-11.962) (-2.276) (-2.807) 
YEAR FE N Y Y N Y Y 
IND48 FE N N Y N N Y 
N 2,831 2,831 2,831 3,146 3,146 3,146 
ADJ. R2 -0.001 0.010 0.014 -0.000 0.005 0.005 
The dependent variable is the cash ratio and the independent variables include firm characteristics. Year 
and industry dummies (based on 48 industries categories) are included to control for year and industry 
fixed effects. T-values based on standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are reported in 
parentheses.
 *
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 4.10 The effect of OVERCONFIDENCE on the cash dissipation directions when there is excess cash 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FDPAYOUT FDINVESTMENT FDDLTR_AT FDPAYOUT FDINVESTMENT FDDLTR_AT 
OVERCONFIDENCE1 -0.002 0.009** -0.003    
 (-0.921) (2.009) (-0.944)    
OVERCONFIDENCE2    0.001 0.016** 0.006 
    (0.265) (2.181) (1.371) 
LN_AT 0.002** -0.008*** -0.002 0.002** -0.009*** -0.002 
 (2.029) (-3.010) (-1.453) (2.565) (-3.668) (-1.624) 
CASH_FLOW -0.008 0.032 0.011 -0.016* 0.050 0.006 
 (-0.987) (0.805) (0.910) (-1.708) (1.174) (0.398) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.005 -0.017 0.012 0.001 -0.014 0.009 
 (0.950) (-1.424) (1.309) (0.177) (-1.282) (1.041) 
LEVERAGE -0.019*** -0.044* 0.045*** -0.029*** -0.044** 0.049*** 
 (-3.549) (-1.741) (3.377) (-4.570) (-2.023) (3.811) 
SALES_GROWTH 0.006** -0.014 0.007 0.010*** -0.005 0.008 
 (2.282) (-1.545) (1.212) (3.175) (-0.400) (1.399) 
DIV_DUMMY -0.008*** -0.009 -0.002 -0.009*** -0.007 0.001 
 (-2.900) (-1.518) (-0.463) (-3.367) (-1.213) (0.186) 
FRCI -0.038*** -0.067*** -0.002 -0.017 -0.078** -0.000 
 (-4.975) (-3.875) (-0.194) (-1.499) (-2.396) (-0.027) 
CONSTANT -0.017 0.102*** -0.016 -0.026* 0.008 0.008 
 (-1.615) (3.285) (-1.060) (-1.944) (0.141) (0.240) 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND48 FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2,801 3,117 3,092 2,962 3,276 3,263 
ADJ. R2 0.054 0.047 0.006 0.058 0.048 0.011 
This table reports the effect of OVERCONFIDENCE on the cash dissipation ways under the excess cash. The dissipation ways are the dividend payouts, the 
investment and the debt retirements. The dividend payouts include the cash dividend and the share repurchase. The investments include the acquisitions, capital 
expenditures and the research and developments. I also include the year and industry fixed effects in the regressions. T-values based on standard errors robust to 
clustering by the firm are reported in parentheses.
 *
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 4.11 Robustness check with GMM generated cash target level to reduce endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DCASH FULL SAMPLE EXCESS CASH 
GMMDEV 0.586*** 0.500*** 0.528*** 0.703*** 0.837*** 0.900*** 
 (34.147) (18.884) (26.348) (8.555) (14.101) (15.944) 
GMMDEVOVER1  -0.015   -0.060  
  (-0.489)   (-1.233)  
GMMDEVOVER2   -0.119***   -0.243*** 
   (-3.634)   (-4.399) 
LN_AT 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.007*** -0.002 -0.001 
 (8.032) (-4.883) (-3.907) (7.255) (-1.194) (-0.332) 
CASH_FLOW 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 
 (11.480) (4.079) (3.384) (8.936) (5.418) (5.158) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.005** 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 
 (2.263) (0.967) (1.034) (-0.216) (0.268) (-0.067) 
LEVERAGE -0.054*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.021*** 0.011 -0.005 
 (-14.957) (-3.177) (-4.091) (-3.153) (0.936) (-0.462) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.011** -0.023*** -0.030*** -0.014* 
 (-5.111) (-2.804) (-2.078) (-6.607) (-4.301) (-1.871) 
MTB 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.001 0.002 
 (11.255) (5.147) (5.277) (2.149) (0.713) (1.510) 
NWC -0.035*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.040*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
 (-11.397) (-8.949) (-8.564) (-5.923) (-3.885) (-4.212) 
CAPEX -0.423*** -0.433*** -0.411*** -0.549*** -0.665*** -0.656*** 
 (-27.531) (-18.950) (-19.428) (-14.830) (-14.389) (-14.614) 
ACQUISITION -0.489*** -0.472*** -0.467*** -0.716*** -0.696*** -0.685*** 
 (-39.705) (-25.664) (-26.411) (-31.477) (-26.437) (-26.933) 
RND 0.010 -0.018 -0.010 0.046*** 0.060* 0.056 
 (1.434) (-0.813) (-0.518) (2.818) (1.696) (1.643) 
DIV_DUMMY -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.005 
 (-3.993) (-1.008) (-1.102) (0.095) (1.468) (1.176) 
MNC 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (7.767) (2.994) (3.054) (3.713) (3.928) (4.085) 
DUMMY_RATING 0.001 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.003 0.008* 0.006 
 (1.064) (3.309) (2.665) (-0.731) (1.712) (1.273) 
LN_FIRM_AGE 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.007* 0.005 
 (4.897) (6.696) (6.174) (1.987) (1.955) (1.446) 
FRCI -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.008** -0.017 -0.025** -0.027** 
 (-3.908) (-2.584) (-2.080) (-1.613) (-2.199) (-2.077) 
CONSTANT -0.017 0.015 0.020 -0.005 -0.069*** 0.067** 
 (-1.283) (0.664) (1.622) (-0.064) (-3.354) (2.194) 
N 44,037 12,975 13,899 10,651 3,191 3,423 
ADJ. R2 0.198 0.256 0.252 0.256 0.352 0.347 
This table is the robustness check using GMM to predict the cash target ratio. The new cash target is used 
to calculate new deviations to run the robust check regressions. The first three models are the results for 
the whole sample. The latter three models are the results for the upper quantile of the sample. The 
dependent variable is the cash ratio and the independent variables include firm characteristics. Year and 
industry dummies (based on 48 industries categories) are included to control for year and industry fixed 
effects. T-values based on standard errors robust to clustering by the firm are reported in parentheses.
 *
 P 
< 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Table 4.12 First lag of regression to reduce the risk of endogeneity 
DCASH (1) (2) (3) 
DEV 0.002*** 0.259*** 0.348*** 
 (6.415) (6.009) (10.319) 
DEVOVER1  -0.157***  
  (-5.415)  
DEVOVER2   -0.268*** 
   (-10.153) 
L.LN_AT 0.004*** -0.002 -0.001 
 (3.322) (-0.932) (-0.582) 
L.CASH_FLOW 0.014** -0.021 -0.007 
 (2.062) (-0.905) (-0.339) 
L.INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.005 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.778) (-0.782) (-0.483) 
L.LEVERAGE 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 
 (6.248) (2.589) (2.829) 
L.SALES_GROWTH -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (-1.570) (-0.725) (-0.399) 
L.MTB -0.001* -0.003* 0.000 
 (-1.821) (-1.869) (0.048) 
L.NWC 0.007 -0.024 -0.011 
 (0.996) (-0.766) (-0.467) 
L.CAPEX 0.056** 0.056 0.064 
 (2.430) (1.343) (1.564) 
L.ACQUISITION -0.053* -0.118*** -0.091** 
 (-1.818) (-2.583) (-2.212) 
L.RND 0.086*** 0.150*** 0.101*** 
 (5.355) (4.266) (3.315) 
L.DIV_DUMMY -0.003 -0.009* -0.012*** 
 (-0.804) (-1.711) (-2.733) 
L.MNC -0.014*** -0.005 -0.003 
 (-4.419) (-0.945) (-0.665) 
L.DUMMY_RATING -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-1.305) (-0.008) (-0.093) 
L.LN_FIRM_AGE 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.007* 
 (4.464) (3.648) (1.830) 
L.FCRI 0.020* 0.011 0.010 
 (1.651) (0.792) (0.691) 
CONSTANT -0.118 -0.165*** -0.051* 
 (-1.579) (-6.877) (-1.749) 
YEAR FE Y Y Y 
INDUSTRY FE Y Y Y 
OBSERVATIONS 10,651 3,191 3,423 
R2_A 0.0358 0.110 0.168 
DCASH is the dependent variable first difference of cash level. DEV is the cash deviation which is the 
target cash level minus the first lag of cash level. I take first lag of the control variables in the regression. 
I do not further take the first lag of DEV and relative interaction term because DEV contains the first lag 
of cash level. I do not need to take lags twice. The results here are consistent with test results in previous 
tables. T STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES, 
*
 P < 0.10, 
**
 P < 0.05, 
***
 P < 0.01 
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Appendix for Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1 Variable definitions 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
CASH_RATIO CASH_RATIO=CHE/AT. Firm’s cash holdings divided by firm’s total asset. 
OVERCONFIDENCE1 
 
Option based CEO over-confidence measure. The calculation is discussed in 
Methodology. 
OVERCONFIDENCE2 
 
Investment based CEO over-confidence measure. The calculation is 
discussed in Methodology. 
LN_AT Firm size. Natural logarithm of firm’s total asset. LN_AT=LN(AT). 
CASH_FLOW 
 
CASH_FLOW=(OIBDP- XINT- TXT- DVC)/AT. Cash flow is measured as 
earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided 
by the total asset. 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA This is the measure of the industry cash flow risk. 
LEVERAGE 
 
LEVERAGE=(DLTT+DLC)/AT. Long term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities divided by the total asset. 
SALES_GROWTH SALES_GROWTH=(SALE-L.SALE)/L.SALE. 
MTB MTB=(AT-CEQ+CSHO*PRCC_F)/AT. This is the market to book ratio. 
NWC NWC=(WCAP-CHE)/AT. This is the net working capital. 
CAPEX CAPEX=CAPX/AT. This is the capital expenditure. 
ACQUISITION 
 
AQUISITION=AQC/AT. This is the merger and acquisition amount divided 
by the total asset. 
RND 
RND=XRD/AT. This is the research and development divided by the total 
asset. 
DIV_DUMMY 
 
This is the dividend dummy. It equals one if there is dividend payment, 
otherwise 0. 
MNC This is the foreign sales percentage indicator. 
DUMMY_RATING 
 
This is a dummy for the public debt issuance right. It equals one if a firm is 
rated by the rating agencies, otherwise 0. 
LN_FIRM_AGE This is the natural logarithm of firms listing time. 
FRCI Financial crisis dummy equals one if the year is 2007 or 2008. 
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Appendix 4.2 Hausman test for panel data 
 COEFFICIENTS 
 (b) (B) (b-B) SQRT(DIAG(V_b-V_B)) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DCASH FE RE DIFFERENCE S.E. 
DEV 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
LN_AT 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
CASH_FLOW 0.035 0.035 0.000 0.000 
INDUSTRY_S~A 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.002 
LEVERAGE -0.013 -0.012 -0.001 0.000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.010 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
MTB 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
NWC -0.026 -0.027 0.000 0.000 
CAPEX -0.391 -0.374 -0.017 0.003 
ACQUISITION -0.481 -0.482 0.002 0.001 
RND -0.051 -0.053 0.002 0.001 
DIV_DUMMY -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 
MNC 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
DUMMY_RATING 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 
LN_FIRM_AGE 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
FCRI -0.018 0.003 -0.021 . 
YEAR DUMMY INCLUDED 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(36) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 63.27 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0033 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
The results of Hausman tests show that I need to use the fixed effect for the regressions. I therefore use 
the year and industry fixed effect in the regressions. 
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Chapter 5 CONCLUSION 
I conduct three studies in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to examine how executive 
ownership and CEO over-confidence can affect corporate policies including accounting 
strategy, dividend payout policy and cash strategy. Many papers argue that the executive 
ownership is related to the corporate governance and the agency problems (Denis et al., 
1997; Holderness et al., 1999; McConnell and Servaes, 1990, 1995; McConnell et al., 
2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010; Zhou, 2001). I undertake my 
investigations among the Chinese-listed firms which are regarded as having weak 
corporate governance and weak legal systems (Jiang et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2014). 
The features
23
 of the Chinese-listed firms are the trigger for me to identify the 
differences in how corporate policies like accounting strategy and dividend payout 
policy is related to executive ownership in China and in the developed countries, such 
as the US. Therefore, I investigate how the executive ownership can affect accounting 
conservatism in Chapter 2 and dividend tunnelling in Chapter 3. 
 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the relationship between accounting conservatism and executive 
ownership in China. To further clarify that accounting conservatism is not purely against 
management’s and dominant shareholder’s interest. I provide the explanations as 
follows. Ball (2001) and Watts (2003) suggest that accounting conservatism helps to 
establish the rules if there is more than one financial reporting alternative, which allows 
the reporting to be fair and objective. Initially, accounting conservatism is recognized as 
                                                             
23 The features are mentioned at the start of Chapter 3. The references and citations are in Chapter 3 first six 
paragraphs. First, the Chinese firms do not face enough external governance mechanisms. Second, minority 
shareholders have little impact on the firm and cannot monitor cases of misconduct efficiently. Third, the weak legal 
system in China cannot regulate the tunnelling behaviours effectively. Fourth, the controlling shareholders’ trading 
behaviours are highly restricted, which pushes them towards dividend tunnelling. Fifth, China, as a developing 
market, has a weaker corporate governance environment compared to the developed markets. 
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a branch of accounting which requires a high degree of verification before making a 
legal claim to any profit as it requires recognition of all probable losses as they are 
discovered and most expenditures as they incurred (Watts, 2003). Furthermore, Watts 
(2003) documents that more accounting conservatism can recognize more “allowance 
for doubtful accounts”, which can provide shareholders with a more accurate picture of 
firm receivables under protection (Jackson and Liu, 2010). Accounting conservatism 
employed by shareholders allows a firm’s resources to cover potential uncollectible 
receivables. Ball (2001) argues that accounting conservatism can monitor firms’ 
investment decisions because asymmetric verifiability of accounting conservatism can 
help shareholders to constrain managers’ behaviour of investing negative NPV (net 
present value) projects. Aa a result, accounting conservatism can help to constrain 
managers’ intentions to overstate the firm’s performance with a large amount of credit 
sales which generate too many uncollectible receivables (Ball, 2001; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005; Givoly et al., 2007; Watts, 2003). Shuto and Takada (2010) also 
argue that accounting conservatism is a useful tool to address agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. As a result, shareholders do not perceive that accounting 
conservatism only has disadvantages for firm value maximization. Instead, accounting 
conservatism can help shareholders to monitor managers’ potential misconduct and 
value-destroying decisions. 
 
In Chapter 3, I discuss potential dividend tunnelling in China. There is no conflict 
between the results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 2. The increase in tunnelling behaviour by 
controlling shareholder does not conflict with the finding that the increase in executive 
ownership can increase the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism. There 
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are two types of agency costs. The first one is the agency cost between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders caused by tunnelling activities. The second one 
is the agency cost between managers and shareholders. Firstly, since most firms in 
China have high ownership concentration (Jiang et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2014), 
controlling shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders through tunnelling, and 
the agency cost between them increases. The dominant controlling shareholders may 
have a strong impact on manager’s behaviour and decision making (Chen et al., 2006). 
Secondly, accounting conservatism as a monitoring mechanism can reduce the agency 
cost between managers and shareholders (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
Givoly et al., 2007; Shuto and Takada, 2010; Watts, 2003). Therefore, when executive 
ownership exceeds a threshold level, the increase in executive ownership leads to the 
increase in shareholders’ demand for conservatism to protect shareholders’ wealth. I 
provide a more detailed explanation below. 
 
The management team is a puppet in the listed firms in China
24
 (Zhang et al., 2014). 
Due to the high ownership concentration of Chinese listed firms, controlling 
shareholders may have a strong impact on managers’ behaviour and decision making 
(Chen et al., 2006). If controlling shareholders want to use the dividend to tunnel the 
firm resources for themselves, it would be very difficult to stop them inside a firm in 
China since Lv et al. (2012) proved that the unbalanced ownership structure with 
                                                             
24 The managers are nearly puppets because the controlling shareholders have dominant control over the firms in 
China (Zhang et al., 2014). The control is reflected in the firms’ board composition and the executive incentives. 
Cullinan et al. (2012) indicate that the controlling shareholders can affect board composition by nominating board 
members. Those nominated and those who successfully remain on the firms’ board may be affiliated with the 
controlling shareholders. Cullinan et al. (2012) find that, in their sample, the affiliated directors occupy almost 40% 
of the board seats. Therefore, even though the board contains the supervisory directors, they do not conduct effective 
monitoring in the decision-making process (Firth et al., 2006). Furthermore, the controlling shareholders have a 
decisive role in determining executive incentive packages including the cash compensation and the stock incentives. 
Firth et al. (2006) and Conyon and He (2011) point out that the executives’ remuneration, appointments and 
dismissals are in the charge of controlling shareholder in Chinese market. 
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dominant controlling shareholders in Chinese-listed firms could change the role of 
dividend from shareholders’ benefit to a tunnelling method. In other words, controlling 
shareholders may put pressure on the managers to collude with them for conducting 
divided tunnelling. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between executive 
ownership and dividend tunnelling. 
 
Under entrenchment theory, when executive ownership is above a threshold, the 
increase in executive ownership leads to managers pursuing their own interests instead 
of the shareholders’ interests (Morck et al., 1988). It is because management 
entrenchment theory argues that executives with the ownership above the threshold are 
less likely to be effectively monitored by the board of directors and market discipline 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). As a 
consequence, the executives’ entrenchment behaviour increases agency costs between 
executives and shareholders and in turns reduces firm value. As a result, shareholders’ 
demand for accounting conservatism is higher to monitor executives’ behaviour, 
because accounting conservatism is considered as a monitoring mechanism to reduce 
agency cost between executives and shareholders (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005; Givoly et al., 2007; Shuto and Takada, 2010; Watts, 2003). Therefore, the increase 
in shareholders’ demand for conservatism can prevent firm resources from being abused 
by managers. 
 
Chen et al. (2009) provide an example of dividend tunnelling in China, the case of 
Ufida Software Company (code 600588), which is listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. In May 2001, Mr Wang Wenjing, Ufida's controlling shareholder, exchanged 
236 
 
the software company's net assets (net book value of RMB 83.84 million, of which Mr 
Wang was entitled to 73.6%, or RMB 61.70 million) for 75 million non-tradable shares 
during the IPO. Meanwhile, minority shareholders had to pay RMB 917 million in cash 
for the 25 million tradable shares. The price of the tradable shares was RMB 36.68 per 
share, which was much higher than the price of RMB 1.12 per share enjoyed by Mr 
Wang. In April 2002, the company announced a huge cash dividend payment of RMB 
60 million. This single dividend payment created an implied dividend yield of more 
than 50% for Mr Wang, but less than 2% for minority shareholders. Moreover, between 
the IPO and April 2007, the total accumulated dividend payments amounted to RMB 
477 million, of which Mr Wang was entitled to RMB 264 million, for an accumulated 
implied dividend yield of 428% (71% annually) for Mr Wang but only around 13% (2.2% 
annually) for those holding tradable shares. At the same time, the post-IPO company's 
ROE consistently fell below 10%, except 2006, which was far below its level before the 
IPO. Obviously, the high-dividend policy of Ufida was not due to the performance of 
the company itself, but to other factors such as tunnelling. 
 
In Chapter 4, I investigate the influence of the CEO over-confidence on the cash 
adjustment speed in the US market. I choose the US market for the study because of the 
availability of top managers’ over-confidence data. I want to carry out relevant research 
on the Chinese markets, but over-confidence data is not available for the Chinese listed 
companies. In particular, Chinese listed firms rarely use equity option compensations. 
However, research in the US (a developed market) can help me to learn that China 
(developing market) may have similar problems such as CEOs’ behavioural influence 
on firm policy. The US is the world’s leading developed country, while China is the 
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largest developing country in the world. The size of the economies in the two countries 
are comparable, and thus if I study the relationship between cash adjustment and CEO 
over-confidence in the US, the scale of my findings are comparable to what may also 
happen in China. I study the US-listed firms first and may leave the study for the 
Chinese market for the future. 
 
I present the summary and conclusions of my research results and implications for 
practice in the following section. In addition, I also discuss the possible limitations in 
my thesis and suggest possible future research directions. 
 
5.1 Findings and implications 
5.1.1 Chapter 2 Executive ownership and accounting conservatism 
In Chapter 2, the study examines the relationship between executive ownership and 
accounting conservatism in China. The sample period covers 11 years from 2005 to 
2015. I collect the data for the listed firms from the CSMAR database. In this chapter, I 
find that the relationship between the executive ownership and accounting conservatism 
is a U-shape curve in China, which is different from the previous studies undertaken in 
developed countries. The U-shape relationship between the executive ownership and 
accounting conservatism can be explained by the incentive alignment theory when the 
executive ownership is lower than the threshold (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008) and 
the entrenchment theory when the executive ownership is higher than the threshold 
(Shuto and Takada, 2010). When the executive ownership is low, the executive 
ownership is treated as the method to reduce the agency cost from the separation of the 
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executive management and their ownership explained by the incentive alignment theory. 
Accounting conservatism is a substitute for the increase of the executive ownership to 
reduce the agency cost. Therefore, when there is an increase in the executive ownership, 
there is a reduction in the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism. However, 
when the executive ownership is higher than the threshold, the management 
entrenchment theory argues that the executives with high levels of ownership are less 
likely to be effectively monitored by the board of directors and the market discipline 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Morck et al., 1988; Shuto and Takada, 2010). 
Therefore, the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism is needed to offset the 
agency cost against management entrenchment. 
 
I also obtain the target value of the executive ownership and generate the deviation of 
the executive ownership from the target value. The evidence shows that there is a 
positive relationship between the executive ownership deviation and the change of the 
executive ownership. Therefore, the results indicate that the executive ownership can 
reverse to the target level. I also examine the influence of the executive ownership 
deviation on accounting conservatism and find that the executive ownership deviation 
has a significantly positive relationship with accounting conservatism. My results show 
that the sensitivities of accounting conservatism and the executive ownership deviation 
are different when the executive ownership is above or below the target level. I find 
evidence that the Chinese firms’ weak corporate governance feature can make the 
entrenchment theory dominant when the executive ownership is beyond the target level. 
 
I examine the influence of the analyst coverage on the relationship between the 
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executive ownership deviation and accounting conservatism. The analyst coverage is 
recommended as a method to reduce the agency cost (Dyck et al., 2010; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Yu, 2008). My results indicate that the sensitivity between the 
executive ownership and the shareholders’ demand for accounting conservatism is 
reduced at a certain level of executive ownership deviation. Therefore, the analyst 
coverage is a method that can be employed to reduce the agency cost in my study. 
 
I make several contributions to the literature. Firstly, I find the U-shaped relationship 
between executive ownership and accounting conservatism in China. Secondly, I first 
examine the influence of the executive ownership deviation on accounting conservatism 
and find there is a positive relationship. Thirdly, in China, I find executive ownership 
can reverse to the target value. Fourthly, I am the first to find that the influence of 
analyst coverage on the relationship between executive ownership and accounting 
conservatism is negative. 
 
5.1.2 Chapter 3 Executive ownership and dividend tunnelling 
In Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between the dividend tunnelling and the 
executive ownership and also consider the internal and external factors which can affect 
the relationship. The data are obtained from the CSMAR database. The research sample 
is from 2005 to 2015. The sample contains all the listed firms in China but excludes 
financial firms. In order to prove that the dividend is not paid rationally according to the 
firms’ financial positions, I make further regressions on the abnormal dividend payouts. 
The results of these regressions can help me confirm that the dividend payout strategy is 
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a tunnelling method in China. My results show that the executive ownership 
concentration can lead to the increases of both the dividend payouts and the abnormal 
dividend payouts. The regression related to the abnormal dividend payout reveals that 
the executive ownership concentration can make the firms pay more than expected 
dividends to the controlling shareholders. The over-payment of the dividend can restrict 
the fund for future investment. Therefore, the minority shareholders in China do not 
regard the dividend payouts as protection. However, the minorities’ actions can worsen 
the existing shareholder imbalance because they sell their shares to the firms’ insiders or 
controlling shareholders who can benefit from the ownership concentration. 
 
When I consider the internal factors, my results also show that the executives are 
aligned with the controlling shareholders’ interests to issue more than expected 
dividends when the executive ownership increases, and also show that the dividend 
tunnelling has a negative relationship with the traditional tunnelling methods. The 
results further indicate that more firms are motivated to use the concealed tunnelling 
methods such as dividend tunnelling, since the CSRC has taken actions to stop 
inter-corporate loan tunnelling. Furthermore, I find that the state ownership 
concentration can help to increase the dividend tunnelling opportunity. 
 
The external monitoring via the analyst coverage is more effective to regulate the 
executives’ and the controlling shareholders’ behaviours. The results in this chapter 
show that the analyst coverage can reduce the sensitivity between the executive 
ownership and the dividend tunnelling. Therefore, I derive several implications from the 
results. Firstly, if the firms need to strengthen their internal corporate governance to 
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reduce the potential tunnelling behaviour, it is better to first reduce the state control and 
the concentrated ownership structure. Secondly, from the external view, the monitoring 
power of the analyst coverage needs to be improved. Since the internal corporate 
governance is not well designed, the external monitoring has even greater importance to 
regulate the firms. Therefore, the regulators need to encourage more third-party 
investigations and monitoring in the financial market. 
 
In this chapter, I make several contributions. Firstly, my research is the first attempt to 
fill the gap in the literature concerning the relationship between dividend tunnelling and 
executive ownership. I find that the cash dividend itself is a channel for tunnelling 
activities. Chen et al. (2009) show that some Chinese firms use high dividends to move 
proceeds of the IPO to the controlling shareholders. However, they focus on dividend 
tunnelling occurring in IPOs but do not consider continuous expropriation by the 
controlling shareholders’ use of dividend payouts. Lv et al. (2012) find evidence that the 
dividend payout is a tunnelling method in the Chinese market but do not investigate the 
relationship between dividend payout strategy and executive ownership. I am also the 
first to use abnormal dividend payouts to investigate the relationship between dividend 
tunnelling and executive ownership. The advantage of using abnormal dividend payout 
is that I can directly argue that dividend payouts extract more than expected dividends 
to the controlling shareholders in China. Secondly, I contribute to the literature by 
studying the influences of internal factors, like the ownership concentration, tunnelling 
of the other receivables and government ownership, on the sensitivity between dividend 
payouts and executive ownership. Thirdly, I contribute to the field by investigating the 
influence of analyst coverage on the sensitivity between dividend tunnelling and 
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executive ownership. This is consistent with the finding of Ding et al. (2013) that 
analyst coverage is an effective external monitoring mechanism to improve corporate 
governance. 
 
5.1.3 Chapter 4 CEO over-confidence and cash adjustment speed 
In Chapter 4, I examine the relationship between the CEO over-confidence and the cash 
adjustment speed. I download the data for this chapter from COMPUSTAT and 
EXECUCOMP to obtain the information of US-listed firms. The sample keeps the data 
from 1993 to 2014. I use two over-confidence measures to test the relationship between 
the CEO over-confidence and the cash adjustment speed. 
 
I design the research in three parts. Firstly, I test how the over-confident CEOs affect the 
firms’ cash levels. The regression results reveal that the CEOs are very sensitive to the 
cash level deduction because they are more likely to increase the firm cash level to 
remain in an adequate cash environment to avoid extraordinary monitoring from other 
forms of financing. The results support the idea of Deshmukh et al. (2013) that the 
over-confident managers save cash for their discretionary use. Heaton (2002) also points 
out that the over-confident CEOs do not have preferences for external funds and prefer 
cash for financing. 
 
Secondly, I introduce the cash adjustment speed and test whether the over-confident 
CEOs have consistent actions to reduce the cash reversal to the target level when the 
firms have excess cash or insufficient cash. However, under the pressure of retaining a 
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reasonable cash level, the over-confident CEOs cannot make over-reserves of the cash. 
Therefore, they reduce the adjustment speed of the cash to keep their discretionary 
power when there is excess cash in the firms. In other words, the over-confident CEOs 
can keep excessive cash by reducing the future cash dissipation. More importantly, I 
show that the cash is not stored for accumulation purposes but for future dissipation 
under the influence of CEO over-confidence. 
 
In the third part, my results show that the reserved cash is used in future investment 
rather than for dividend payouts or debt retirements. Therefore, my research shows that 
the over-confident CEOs are likely to reduce the cash dissipation to store more cash for 
their discretionary use in the investments when there is excess cash. 
 
In this chapter, I have three contributions. Firstly, I find that cash adjustment speed is 
negatively related to CEO over-confidence. Secondly, if there is excess cash, I find that 
over-confident CEOs are more likely to reduce firms’ cash adjustment speed. However, 
if there is insufficient cash, CEO over-confidence does not have a significant effect on 
firms’ cash adjustment speed. Thirdly, the cash reserved by over-confident CEOs is for 
future dissipation in the future investments projects rather than dividend payouts or debt 
retirements. 
 
5.2 Limitations and future studies 
I need to point out the limitations and the possible directions for modifications in the 
summary and conclusion. The first limitation of the research is the number of the 
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countries investigated. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I focus on the Chinese-listed firms. 
Although the Chinese market is important in the emerging economy, it cannot reveal the 
general pattern of all the other emerging markets. Therefore, future studies can consider 
the other major emerging market countries and draw comparisons between them. 
Secondly, the shortage of the CEO over-confidence data in China restricts my research 
to compare the influence of the CEO over-confidence on the cash adjustment between 
the US and China. In the future, I can undertake surveys and hand-collect the data from 
the Chinese firms in order to draw comparisons. Thirdly, my research does not consider 
the private sectors of both China and the US because of the lack of publicly available 
data. If further researchers need to capture the whole economic view of a certain country, 
it is necessary to consider the private sectors. The fourth limitation of the research is 
that I focus on the non-financial listed firms in both the US and China. The accounting 
rules are different in the financial listed firms and the non-financial listed firms. I opted 
for simplicity and excluded the financial listed firms. Therefore, future research can 
study the same topics in the financial listed firms. 
 
Apart from the above limitations, I find my research needs to focus on some 
macroeconomic event such as policy and regulation changes, and thus my studies may 
be limited to just firm level. Government policy and regulation modifications and their 
influences on the firms are important because they can change the business environment 
in a certain market and can affect all the firms. For example, when I study the 
relationship between cash adjustment speed and CEO over-confidence, my research can 
be more attractive if I include the concurrent event in the US which can affect cash 
adjustment speed, such as regulations of cross-border M&As, changes of tax laws and 
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trading laws. However, I am not familiar with laws and regulations in the US, and thus I 
cannot efficiently find an accessible resource to obtain relative data. In the future, I can 
consider this aspect and make further studies. I also notice that I need to consider both 
positive and negative effects of CEO over-confidence. To mitigate the negative effects 
of CEO over-confidence, I need to consider the external monitoring mechanism, 
independent board member’s duty and institutional investors’ participation in firm 
operations. I can take them into considerations in my future studies. 
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